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Turkish PM hopes Kurds will be part of
strategy to deal with Syria’s Assad regime
6.6.2012
By Gonul Tol - The Global Post |
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Turkey cozies up to Iraq's
Kurdistan regional government KRG
June 6, 2012
WASHINGTON,
— Turkey’s popular and outspoken prime minister,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was treated to a hero’s
welcome recently when he met with Syrian refugees
for the first time since Turkey opened its doors to
the thousands of people fleeing Bashar Al-Assad’s
crackdown.
Erdogan’s pledge to defend the rights of the Syrian
people and his call for Assad’s removal, however,
fell short of expectations.
Although Erdogan’s speech drew some applause, it was
also interrupted by shouts of “We want arms for the
Free Syrian Army and a buffer zone inside Syria!”
The Turkish PM’s reiteration of his previous
positions seemed to dismay the refugees and some in
the international community who hoped he would call
for the establishment of a buffer zone or offer
other more forceful support.
Thus, Turkey’s strategy of seeking regional and
international initiatives to increase the pressure
on Assad remains intact, but with a twist: Turkey
has begun to strengthen bilateral relations with the
Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a way
of making inroads into Syrian Kurdish politics in a
post-Assad Syria.
Without a doubt, the stakes are high for Turkey in
Syria. The longer the conflict drags on, the
costlier it becomes for Ankara. Anxious about the
possible spillover effects of Kurdish unrest in a
post-Assad era, while at the same time confronting a
rise in terrorism from the Kurdish group, PKK, and
distrustful Shi’a-led regimes in Baghdad, Tehran and
Damascus, Turkey finds itself between a rock and a
hard place. The Kurds in Syria could hold the key in
the uprising: should they change sides and start
supporting the opposition, they could actually tip
the balance. But Syrian Kurds remain wary about
Ankara’s close ties to the Syrian opposition,
affording Turkey little leverage with them.
The Turks hope to gain some influence by cultivating
ties with the Iraqi Kurds, who enjoy a close
relationship with their Syrian brethren.
In contrast to the increasing tensions between
Ankara and Baghdad following the US withdrawal last
December, Turkey’s relations with the KRG are
flourishing. Masoud Barzani, the head of the
Kurdistan Regional Government, was given a red
carpet welcome last month in Turkey when he met with
President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, and
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Barzani
reciprocated the warmth by highlighting Turkey’s and
the KRG’s common position on Syria and signaling to
the PKK that if it “goes ahead with weapons, it will
bear the consequences.”
While the warming of relations between Turkey and
the KRG dates back to 2008, the current push for a
strategic alliance signals a new era in bilateral
relations where cooperation is not only desirable
but also necessary, given the unfolding events in
the region.
From the Turkish perspective, closer ties to the KRG
serve Turkey’s strategic interests in Syria. Turkey
would like to use the clout of Barzani with the
Syrian Kurds to sideline the Democratic Union Party
(PYD), the PKK offshoot in Syria, and to gain some
influence with the Syrian Kurds in a post-Assad
scenario. The Syrian Kurds, however, are skeptical.
On several occasions, high-ranking PYD officials
have criticized Turkey’s involvement with the Syrian
opposition, accusing Turkey of trying to turn Syria
into a “satellite state” and preventing Kurds from
having any role in the country. Although the Kurds
in Syria are fragmented, the PYD’s stance vis-à-vis
Turkey represents the majority attitude.
A key question remains: Will Barzani be willing to
side with Turkey against the PKK both in northern
Iraq and Syria, in addition to serving as Turkey’s
entry into post-Assad Kurdish politics? Perhaps, for
two main reasons.
First, following the departure of the Americans, the
Iraqi Kurds need Turkey as an ally to help stave off
the dominance of Baghdad. Since the last US troops
left, relations between Erbil and Baghdad have
sharply deteriorated over the issues of the status
of oil-rich Kirkuk, the deployment of Kurdish
Peshmerga forces, the hydrocarbon law, and
power-sharing.
On several occasions, Barzani has openly accused
Iraq Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki of being a
dictator, and has complained about the perceived
lack of good will by Iraqi political actors to
resolve their festering disputes. During his visit
to Washington,www.ekurd.net
DC in April, Barzani sought US security guarantees
for the Kurdish region but the Obama administration
reportedly demurred. The Iraqi Kurdish leader sees
no resolution of his thorny disputes with Baghdad on
the horizon, and therefore appreciates Turkey’s
helping hand. Turkey might serve both as a conduit
for the KRG’s oil exports to the West and as a
political ally in the fights with the Iraqi central
government.
Secondly, the PKK has increasingly become
problematic for the KRG. The PKK mounting attacks
against Turkey and Iran from northern Iraq invites
those countries’ retaliation in KRG areas via
cross-border operations and the shelling of PKK
strongholds, actions the KRG considers a violation
of its sovereignty.
At a time when Barzani is speaking more frequently
about declaring an independent Kurdish state, he has
to demonstrate that he has full control over what is
happening within his borders.
The PKK presence also hurts the KRG’s economic
interests. Turkish and Iranian air strikes
destabilize the relatively peaceful northern region,
frightening away badly needed foreign investors. The
situation in Syria only adds to the tension between
the KRG and the PKK as the two vie for influence
over their neighboring kinsmen. There have been
heated exchanges between the PKK/PYD and Barzani
over the latter’s stance toward the Syrian uprising.
Indeed, in an attempt to sideline the PKK, Barzani
did not invite its affiliate in Syria, the
Democratic Union Party (PYD), to the meeting of
Kurds from 32 countries he hosted in Erbil in
January.
Faced with the challenges and uncertainties that the
Arab Spring has implanted on its southern border,
Turkey is struggling to recalibrate its regional
policy, forming new alliances and ending others.
Closer ties to the KRG forms one of the pillars of
this new regional policy. And due to internal
factors as much as external, the KRG appears to be
welcoming this rapprochement with its powerful
patron.
Gonul Tol is the director of the Middle East
Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies in
Washington.
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