Hiwa Zandi is a lawyer, Kurdish
politics commentator and Kurdish history translator
and researcher. He obtained bachelor of
International Relations and Bachelor of Laws from
the University of Queensland Australia in 2007.
•
Read more by the Author
August 21, 2012
The political wave sweeping through the Middle East
has given the Kurds a golden opportunity to rise
from the ashes of historical misfortunes and reclaim
their political status in the community of nations.
The swiftness and sensitivity of the transpiring
political changes signifies the availability of zero
margin of error for the Kurds to reap any
significant political advantage.
From many centuries, whoever confronted the Kurds
said one thing about the Kurds’ secret for success,
‘unity’ makes the Kurds unsurmountable in the face
of any opponent. Kurds require yielding the resolve
of this wisdom more than ever.
The Iraqi Kurdistan has a special and important role
to play in relation to the Kurdish political
advances across the region. Kurds in all parts of
Kurdistan in Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq and the
rest of the world are eying the Iraqi Kurdistan play
a major role in emancipating the rest of Kurdistan.
This imposes a special responsibility on its
decision makers at this political juncture to stay
united and powerful for the advancement and
realisation of Greater Kurdistan.
There are, however, alarming political syndromes
appearing in Kurdish politics in the Iraqi
Kurdistan.
The first syndrome is the politics of City States
which was once dominating ancient Greece in the
first millennia BC (first syndrome). This is in the
context of Kurdish politics moving in a regionalist
direction. In other words, what is being witnessed
is polarisation of party allegiance and political
power based on a specific region or city as opposed
to the national inclusiveness which was once
dominating Kurdish politics.
The first syndrome is implicating the initiation of
the second syndrome which is the debilitating
politics of uniting with regional antagonists
against fellow
brethren (second syndrome). That is
one party siding with or taking assistance from an
antagonist regional power that would debilitate the
other party’s political status. This is a wicked
political game which was once played by the Kurdish
municipalities in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. What is now uncovering in the Kurdish
politics is that the political parties in the Iraqi
Kurdistan have shown signs of political disunity in
return for individual party interests.
If these viscous political syndromes are to thrive,
they may have detrimental consequences for the
Kurdish strategic national interests. They could
once again not only derail the Kurdish national
dream of an independent Kurdistan but also put the
status of Iraqi Kurdistan in danger.
A. The First Syndrome: City
State Politics
Kurdish politics in the Iraqi Kurdistan has not
progressed upon its national framework which was
building up in the ‘new revolution’. The new
revolution is generally identified with an era of
the Kurdish uprising against the Saddam regime
spanning from the fall of semi-autonomous Kurdistan
Region of Iraq in 1975 to the establishment of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1991.
a. The New Revolution Politics
After the end of semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of
Iraq in 1975, Iraqi Kurds reorganised themselves in
several existing and newly-formed political parties
to continue their struggle for autonomy in the Iraqi
Kurdistan. The four main political parties included
Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, Kurdistan Socialist Party, and Iraqi
Communist Party (Kurdish wing).
Although there were instances when one or more of
these parties involved in the second syndrome by one
party taking assistance from a regional antagonist
to fight against another or several other parties
they laid several positive marks on the Kurdish
political culture and social establishment. They
were primarily functioning under a national
political framework. Their national agendas were
embraced by diverse groups and classes of people
across the Iraqi Kurdistan. There was no apparent
regionalist incentive and local favouritism or
dominance.
These parties further played a successful role in
boosting the transformation of the Kurdish society
from one dominated by tribal leaders, lords (aghas),
religious clerics and sheiks to one dominated by
progressive political parties, a process primarily
commencing from the start of the twentieth century.
Thus the new revolution politics was a kind of
enlightening political renaissance. It did not only
sow the seeds of modern political ideas such as
democracy, socialism and constitutionalism into the
Kurdish society but also directed the people to
embrace national ideals and sentiments.
b. The Current Politics
The current politics in the Iraqi Kurdistan
identified as post uprising politics commencing with
the establishment of the KRG in 1991, has undergone
radical changes. It has not picked upon its
inclusive patriotic or nationalistic direction. It
is rather moving towards regionalism or a
polarisation process based upon specific regions and
cities. The major political parties’ current
constituencies and areas of influence as per the
2009 Kurdistan Parliament election is a good
indicator to understand this trend of Kurdish
politics.
The political parties dominating the Iraqi Kurdistan
politics are characterised by leftist, nationalist,
patriotic, traditionalist and Islamic inclination.
Theoretically, the majority of the parties intend to
follow various centre-left progressive ideologies.
Practically, while they adhere to some threads of
such ideologies, given the status of Kurdistan, they
are primarily driven by patriotic, nationalist and
conservative values.
The two ruling parties, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and Patriotic Union Party (PUK), both currently
possessing 59 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament out
of a total of 111 seats, are considered to be
centrist to centre left parties. The former,
maintains to have populist allegiance. The latter
proclaims allegiance to social democratic politics.
