December 16, 2014
Since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) has promised to resolve
Turkey’s Kurdish problem and in the last several
years it has initiated a ‘Resolution Process’ which
has been commended by many Kurds and non-Kurds
alike. It was a bold step that broke many taboos and
placed the Kurdish question firmly on Turkey’s
national agenda.
However, progress has been very slow which has in
turn led to criticism that the ‘Resolution Process’
is not honest. The AKP rejects these criticisms and
insists the process in genuine despite the lack of
tangible results.
This raises an interesting question about the extent
to which the AKP might be more interested in the
process of negotiations than in meaningful change.
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, for
the AKP to govern it needs Kurdish votes. To this
end the AKP has invoked pan-Islamic sentiment partly
in an effort to exploit Kurdish religious
sentiments. This is an effective tactic as these
sentiments are in themselves rooted in the Kurd’s
early rejection of Turkish nationalism.
The AKP also promised to resolve the Kurdish
problem when no other political party dared talk
about it. The results have been obvious; the AKP has
been getting over fifty percent of the Kurdish votes
and have governed Turkey continuously for over
twelve years. Meanwhile, the main opposition party,
the Republican People's Party (CHP), which has been
denying the Kurdish reality is teetering on
political irrelevance.
Secondly, by promising to resolve the Kurdish issue,
the AKP has been able to secure a long-term
ceasefire with the PKK. This has in turn improved
security and fostered Turkish economic development.
The AKP expects these positive developments to
eventually help fulfil its dream of turning the
nation into a regional economic power and to
leverage its financial muscle to revive its
Ottoman-era reputation.
However, the AKP’s ambition to become a leading
player in the Islamic world has so far yielded
little more than embarrassing failures. Ankara’s
mishandling of key foreign policy issues and its
clumsy attempts to meddle in the internal affairs of
its neighbours is feeding anti-Turkish sentiment
across the region. In fact, the ‘Resolution Process’
can also be seen as a device for the AKP to pre-empt
the possibility that some of Turkey’s neighbours
might retaliate against Ankara’s harbouring and
arming of regional opposition groups by providing
support to a resurgent PKK.
Indeed, there are credible reports that both
the Assad regime in Syria and its Iranian allies
promised heavy weapons to the PKK in return for
a revival of the armed insurgency. This is a
possibility that must surely have frightened
Ankara in stepping up efforts to ensure the
Kurds remain appeased.
If appeasing the PKK remains a key motive for
the ‘Resolution Process’, then the consequences
would seem obvious. The AKP would try to engage
the PKK in the peace process hoping all along
that the Syrian conflict will end with Assad’s
fall sooner rather than later. With Assad gone
the AKP could end the ‘Resolution Process’ by
blaming the PKK for not implementing its part of
the deal.
The fact that Assad remains in power, and is
looking stronger than he has for several years,
has meant a gradual unravelling of the AKP’s
grand strategy. The unexpected rise of ISIL out
of the ongoing chaos in Syria and Iraq, and its
apparently wide supporter base in Turkey, adds
another unexpected complication.
For its part the PKK is well aware of the AKP’s
scheming and has responded by pressuring Ankara
to accelerate the peace process. The PKK
leadership has also requested third party
mediation in an effort to provide independent
monitoring of possible duplicity or backsliding
by the Turkish government. The Erdogan
government’s refusal to accept third party
mediation confirms that we are right to suspect
its sincerity.
But there are additional reasons to be
suspicious about the honesty of the AKP’s
approach to the Kurdish peace process. Indeed,
Ankara has even gone so far as to avoid at all
costs even acknowledging that the ‘Resolution
Process’ is in fact a peace process with the
Kurds.
On another level we need to ask why the AKP
government is planning to build more than 200
police/gendarmerie stations in thewww.Ekurd.net
Kurdish southeast if not to boost its control
over the local population. If the government
really wants to find a solution to the Kurdish
problem and is genuine when it says it respects
Kurdish loyalty, why is there a need for a
substantial increase in Turkish security forces?
The answer is because the AKP has never accepted
Kurdish claims that the quest for autonomy
reflects a long history of injustice. Ankara has
never approached the ‘Resolution Process’ in the
belief that there exists a list of cultural and
political injustices perpetrated against the
Kurdish people that must be rectified before
peace can occur. Rather, the AKP looks at the
Kurdish issue through a single lens: terrorism.
The AKP’s approach resolution with the Kurds is
still based on the premise that the Kurdish
problem is essentially a terrorist problem that
must be ended, through force if necessary. In
this sense, any discussion by Ankara about
Kurdish cultural rights and autonomy is
essentially shaped by the quest to end PKK’s
terrorism. Or looked at slightly differently,
the AKP’s interlocutors are not the Kurdish
people per se, but PKK terrorists.
Resolving the Kurdish question with such a
mindset will unfortunately prove an impossible
task.
Unless the Turkish government can inject fresh
life into the peace process, win back those
Kurds angered by Ankara’s dithering in the face
of ISIL massacres of their Syrian brothers and
sisters, and announce some tangible outcomes in
the near future, then it is likely the Kurds
will not remember it as a ‘Resolution Process’,
but as a ‘Deception Process’. And this could set
back Kurdish-Turkish relations by a generation.
Dr Hussein Tahiri is a commentator on Middle
Eastern affairs, and his contributions in this
sphere are regularly published in Australian and
international media. He is currently an adjunct
Associate Professor at the Centre for Cultural
Diversity and Wellbeing at Victoria University,
Australia.
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