|
Multi-National Intervention as a Solution
for the Kirkuk Impasse
8.7.2011
By Saeed Kakeyi - ekurd.net |
|
|
|
July
8, 2011
Introduction
Kirkuk—an oil-rich with vast agricultural lands—is
one of the principal impasses to a peaceful solution
to the Kurdish question in Iraq.
Geographically, the Kirkuk Region straddles the
strategic trade routes between Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Turkey. However, it was the discovery of vast
quantities of oil that led Great Britain, in 1926,
to append Kirkuk and the former Ottoman Wilayet of
Mosul (of which the Kirkuk region was a part) to the
newly created state of Iraq. This new state, created
in 1921, was under the Mandate of Great Britain.
Ever since, and particularly after 1963, there have
been continuous attempts by the central governments
of Iraq to Arabize Kirkuk.
A geo-historical synopsis
of the Kirkuk Governorate
The diamond-shaped Kirkuk region lies between the
Zagros Mountains in |
Saeed Kakeyi |
the north-east, the Lower Zab and
the Tigris Rivers in the north-west and west, the
Hamrin mountain range in the south-west, and the
Diyala (Sirwan) river in the south-east. This is the
region and city known as Ara'pha to the ancient
cultures and as Karkha d’beth Silokh to the
classical world (Talabany: 2000, 7). To Sassanians,
this was their governorate of Garmakân (Talabany:
2000, 7). By the medieval authors, the region was
known as Garmiyân. This historic name still survives
for the region in the common folk language, while
the classical Seleucid name of Kirkuk is reserved
for the city alone.
Major trade routes pass through or touch on the
borders of the Kirkuk Region. To safeguard these
commercial and strategic crossings, Ottoman military
forts were established in the nearby cities of Kifri,
Tuz-Khurmatu, Daquq, Perdé as well as within Kirkuk
city itself. The city of Kirkuk has served the area
as its major hub since the beginning of the 17th
century (Talabany: 2000, 8).
Speaking of the city’s ethnic composition at the end
of the 19th century, the Ottoman encyclopedic,
Shamsadin Sami, states in his celebrated Qamusl al
A’ala'm that “Three quarters of the inhabitants are
Kurds and the rest are Turkmen, Arabs, and others.
After visiting the city of Kirkuk, he estimated the
population to be between 12 and 15 thousand, all
Kurds except for 40 Armenian families (Talabany:
2000, 8).
During the years of conflict between the Shi’ite
Safawid Empire and the Sunni Ottoman Empire, the
Kirkuk region, and Kurdistan in general, became a
constant battleground (Amin Zaki: 1961, 164).
Kirkuk’s strategic location led to its changing
hands many times and suffering a great deal of
damage (Amin Zaki: 1961, 166).
C.J. Edmonds describes the administration of the
Kirkuk region during the last phase of the Ottoman
rule thus: “In the 18th century Kirkuk was the chief
town of the Wilayet of Sharazur which included the
modern [Iraqi] liwas of Kirkuk, Arbil and,
nominally, of Suleimani under a mutassallim. With
the reforms of Midhat Pasha, Wali of Baghdad from
1869 to 1872, the name of Sharazur was given to the
sanjak of Kirkuk, corresponding to the present-day
liwas of Kirkuk and Arbil, whereas the historic
Sharazur remained outside, in the new sanjak of
Suleimani. The Wilayet of Mosul was formed in 1879,
and Kirkuk remained an important garrison town”
(Edmonds: 1957, 6).
Under the renewed, direct, Ottoman rule the Wilayet
of Mosul was divided into three governorates of
Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleimani. Following the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, three districts (qada’)
situated to the north of the Lower Zab River were
detached from Kirkuk to form the governorate of
Arbil. Under the Iraqi administration, in 1925,
Kirkuk became a governorate comprised of the four
districts of Kirkuk Central, Kifri, Chamchamal and
Tuz-Khurmatu (Talabany: 2000, 9).
The Turkman population in
the Kirkuk Governorate
To better control the area, the Ottomans encouraged
their more loyal subjects and military personnel to
settle in the cities and towns—of Tel Afar and Mosul
in the north, Arbil, Kirkuk and Kifri in central
north and Khanaqin and Mandali on the present
Iraq-Iran borders—which dotted the trade routes in
the Mosul Wilayet (Talabany: 2000, 11).
The Iraqi historian Abdul-Razzaq Al-Hassani asserts
that the Turkmen of this inclined region are “a part
of the forces of Sultan Murat IV who recaptured Iraq
from the Safawid Persians in 1638 and remained in
these parts to protect this route between the
southern and northern Ottoman Wilayets” (Talabany:
2000, 11).