However, they are both dominated by Kurdish
nationalist and traditionalist influences.
The main opposition party Movement for Change (Gorran)
which has 25 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament
proclaims adherence to social justice, liberalist,
reformist and Kurdish nationalist values.
The other smaller parties that have secured seats in
the Kurdistan Parliament include three Islamic
parties, namely Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) (6
seats), Islamic Group in Kurdistan (IGK) (4 seats)
and Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK)(2 seats).
These parties consider themselves to be
predominately ‘Islamic reformists’ and adhering to
moderate Islamic ideology. There are however some
Kurdish nationalist, Salafi and isolated extremist
tendencies. In particular, IMK believes in Islamic
law and that to be the main source of law in the
Kurdistan constitution.
There are also other smaller and mainly left-wing
parties that have secured seats in the Parliament.
These include the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic
Party (KSDP) which has 2 seats and proclaims
adherence to social democracy. The Future Party
along with the Freedom and Social Justice List (a
group of parties) each possess a seat and have
left-wing ideological orientation. There are also
Turkmen, Chaldean Syriac Assyrian and Armenian
minorities that possess quota based seats (a total
of 11 seats) in the Kurdistan Parliament, however
their role in Kurdish politics is trivial due to the
lesser number of seats they possess.
The PUK and KDP both enjoyed strong support from
most areas of the Iraqi Kurdistan. However, as the
2009 Kurdistan Parliament election also indicates,
PUK is increasingly losing ground in the Slęmani
[Sulaimaniyah] and Hewlęr [Erbil] provinces. It is
now the dominant party in the Kerkuk province. KDP
on the other hand is becoming the dominant party in
Duhok and Hewlęr provinces with little or minimal
support from the Slęmani and Kerkuk provinces.
Change is a new party founded in 2009 ostensibly
in reaction to the two ruling parties’ nepotism,
corruption and anti-democratic practices. It
proclaims to uphold to social justice values and
introduce welfare policies in the Iraqi
Kurdistan. The party’s programs refer to many
civil society ideals based on human rights,
international laws and social democratic values.
This political movement on its face value is a
positive development in Kurdish politics in the
context of promoting progressive values and
culture of opposition scrutiny over the
government policies and
practices.
However, by closer examination of the party’s
make up and support base, one can apprehend its
regionalist inclination. The party’s power base
is only in the Slęmani province. The majority of
Change’s leadership including its top leader Mr
Nawshirwan Mustafa and Parliament members come
from the Slęmani province. The province’s
support was primarily garnered not just through
anti-corruption stance but also through
initiating regionalist sentiment. They stirred a
sense of subordination amongst the province’s
people for the province’s relative under
development. They convinced the people to blame
it directly to the ruling parties’ mal
practises.
It is noticeable that outside Slęmani, Change
has limited grass root support. Although during
the 2009 Parliament election, Change received
reasonable
votes from the
Hewlęr province by including few Hewlęrian
candidates on its list, the majority of the
voters voted not because they believed in the
party and its leadership but to protest against
the ruling parties’ nepotism and bureaucratic
malpractices.
Similarly, the three Islamic parties’ support
base is primarily in the districts of the
Slęmani province. They also enjoy a reasonable
support from the Hewlęr and Duhok provinces. The
KDSP that once enjoyed a regional wide support
in the new revolution era, its support base has
now reduced to the Sharezur area of the Slęmani
province.
c. Causes of Polarisation of
the Support Base
As the above examination indicates, there is no
party that has regional wide majority support in
the Iraqi Kurdistan. The parties’ political
power is becoming increasingly localised as
opposed to being nationalised. This is primarily
because the political parties are engaged in a
constituent polarisation game. The parties are
concentrating on local politics as opposed to
national politics.
A party having dominance in a city or a district
makes it difficult for any other party to
operate in its sphere of influence. In their
congresses, local favouritism is stirred up by
virtually hand picking the politburo and council
members as secret nomination lists are
distributed to the congress members to vote for.
The congress members are also selected on the
basis of factional allegiance rather than merit
and fair elections.
These developments in Kurdish politics are
closely associated with the maintenance of
Kurdish traditionalist power. The majority of
the dominant party leaders, including those in
the politburo, council and regional branches,
were involved in the new revolution in 1970s and
1980s. Some of these leaders are finding it
increasingly difficult to justify their rule and
power in the face of burgeoning social,www.ekurd.net
political and economic progresses in the
Kurdistan Region. The favourable national
sentiment of the revolutionary era is no longer
available that could assist in maintaining their
political status.
For these reasons, some leaders have resorted to
party factionalism more cordially and stirred
regionalist politics. This is so that local
favouritism can support maintaining their power
and status. At points, it has even led to
division and creation of separate political
parties.
This detrimental internal politics is heading to
the harm the status of the Iraqi Kurdistan. It
will have severe social, political and economic
repercussions.
