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Syria's Kurdish Quagmire
3.5.2012
By Denise Natali
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Al-Monitor |
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Denise Natali is the Minerva Fellow at the Institute
for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University and the author of The Kurdish
Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post Gulf
War Iraq.
Read more by the Author
People stand in front of a Kurdish flag during a
protest against Syria's President Bashar al-Assad,
and celebrating Newroz held by Kurdish community in
Qamishli, Syrian Kurdistan. March 21, 2012. Photo:
Reuters
May 3, 2012
Although the Syrian crisis continues, Kurdish groups
have not become the decisive minority to help
overthrow the Assad regime. Most demand Kurdish
rights in the Syrian state; however, their
nationalist goals have become part of regional proxy
wars, sectarian tensions, and competing cross-border
nationalism. The Syrian Kurdish opposition now
involves relations with Ankara and other Kurdish
groups as much as Damascus. While the Partiye
Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) has entered the conflict
alongside Assad and against Turkey, Iraqi Kurds have
intervened on behalf of Ankara and their own
nationalist interests. These cross-cutting links
will not only stifle a unified Syrian Kurdish
movement, but they will likely create new
opportunities for group conflict and border
instability.
The Syrian Kurdish opposition is ineffective because
it is targeting multiple fronts — the Assad regime,
the Syrian opposition, Turkey, and fellow Kurds —
that reinforce its disunity. Anti-regime sentiment
is rooted in the discriminatory policies of Syrian
Arab Baathism that excluded Kurds on an ethnic basis
while assimilating them as Syrians, tribal chiefs
and public officials. A shared sense of Kurdish
ethno-nationalism certainly emerged; however; it
fragmented between different socio-economic groups.
This is why many Kurds have created the Kurdish
National Council (KNC) and will not support the
Sunni-Arab based Free Syrian Army, while others who
have assimilated into the Syrian state have
refrained from opposition politics altogether.
Nor do most Syrian Kurds support The
Muslim-Brotherhood influenced Syrian National
Council (SNC), the main opposition group based in
Istanbul. Turkey’s inability to resolve its own
Kurdish problem under the AK party has left Syrian
Kurds worried of a similar fate under SNC rule.
These anti-Turkish sentiments also reflect the
significant PKK representation among Syrian Kurds —
approximately one-third of rank-and-file members —
and the group’s renewed alliance of convenience with
Assad. The PKK’s increasingly active role in Syria
has not only hardened Turkey’s security concerns,
but has reinforced intra-Kurdish tensions. The PKK
and its local Syrian branch, the Democratic Union
Party (PYD), continue to recriminate against fellow
Kurds opposing Assad.
Further complicating the situation are Iraqi Kurds,
who have deep-rooted institutional and tribal
patronage networks in Damascus and the al-Jazira
region. The two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have operated in Syria for
over three decades, alongside their local branches,
with the tacit agreement of Assad and his security
apparatus. Even after Iraqi Kurdish president Masoud
Barzani started to support regime change, Iraqi
Kurdish influence in Syria continued. Barzani has
reached out to KDP-tribal loyalists, independents
and youth groups in his attempt to secure leadership
among Syrian Kurds and counter PKK support.
The problem, however, is that despite a commitment
to Kurdish rights, Iraqi Kurds can only offer
limited support to their Syrian Kurdish brethren.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) needs to
assure the viability of its own autonomous region,
which is highly dependent upon Turkey as a leading
commercial partner and political ally. Securing this
alliance requires repelling the PKK and moderating
Syrian Kurdish demands. The PKK threat has become
especially important for Ankara as the radical group
has extended its influence across four
geographically contiguous states in Turkey, Iraq,
Iran and now Syria.
In fact, Barzani has become the unofficial envoy for
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in managing
Kurdish nationalism in Syria and across borders.
During a recent meeting in Istanbul, Barzani assured
Erdogan that he would expel the PKK from his region
if it continued to engage in warfare. The Iraqi
Kurdish leader also downplayed his support for
Syrian Kurds by publicly offering his “general
support to the people of Syria and the rights of
Kurds to become Syrian citizens.” He did not,
however, mention Kurdish autonomy in a post-Assad
state.
In exchange, Ankara has reaffirmed its backing of
the KRG. The strengthening of ties between Turkey
and Erbil comes at a time of increased tensions
between Erdogan and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki,
as well as between Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad. The KRG
will continue to take advantage of this alliance to
gain leverage in Iraq and the region, particularly
as it seeks to develop its emergent energy sector
apart from the Iraqi central government.
Still, realities on the ground will ultimately check
the KRG’s ability to fulfill its promises to Ankara.
Like their Syrian Kurdish brethren, Iraqi Kurds are
equally concerned about the prospects of an Islamic,
Brotherhood-influenced regime or a Sunni-Arab
government assuming power in Syria. Iraqi Kurds and
Barzani’s Dohuk region in particular, compete with
the Kurdish Islamic Union and do not welcome the
prospects of The Muslim Brotherhood's influence on
its own secular nationalist project.
Moreover, as the gap between what Iraqi Kurds have
attained, and what Syrian and Turkish Kurds have
not, becomes increasingly evident, it will be even
more difficult for Iraqi Kurdish leaders to contain
Kurdish nationalism across borders. Kurdish
political expectations will also strengthen as
democratization movements in the region continue and
the issue of minority group rights remains on
reformist agendas. This dilemma is compounded by
demographic trends. As Iraqi Kurdistan has become a
safe haven for Kurdish groups from Turkey, Iran and
Syria,www.ekurd.net
the KRG will be challenged if it clamps down on
other nationalisms while it expands its own,
particularly since the PKK has popular support among
local populations.
Given these constraints, Syrian Kurds are unlikely
to gain the external support needed to propel their
nationalist demands or fundamentally alter the
balance of power in Syria. What is more likely is a
continuation of the status quo, with different
Kurdish groups trying to take advantage of the
political vacuum and shifting alliance structures.
The most unsettling possibility, however, is the
PKK-ization of the Syrian Kurdish opposition,
particularly if moderate groups remain checked by
the SNC and fail to receive the backing they need to
advance their group claims.
Denise Natali holds the Minerva Fellow at the
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS),
National Defense University and author of The
Kurdish-Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in
Post-Gulf War Iraq. The views expressed are her own
and do not reflect the official policy or position
of the National Defense University, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Summary: About This Article:
Even as the Syrian crisis deepens, Kurdish groups
have not become the decisive minority to help
overthrow the Assad regime. Most demand Kurdish
rights in the Syrian state, but superseding those
desires are nationalist goals that have become part
of regional proxy wars, sectarian tensions, and
competing cross-border nationalism. Denise Natali
analyzes this crucial time for Kurds in the region.
Author: Denise Natali. Published on: Tuesday, May 1,
2012
Denise Natali is the Minerva Fellow at the
Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University and the author of
The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and
Dependency in Post Gulf War Iraq.
Submitted to Ekurd.net by Denise Natali.
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