Many Turkman military personnel who settled
permanently in the above mentioned cities
subsequently engaged in commerce and other
professions. The earliest traces of Iraqi Turkmen
are, perhaps, to be found in the Turkman soldiers
who served in the region under the flags of the
Abbasid caliphs and, eventually, the Ottomans (Khasbak:
1973, 211). The Turkmen themselves maintain that
they migrated to Iraq during the Umayyad and Abbasid
caliphates to lend their military talent to those
dynasties.
Estimates of the number of Turkmen made public
during the 1920s and 30s put them at 2.1% to 2.4% of
the total population of Iraq (Ismail: 1993, 22). In
the official Iraqi census of 1957 which is, until
now, considered to be the only valid census, this
approximate proportion was basically reconfirmed and
the results revealed that Turkmen made up 2.16% of
the total population (Talabany: 2000, 14) However,
this percentage decreased in later censuses partly
because the Iraqi regime deliberately muddled the
ethnicity of the Turkmen and classed many of them as
Arab. By the time of the 1977 census, the Turkman
share of the Iraqi population was recorded as a mere
1.15 % of the total state population (Talabany:
2000, 14). The fall in percentages was recorded for
Kirkuk as for the other governorates where Turkmen
resided.
Relations between Kurds,
Arabs and Turkmans
As a way of promoting Turkman dominance in the last
years of Ottoman rule, the right to extract
petroleum in a primitive way from the Baba-Gurgur
oil fields near the city and to sell it for local
consumption was granted to the Turkman family of
Nafitchizada (Talabany: 2000, 17). Despite this, the
Ottomans did not expel the Kurds from the city,www.ekurd.netnor
did they deny the ethnic make-up of the city as
being one in which a Kurdish majority co-existed
with Turkmen and other ethnic groups. Monarchical
Iraq followed the same general policy, but they
awarded sensitive positions, such as that of
Provincial Governor or General in Command of Iraq’s
Second Army Division stationed in Kirkuk, mostly to
Arabs. This in turn encouraged many Arab families to
migrate to Kirkuk region to be employed with the
Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) early in the twentieth
century (Talabany: 2000, 23).
Meanwhile, throughout the monarchical period,
two-thirds of the members representing the Kirkuk
governorate in the Iraqi Parliament were Kurds and
the other one-third was Turkmen and only sometimes,
during forty years of monarchical rule, was there
one or two Arab representatives. This representation
in the Iraqi Parliament reflected, to a great
extent, the ethnic composition of the governorate
before the policy of extensive Arabization began in
the early 1960s (Talabany: 2000, 18).
In general, however, most cabinets of monarchical
Iraq encouraged Arabs to settle in Kirkuk. For
instance, the cabinet of Yasin Al-Hashimi in 1935
embarked on settling groups of the Arab Ubaid tribe
in the Hawija district of Kirkuk (Talabany: 2000,
24). After the coming to power in Iraq of the Ba’ath
Party in 1963, played a prominent role in the Iraqi
government’s efforts to Arabize the city of Kirkuk,
their descendants readily joined the Ba'ath party
and were rewarded with sensitive civil service jobs.
Oil and the Arabization of
Kirkuk
The City of Kirkuk has been known to have oil long
before the Ottoman occupation of Kurdistan. However,
since 1639, the Ottomans used primitive methods to
extract it for local consumption (Talabany: 2000,
22). Nonetheless, the systematic and organized
exploitation of the Kirkuk oil fields only began
seven years after the British occupation of
present-day Iraq in 1918. Whether or not the initial
intention of the Colonial Britain in the aftermath
of the World War I was to help the minorities of the
defeated Ottoman Empire to establish their own
nation-states, the discovery of enormous oil
reserves in Kurdistan led to a fundamental change in
British policy towards the Kurdish
self-determination issue.
At first, there was a tendency among some British
officers to favour the creation of a Kurdish state
that would extend northward to Lake Van and
southward along the ridges of Hamreen Mountains in
current Iraq. Kurds were trying to persuade the
Western countries to implement the terms of the
Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920. The
Treaty stipulated the establishment of a Kurdish
state in Ottoman Kurdistan. This was first proposed
by Captain Noel, a British political officer who had
traveled throughout Kurdistan. Then the policy
changed to one of working actively for the
annexation of the former Kurdish populated Ottoman
Wilayet of Mosul to the newly established British
Mandate of Iraq which, until then, was comprised of
the former Wilayets of Baghdad and Basra alone (Talabany:
1999, 35).