B. The Second Syndrome:
Polarisation on the National Strategy
The internal political divisions and detrimental
political conduct will effectively harm Kurdish
national strategic interests. As one party
cannot achieve the absolute majority and power
in the Kurdistan Region, the uncovering Kurdish
political issues indicate that the parties are
becoming amenable to the regional powers’
political use.
This is repetition of the old destructive
tactics of siding with regional antagonists to
achieve one’s individual political and economic
interests. The Kurdish politics has experienced
this during the internal fighting of the Baban,
Ardelan and Soran municipalities in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and more
recently in the 1990s.
The recent political manoeuvres to dethrone
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is an
example signifying these harmful repercussions.
The Kurdish political parties were initially
showing a united front on this issue. The
Kurdistan Region’s President Massoud Barzani
publicly warned that Maliki is consolidating his
dictatorial power. He further stressed that it
is only a matter of time when Maliki will gain
the military capability that will enable him to
attack the Kurdistan Region in attempt to
dissolve the Kurdish political and economic
gains.
In reacting to imminent threat, Barzani
initiated his efforts to dethrone Maliki. A
political block was formed that included Jalal
Talabani, PUK General Secretary and current
Iraqi President, along with Iyad Allawi, the
leader of the Iraqi list, and Muqtada al-Sadar,
the religious leader of the Sadrist Movement.
However, after a number of meetings, Talabani
retracted from the political campaign aiming to
dethrone Maliki. Political analysts believe that
Talabani took this course of action because of
the pressure exerted by the Iranian government.
Change party also sided with the pro-Maliki
block after its leader was invited to Tehran in
an effort to divide the Kurdish block and
debilitate Barzani’s role in the dethroning
campaign.
Regional States also became part of the
political stalemate. Iran supported Maliki to
flex its sphere of influence in the region. On
the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and
Arab Emirates supported the efforts to unseat
Maliki in order to contain Shia Iran’s sphere of
power in the region.
As uncovered, these political manoeuvres were
not successful to unseat Maliki. Maliki being
encouraged by failure of the unseating campaign
and the developing political division amongst
the Kurdish parties became more assertive
against the Kurdistan Region. The recent Syrian
border military stand-off between the Iraqi army
and the Peshmarga forces and closing down the
KRG’s representation in Baghdad are political
moves taken in this direction. Maliki will
further exploit the political division amongst
the Kurdish parties if it is to deepen further.
C. Endangering Kurdish
Strategic National Interests
Whether or not persistence on dethroning Maliki
was a strategic move from the part of President
Barzani, the division of Kurdish political
parties on national
strategic issues
is a severe blow to the Kurdish national
interests. Kurdish parties achieved the current
political gains after the fall of Saddam in 2003
through strong political unity. They would not
have been able to secure the current
constitutional rights if they were fragmented
along political and regionalist lines.
There are yet big challenges ahead to confront
in warranting Kurdish national rights. The Iraqi
central government poses a great danger to the
political status of the Kurdistan Region. It has
not shied to expose its military, economic and
political ill intentions against the Kurdistan
Region. It is doing anything possible to stop
the economic and political developments of the
Kurdistan Region.
In addition, there are other significant
political developments in the region that will
directly affect the political status of the
Kurds in the region. These include but not
limited to the emerging Kurdish self-rule in the
Syrian Kurdistan, PKK and Turkish government’s
longstanding conflict and the Iranian conflict
with the West over its nuclear programmes.
Considering all these major challenges, it is
fundamental that unity over strategic national
interests overcomes any short-term individual or
party interests. The political parties must
function with the same spirit of unity that
assisted them with securing some of their
national rights under the Iraqi Constitution. It
is paramount to make division on national
strategic interests a red line in Kurdish
politics.
At the same time, the Kurdish political parties
are required to engage in internal politics
within a national framework as opposed to a
regionalist impetus. They require teaching and
spreading national ideals and values across
their constituencies so that Kurdish people
achieve social and political unity. Any effort
to divide Kurdish constituencies based on
regional or City State politics to achieve short
term individual or party interests will lay
detrimental impacts on Kurdish strategic
interests.
Kurdish people cannot afford any further
repetition of siding with regional antagonists
and moving the Kurdish society towards a
regionalist political composition to attain
short-term individual or party interests.
Kurdish history is a lesson. Achieving Kurdish
national rights lies in a unified political
stance.
Hiwa Zandi is a lawyer, Kurdish politics
commentator and Kurdish history translator and
researcher. He obtained bachelor of International
Relations and Bachelor of Laws from the University
of Queensland Australia in 2007. He was admitted as
a lawyer in the Supreme Court of Queensland on 1
February 2010 and currently studying Master of Laws
at the same University. He has worked extensively on
the historical and racial relations between the
Kurds and Baloches. He has translated and published
two books in addition to his own research on the
origins of Baloches from the Median Kurds. He can be
reached at hiwa_zandi@hotmail.com or his Facebook
page.
Hiwa Zandi, A
regular contributing
writer and
columnist for Ekurd.net
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