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Does Kurdish Crude Mean Kurdish Statehood?
8.8.2012
By Dr. Denise Natali
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Al Monitor |
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A Syrian Kurd walks past giant Kurdish (L) and
Syrian opposition flags ahead of a sit-in in front
of the United Nations headquarters in Beirut, in
solidarity with anti-government protesters in Syria,
April 29, 2012 Photo: Reuters. •
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Dr.
Denise Natali is the Minerva Fellow at the Institute
for National Strategic Studies INSS, National Defense
University and the author of The Kurdish
Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post Gulf
War Iraq.
Read more by the Author
August
8, 2012
Recent developments in Iraq and the region have
renewed speculation about Kurdish statehood. Some
argue that the increasing presence of major oil
companies in the Kurdish north provides the economic
leverage needed for independence. Others see the
political vacuum in Syria as an impetus for a Syrian
Kurdish state or autonomous region, one that could
potentially merge into a greater Kurdistan with
access to the sea.
Yet, while stirring nationalist rhetoric and
investor confidence, these claims ignore regional
geopolitics, security issues and political trends
that make statehood highly unlikely. Rising Iraqi
nationalism, conflicting aims in Syria and a
strengthening PKK problem have intensified divisions
not only between Baghdad and Erbil, but also between
Kurdish groups inside and across the Kurdistan
Region. The real concern is not a potential Iraqi
Kurdish state, but the extent to which Iraq Kurdish
autonomy can be sustained and the compromises needed
to advance energy-sector development.
The entrance of oil majors in the Kurdish north is a
feat for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),
but not a surprising one. It reflects an expected
trend of mergers and acquisitions that has required
smaller and medium-sized companies to sell their
fields or seek larger partners to help defray costs,
particularly since most have not yet been paid for
their operations. These financial demands, as well
as potential profits from generous Kurdish
production-sharing contracts (PSCs) and the current
disincentives for working in Baghdad’s oil sector,
have turned many larger international oil companies
(IOCs) to the Kurdistan Region.
Still, there is no positive causal relationship
between IOC presence and Kurdish statehood. Just as
modernization theory neglected the path dependencies
embedded in each country’s character and traditions,
the idea that market logic (and investor hopes) can
override the deep-rooted politics that drive Iraq’s
energy sector is another form of misguided economic
determinism. Nor do IOCs have the same role in
developing countries’ economies and asserting
political leverage as they did in the 1980s. In the
Middle East in particular, resource nationalism and
commitment to state sovereignty have given national
oil companies a greater role in energy-sector
management, assuring that oil-generated revenues are
controlled by the state and not by foreign or
private companies.
Regional states will likely determine whether the
landlocked Kurdistan Region attains statehood, not
IOCs. Turkey’s interests are essential. Alongside
positive commercial and political relations between
Ankara and Erbil is an ongoing PKK problem,
invigorated by the Syrian crisis that has reinforced
Turkey’s concerns about border security and the
emergence of three geographically contiguous Kurdish
autonomous regions. Other regional states with
Kurdish populations of their own, including Iran and
a post-Asad Syria, also would oppose any form of
expansive Kurdish autonomy, let alone an independent
Kurdistan.
Recent trends in Iraq pose additional problems. One
of the unintended consequences of the KRG’s zealous
energy-sector development and maximalist territorial
ambitions has been a strengthening of Iraqi
nationalism. Instead of forming a regional Sunni
Muslim alliance — as Ankara may have hoped — Iraqi
Sunni Arab groups have reacted against Kurdish
overreach by turning toward Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri Maliki in an anti-Kurdish bloc. The recent
reconciliation between Maliki and key Sunni Arab
leaders such as Salih al-Mutlak and Qutayba al-Jaburi,
as well as Sunni Arab tribes in Kirkuk and Mosul,
reflects this reactionary trend and the constraints
it poses to increased Kurdish autonomy.
Growing political polarizations within the Kurdistan
Region further complicate the issue. The
centralization of Barzani-Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) power, fueled by its control of most oil
contracts and revenues at the Iraqi-Turkish border (Habur),www.ekurd.net
have led to a reshuffling of alliances that
challenge Kurdish unity. In a pattern similar to
that of Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1990s, the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Iraqi President
Jelal Talabani and its breakaway Change movement are
attempting to counteract the profits and power of
the Barzani-Ankara alliance by reinforcing their
ties with Iran. Both oppose Barzani’s inflammatory
approach toward Baghdad, the attempted vote of
no-confidence against Maliki and KDP interventions
in Syrian Kurdistan, having been instructed by Iran
to “stay out of the affair.” Internal Kurdish party
tensions also are playing out in the Iraqi
parliament on oil issues, causing further
bottlenecks in negotiating a payment plan for Erbil.
Instead of a forward-moving process leading to an
independent Kurdish state, what is more likely is
ongoing political limbo. Different Iraqi and
regional party leaders will take advantage of the
uncertain legal and political environment to secure
maximum leverage and oil-generated profits before
attempting to negotiate a side deal among
themselves. Even then, in light of re-emergent Iraqi
nationalism, growing regional fears of cross-border
Kurdish nationalism and the potential profits for
the KRG, this deal will likely check Iraqi Kurdish
autonomy and not expand it. It also will require
more compromises from the KRG on its approach toward
Syrian Kurds and greater vigor against the PKK,
which could create new forms of instability by
disenchanted Kurdish populations in a post-Asad
state and the region.
Dr.
Denise Natali is the Minerva Fellow at the
Institute for National Strategic Studies INSS,
National Defense University and the author of
The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and
Dependency in Post Gulf War Iraq. The views
expressed are her own and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the National Defense
University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
government.
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