The British Mandate authorities for Iraq and
Kurdistan organized a referendum in 1921 on the
accession of Emir Faisal bin Hussein as king of the
new state of Iraq. The great majority of the people
of the Kirkuk region rejected this proposal. Other
Kurdish regions, such as the Suleimani, refused even
to take part in the referendum. Kirkuk later became
a part of the Iraqi kingdom when the League of
Nations, at its 37th Assembly in Geneva, on December
16, 1924, decreed that all the land below the
“Brussels Line” (the current Iraqi-Turkish border)
should be incorporated into Iraq (Talabany: 2000,
20).
Later, however, successive Iraqi governments tried
with varying degrees of intensity to change the
ethnic character of the Kirkuk region and
perpetually appointed Arabs to the key positions.
From the outset, in co-operation with the British
oil company operating in Kirkuk, the central
government in Baghdad brought large numbers of
workers from other parts of Iraq to work in the
company and then to settle in the city. The company
brought in a large number of skilled Arab and
Assyrian workers from other parts of Iraq (Talabany:
2000, 21).
The establishment of the petroleum industry in
Kirkuk brought about a significant change in the
city’s social and ethnic character. The new
neighbourhoods, near the oil company’s facilities,
housed mostly Assyrians and Arabs. So, from the
beginning, the Kurds felt resentful that, in spite
of their numerical majority in the city and
governorate of Kirkuk, so few of them were employed
by the oil company. This influx of workers from
other areas into the city marked the beginning of
the process of Arabization there. Following this
earliest example, the process of changing the ethnic
character of Kirkuk became a permanent undertaking
by all the subsequent governments that have ruled
Iraq since the coup of February 8, 1963.
The resumption of the fighting in Kurdistan in June
1963 between the Kurdish Peshmerga Forces (freedom
fighters) led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and the Ba’athist pan-Arab Iraqi regime, with the
aid of most Turkmen, intensified the Arabization of
Kirkuk governorate and other Kurdish cities and
towns in the governorates of Mosul, Arbil and Diyala.
Among the many measures taken by the organizers of
the February 1963 coup were: The deportation of
Kurds, the destruction of their towns and villages,
the demolition of their neighbourhoods in the city
of Kirkuk with the consequent displacement of many,
and the transfer of Kurdish civil servants and
workers to southern and central Iraq. Accordingly,
Arabization became a well-established policy of all
Iraqi regimes from 1963 to 1968.
The Arabization of Kirkuk
from 1968 to the 1991 Desert Storm
The Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party returned to power in
a military coup on July 17, 1968. Leading Ba’athists
were appointed as governors of Kirkuk and granted
wide and extraordinary powers. Shortly after seizing
power, the regime used the following measures to
change the ethnic character of Kirkuk:
• Low-ranking civil servants, including Kurdish
elementary and secondary schoolteachers, as well as
workers in various government departments and in the
oil company facilities, were transferred to areas
outside the Kirkuk governorate and replaced with
Arab civil servants and workers. Kurds were barred
from ever returning there (Talabany: 2000, 35).
• The names of Kurdish neighbourhoods, streets,
schools and markets were changed to Arabic names and
the owners of commercial establishments were forced
to adopt Arabic names for their businesses (Ali:
2008, 54).
• Wide streets were constructed in the Kurdish
neighbourhoods with very laughable compensation.
Then, Kurds were forbidden to sell their properties
in Kirkuk except to Arabs, and were prevented from
buying homes or renovating their existing homes and
properties under any circumstances (Ali: 2008, 56).
• Fraudulent new lists of Arab newcomers were added
to those of the 1957 census to give the impression
that they had lived in Kirkuk since 1957 or earlier
(Ali: 2008, 61).
• Various charges, threats and intimidations were
applied against many Kurds to force them leave the
city and then confiscate their homes and properties.
Many Kurds were arrested, imprisoned and put to
death by with neither charge nor trial (Ali: 2008,
66).
• New factories and government facilities were built
in the southern outskirts of Kirkuk city and
thousands of residential units were constructed only
to be given to Arabs (Ali: 2008, 67).
