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August 2, 2012
While terrifying news of Syria hover over the globe
and eyes are transfixed on the gruesome news, Kurds
have liberated some towns in north east Syria in the
void left by the Syrian security forces, but their
political jubilance and euphoria remains largely as
unknown to the outside world as their plight and
cause. Kurds in Syria as a disenfranchised minority
have for long been committed to an enduring struggle
for defending their distinct cultural and linguistic
identity. It is not then surprising that they have
risen against pervasive institutionalized racism and
marginalization put in place since the French
mandate of 1924.
In the post-colonial context, Kurdish political
forces have intermittently continued to play an
active role in re-framing political developments in
Syria. The latest changes in Kurdish areas in Syria
reflect their firm will to put an end to their
depravation, despair, and despondency in a
pro-democracy and secular movement. The liberated
areas offer a new possibility for emancipation and
autonomy and yet they could also highlight the
political peril that awaits Kurds in Syria. While it
is plainly understandable for Kurds to use the
favorable circumstances to re-assert their
legitimate historical rights , the regional and
international response to proclaiming autonomy would
appear to be ambivalent at best and hostile at
worst.
Kurdish political organizations were a divided force
until July 11 when under the auspices of president
Barazani, they were urged to build an inclusive
front, composed of Kurdish Democratic Party and
Democratic Union of Kurdistan. The front is now in
control of some areas, but increasingly it will be
in danger of collision with Syrian security forces
on the one hand and Syrian Free Army on the other.
As ideological clashes and political loyalties widen
and Kurds reassert their sense of national identity,
they have to prepare for the worst. The Syrian Free
Army hypocritically in a symbolic gesture has
already threatened to join Turkey if it is called
upon to crush the Kurds. It is not clear what
machinations and designs the Syrian security forces
were pursuing in giving up some of their footholds
in Kurdish areas. Turkey caught in its own Kurdish
problem, is now questioning the legitimacy of the
Kurdish demand for autonomy in Syria, vehemently
threating that it will not tolerate a “Kurdish
entity” in the region. Moreover, the Kurdish
alliance itself is vaguely and loosely defined and
has its own internal entanglements. Paradoxically,
Kurdish communities in different areas of Kurdistan
proper and in diaspora have been curiously following
the developments; without being vocal in lending
their support to this nationalist uplift that will
gradually sweep Kurdish towns and areas in Syria.
I tend to think that the descendants of the
ill-fated Khoybun (autonomy movement) and other
Kurdish democratic movements in Syria are
confronting a complex political landscape as they
are now caught between the possibility of a utopian
freedom and the dilemmas and political peril of
proclaiming an autonomous Kurdistan in Syria. The
status quo can be compared and extrapolated with the
more distant history to understand the complexity of
the situation. Although Syrian Kurds have a long and
colorful history of resistance, their history has
been marginal to other Kurds and the world as noted
by James Boris ( 2011) in his probing review of
Tejel’s (2009) socio-political and historical
analysis of the Kurdish nationalism “Syria’s Kurds:
History, Politics, and society. Alas! History may be
repeating itself if Kurdish organizations and
intellectuals do not ask and answer some fundamental
questions before wallowing in the utopia of
autonomy. Some of the emerging questions are: how
can history inform the present? To what extent are
Kurds in Syria aware of such a history? How can such
a knowledge help Kurds shed light on their current
reality? What are our specific agendas for the
realization of the Kurdish distinctive cultural and
ethnic demands? Have political organizations
articulated these objectives? What are they? To what
extent, have they created the necessary structures
to meet the expectations of their people? How are
they sketching out national and ethnic boundaries?
How do they ensure and authenticate ethnic unity?
Kurdish national opposition forces are at such a
critical cross road to tackle these and more
challenging questions.
Interestingly enough Kurds find themselves in
strikingly a similar situation to the post-colonial
era in Syria, a situation which James Boris calls a
“quadrangular political game between the French
Mandate authorities, the national bloc (the Arab
nationalists), the notables of the ethno-religious
minorities and the Kurds at the margins.” This was
the situation from 1924 to1948. Such a political
game is now being played out again with slightly
different players, the Western World in supporting
Turkey is hypocritically continuing the French
Mandate policy that denied Kurds any territorial,
cultural and linguistic rights thus paving the way
for the merciless repression of the Kurds for over
90 years. The Arab nationalism is more entrenched
now constituting and constitutive of a major
chauvinistic Arab force in the Syrian National
Council - SNC. Their pan-Arabism is adamantly
insisting on naming the emerging Syria as an Arab
state; again cultural,www.ekurd.net
ethnic, and religious differences have become more
accentuated than before; moreover, there is now a
militant politically defined religious force, the
Salafi fundamentalists who are supported by Islamic
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Iraqi
government has sent some troops to the borders in
defense of the Syrian oppressive regime. The only
difference between the periods of 1924-1946 is that
Kurdish society is no longer predominantly tribal
and that Kurds, who were divided then, are now at
least temporarily united. This sense of control no
matter how temporary may heighten the Kurdish
collective demand for autonomy and create the ground
for greater participation of the Kurdish people in
the controlled areas.
Syria may be up for grab politically among
contending internal and external forces, but the
conditions are far from being ideal for the creation
of an autonomous Kurdistan. While the Kurdish united
front and its byproduct, the Kurdish Supreme
Committee composed of the representatives of
Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP) have just started to work on developing
civic, social, and security structures as a critical
precondition for the emerging autonomy to meet “the
historical aspiration of the Kurdish people” .there
is no way of knowing if these measure are adequate
for proclaiming autonomy even in the regions they
have under control. Many ideas are critical to the
objective orientation as internal and external
discourses define their purposes. The Supreme
Committee can embark on preparing the ground
regionally and internationally. It is important to
obtain the Kurdish and non-Kurdish, Christian and
other minorities’ consensus for any restructuring to
take place.
Recent celebrations in the streets of Kurdish areas
in Syria have undoubtedly shown the favorable
sentiments of the general public who should also be
made aware of the debacle that might ensue.
Internally political forces should continue to
insist on being constitutionally included in the
post Baath period. Internationally the Kurdish
historical grievances and territorial claims should
be taken up and established with respect to
injustices and discrimination they have suffered at
the hands of barbaric nationalism of the Baath
regime and the threats that the emerging government
may be posing if it does not guarantee Kurdish
constitutional rights. The popular support of the
movement will prevent the sullying of the truth and
moral imperative of the Kurdish demands. The Kurdish
legitimate grievances are to be established by a
more inclusive Kurdish United Front in Syria,
Kurdish Regional Government and non-governmental
agencies in international law and United Nations.
The Western world needs to be convinced that the
Kurdish secular movement, to which it is oblivious,
is far more progressive and liberal than the
emerging retrograde forces in the region. Western
democracies cannot be insensitive to Kurdish
universal rights and persuasive case. While Kurds in
Syria can learn from the experiences of their
compatriots in Iraq, it seems that proclaiming
autonomy would require more rigorous preparations,
critical orientation, and institutions to create
realistic opportunities to establish the historical
legitimacy of the Kurdish ethno-cultural rights and
demands for fundamental freedoms.
References:
Fishman, J. (1972). Language and Nationalism: Two
Integrative Essays. New Bury House
James, B. (2011). Syrian Studies Association
Newsletter, Vol 16, No 1 (2011)
Tejel, J. (2009). History, Politics, and Society.
Routledge. New York
Dr.Amir Sharifi
Lecturer
California State University, Long Beach
Dr Amir Sharifi is the President of the Kurdish
American Education Society
This article first appears on
kurdishmedia.com
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