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Turkey must work with Syria's Kurds 1.8.2012
By Ranj Alaaldin - The Guardian |
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Syrian Kurds hold their rifles, as they flash the
sign for victory, in the Kurdish town of Jinderes,
near the northern Syrian city of Aleppo. Photo: AFP
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While Turkey may be
threatened by Kurdish gains in Syria, there's little
it can do to prevent an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan
August 1, 2012
Turkey's support for the uprising against
Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, has been
challenged during the last week or so as Kurds in
the north-east of Syria have taken control of
several towns and cities.
The ploy, if it succeeds, will bring a further
extension of Kurdish autonomy in the Middle East,
complementing Iraq's booming Kurdistan region, where
5 million Kurds govern themselves as a federal
entity within Iraq and with minimal interference
from the central government in Baghdad.
The problem from Turkey's perspective is two-fold:
firstly, a Syrian Kurdistan alongside Iraqi
Kurdistan will encourage Turkey's own restive
Kurdish population to demand greater political and
human rights, as well as embolden their demands for
autonomy from the rest of Turkey.
Turkey's Kurds, numbering more than 13 million, are
a far more sizeable group than their fellow Kurds in
Iraq, Syria and Iran. As in Syria, Turkey's Kurds
have been targeted through oppressive measures that
have suppressed their cultural, political and human
rights.
The second problem for Turkey relates to the
Kurdistan Workers party (PKK), a guerilla movement
that has fought the Turkish state over the past 40
years. Initially the PKK sought autonomy for
Turkey's marginalised Kurds but later turned to
demanding greater political and human rights,
following the imprisonment of the organisation's
leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the movement's
eventual decline.
A Syrian Kurdistan, however, would offer a lifeline
to the PKK in the same way the uprising in Syria has
provided an opportunity for other political
movements to assert their presence. Further, the PKK
is closely linked in Syria to the Democratic Union
party (PYD) which controls most of the liberated
areas as part of a broader coalition of Kurdish
parties in Syria,www.ekurd.net
known as the People's Council for Western Kurdistan
(PCWK). The other main Kurdish opposition bloc of
parties is called the Kurdish National Council (KNC).
In other words, Turkey fears north-eastern Syria
becoming a bastion for its long-time enemy the PKK
(and its sister movement the PYD), fearing that this
will supplement existing PKK strongholds in the
rugged mountains of Iraq's Kurdistan region, which
it has sought to eliminate – but without success –
over the past 30 years through umpteen military
incursions.
The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
acknowledged these concerns last week, stating that
Turkey would "not allow a terrorist group to
establish camps in northern Syria and threaten
Turkey". However, there is little Turkey can do.
Politically, if and when Assad falls, Turkey may
continue to encourage the Arab-led opposition to
resist Kurdish political and territorial demands but
that hinges on the leverage that those forces will
have in Kurdish-held areas. So far, Kurdish
opposition fighters have prevented the Free Syrian
Army from entering Syrian Kurdish territory.
It will also depend on the extent to which Arabs can
be unified and whether a smooth transitional process
follows Assad's downfall. Both are unlikely. While
the rest of Syria will probably be embroiled in
post-conflict infighting and instability, the Syrian
Kurds – like the Iraqi Kurds after the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein – are more likely to be remedying
internal divisions, organising themselves and
stabilising their region to create a buffer between
a far more stable Syrian Kurdistan and the rest of a
tumultuous Syria.
Here, the Kurds would be aided by brethren in Iraqi
Kurdistan, where President Masoud Barzani has been
training Syrian Kurdish fighters, as well as
possibly by Iran and Iraq, which will be looking for
new partners in the post-Assad Syria.
Turkey may, therefore, look to its military to
restrict Kurdish autonomy and the PYD's influence.
However, that is easier said than done. Firstly,
pursuing PYD targets before the Assad regime falls
could provoke a response from Damascus and radically
transform the uprising into a direct military
confrontation between the two states. Secondly, the
PYD cannot single-handedly control the whole of
Syria's Kurdish region and must instead operate with
other groupings, some of which Turkey will deem more
acceptable.
Finally, Russia and Iran, who would also be looking
to protect their own strategic interests and
leverage in a new Syria, would fiercely reject any
Turkish military advancement. They would be telling
Turkey that it cannot on the one hand call for
regime change and yet, on the other hand, prevent a
pluralistic Syria from emerging. Iran would also be
reminding Turkey of its decision to turn a blind eye
to the sectarian Sunni Islamic fundamentalist
presence in Syria, which Iran views as a direct
threat.
As a consequence, Turkey's best hope is to work in
co-operation with Syria's Kurds, accepting that this
will be far more constructive and effective than
trying to prevent the unpreventable: the emergence
of an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan. Turkey's previous
experience with the Iraqi Kurds shows that this
approach works and that it is the only plausible
option in a region that looks set to finally gift
the Kurds with the opportunities that have eluded
them for decades.
Ranj Alaaldin is a Middle East political and
security risk analyst. He is a senior analyst at the
Next Century Foundation and is doing a doctorate on
the Shias of Iraq at the London School of Economics
and Political Science. He visits the Middle East
regularly and has conducted extensive fact-finding
missions throughout the region.
Copyright ©, respective
author or news agency,
guardian.co.uk
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