All the area around Kirkuk and the oil fields and
installations in the governorate was declared a
military and security zone. The regime also detached
four out the seven districts that had once belonged
to the Kirkuk governorate and attached them to the
neighbouring governorates in order to make the Kurds
a minority there. Thus, the two exclusively Kurdish
districts of Chamchamal and Kala'r were attached to
the neighbouring Suleimani governorate, while the
Kifri district, where the Kurds constitute a great
majority, was attached to the Diyala governorate,
and the Tuz-Khurmatu district with a Kurdish
majority was attached to the distant Salahaddin (Tikrit)
governorate. The main goal was to strip the Kirkuk
governorate of these Kurdish districts, thereby
ensuring that the Kurds become a minority there. In
addition, the Iraqi regime had changed the name of
the Kirkuk governorate to Al-Ta’mim (Arabic for
“nationalization”) to seal the second phase of the
Arabization. Moreover, the Iraqi regime not only
brought Arab tribes from southern and central
governorates to settle in the Kirkuk governorate,
but it gave them agricultural land, granted them
numerous privileges and armed them. It
simultaneously destroyed hundreds of Kurdish
villages and some counties where they were not
suitable for settling Arab nomad tribes. Entire
populations of these villages were placed in
concentration camps in other counties, districts and
governorates where they barely had the means to
survive and were kept under constant surveillance by
the security services. No one was allowed to enter
or leave without official approval. These camps were
a grim reminder of those run by the Nazis and
fascists during the Second World War. They had all
been given Arab names such as “Al-Sumud,” “Al-Quds,”
and “Al-Qadissiyah,” (Talabany: 2000; Ali: 2008).
The Arabization of Kirkuk
from 1991 to 2003
Following the 1991 mass Kurdish uprising in Iraq,
the government forcibly expelled over 120,000 Kurds,
Turkmen, and Assyrians from their homes in the
region of Kirkuk and neighbouring towns and
villages. Over the past twelve years, entire
families belonging to these ethnic minorities have
been obliged to relocate, leaving behind virtually
all their possessions, properties, and means of
livelihood. Most of them sought refuge in the
provinces of Arbil and Suleimani controlled by the
KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
respectively. A smaller number were relocated to
government-controlled areas in central and southern
Iraq. This systematic forcible transfer of Kurds and
other was the last phase of the Arabization of
Kirkuk region (OLeary: 2008, 2).
After the liberation of Iraq by the “coalition of
the willing” nations—led by the United States—in
2003, many Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians returned to
Kirkuk hoping to gain back their confiscated homes
and properties. Many of these people have been able
to go back to their homes and properties left behind
by the escaped Arab settlers. Others are still
waiting to claim back their titles which are
dependent on the disputed status of the region
between the KRG and the newly established fragile
government of Iraq.
In 2003, the US led Coalition Forces (CF) deposed
the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein. Shortly
thereafter, the US setup the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) to engage in nation-building and
reconstructing Iraq. While the CF was tasked to
provide security to the people of Iraq on the one
hand, and fight the emerging insurgency on the other
hand, the CPA (May 2003-June 28 2004) was able to
draw a peaceful resolution for the status of Kirkuk
and the other disputed Kurdish areas. According to
article 58 of its Transitional Administrative Law (TAL),
the CPA recognized profound demographic and boundary
manipulations by the Ba’athist regime which
transgressed human rights, political rights and the
rights of nationalities and ethnic minorities. It
proposed measures to rectify these injustices
“expeditiously”. However, the CPA and the subsequent
Iraqi transitional government (June 28 2004-January
31 2005) failed to rectify the relevant injustices
“expeditiously” on excuses of heightened insurgency
and the regional interference on the one hand, and
the questionable legitimacy of the TAL written by an
internationally recognized occupation authority on
the other (OLeary: 2008, 3).
To offset these arguments, the makers of Iraq’s
permanent constitution—passed by an extraordinary
voting referendum by the Iraqi people in October
2005—reemphasized the political status of the
governorate of Kirkuk, and other disputed
territories in Article 140 and scheduled them to be
formally resolved by the end of December 2007.
Despite little progress, unfortunately, the elected
government of Iraq was not able solve the issue.
Hence, the prospective referendum affecting the
status of Kirkuk governorate was, by agreement,
postponed for six months, until the summer of 2008 (OLeary:
2008, 1). The KRG and all Kurds within it ardently
want to unify with the relevant disputed
territories, either by political agreement or by
violent means (Kurdistani Nwe: 2008).
For now, the constitutional obligation to fulfill
Article 140 remains a constitutional imperative, and
the KRG and the people of the Kurdistan Region are
able to block any proposed amendment to Iraq’s
constitution, which would modify Article 140.
Furthermore, Kurds are capable of blocking any
unconstitutional mechanisms that may jeopardize
their position on Kirkuk. For instance, as the Iraqi
Council of Representatives (ICR) passed the
Provincial Elections Law (PEL) on 22 July, 2008,
thereby weakening the Kurdish stand on the status of
Kirkuk, the very next day, President Jalal
Talabani—a Kurd—and his Vice President Adil
Abdil-Mahdi—an Arab Shi’ite—both vetoed the PEL as
unconstitutional. Then, after a week of heated
debate in the ICR over amending the PEL, the Iraqi
lawmakers were not able to get a consensus over the
issue and agreed to postpone it to their next
parliamentary season to start in September 2008.
At this turning point in the historical making of
Iraq, what is happening behind the scene? From a
Kurdish perspective, Kirkuk and their other disputed
territories are the principle demands for the making
of their “unique” national identity within the state
of Iraq. Throughout their modern Iraqi history,
Kurds have been engaging in on-again off-again
fighting with the consecutive governments of Iraq,
mainly, because of their consistent claim to
Kirkuk’s Kurdistani identity; and, therefore, their
rights to govern it and have an equal share of its
oil-rich resources with the rest of Iraq. In
contrast, Iraq with the rest of the regional powers,
especially Turkey, Iran and Syria, fear that
honouring the Kurds the title of governing Kirkuk
and the other oil-rich territories would empower
them to establish their independent Kurdish state.
Although the Kurds have all the rights to declare
their independent state, they have not done so. The
geopolitics of the Middle East would not allow the
development of a Kurdish state for as long as the
authoritarian mindset is the dominant
decision-making in the region. The Kurds do
recognize this dilemma very well. Hence, claims of
Kurdish independent drive conspiracy in the region
are unfounded. Rather, all they want is the reversal
of the Arabization policies of Baghdad and their
constitutional rights to govern themselves within
the federal state of Iraq. Also, Kurds, indeed, do
not want to cause more interstate wars—let along the
intrastate fights--for Iraq. In fact, they have been
active in reminding the seasonal new Iraqi
politicians that Iraq’s eight years of war with Iran
(1980-1988) was, indirectly, a consequence for not
agreeing with the Kurds in 1974 on the status of
Kirkuk and the other disputed territories (Kurdistani
New: 2008).
Unfortunately, however, amateur Iraqi politicians,
motivated by the agendas of the regional powers, are
driving Iraq yet for another catastrophic situation.
In their alliance with the former Ba’athist
lawmakers in the ICR, these radical lawmakers—Shi’ites
and Sunni Arabs—are setting Iraq for an ongoing
devastations and a regional turmoil by not acting
according to their constitutional obligations. To
add more to the dilemma, the US government, under
domestic and regional pressures, is not playing its
powerbroker role in Iraq. Instead, it has left the
Kirkuk impasse to inexperienced diplomats coupled
with low ranking military officers working in
Baghdad to handle it with much carelessness and
ill-thoughts of non-interference.
The Peshmarga forces—heavily participated in the US
“Surge” to bring security to the quarters of Baghdad
and northern areas of the Diyala Province in
2007—have been disgracefully asked by newly formed
Iraq Security Forces (ISF) led by former Ba’athist
officers to retreat to Kurdistan Region. Moreover,
these officers are also trying to instigate troubles
with Kurdish authorities by sending their troops to
the trouble-free Kurdish towns and villages in order
to exacerbate the politically charged situation in
the disputed territories of Khanaqeen near the Iraqi
central eastern borders with Iran (Kurdistani Nwe:
2008). The issuance of 24 hours of notice to the
34th Brigade of the Peshmarga forces to leave its
area of operation on August 10, 2008, is a clear
demonstration for the ill wishes of Iraq’s Nuri Al-Maliki
government. This in turn triggered the KRG to
retreat its Peshmargas from the town of Jalawla (30
kilometers southwest of Khanaqeen) and position them
in the town of Khanaqeen with three extra brigades
of Peshmargas brought from elsewhere ready to engage
the IA in any minute.
The least to say about these ISF trouble
instigations is that another US betrayal of the
Kurds is just around the corner. The uncalculated
aerial, logistical and advisory support that the 1st
and the 5th Iraqi Army (IA) divisions are getting
from the US army for their insurgency fights in the
province of Diyala is backfiring. Instead of
eradicating the insurgency in other parts of Diyala,
Nuri Al-Maliki’s government is trying to arm twist
the Kurds with the US military backing.
What is the next facing the
Kurds?
In light of the developments in the Diyala province,
the KRG is preparing to have a possible show down in
the disputed territories of Mosul, if the Al-Maliki
government repeats its miscalculated actions while
getting ready to deploy more IA forces to the Mosul
area early in October, 2008. Moreover, if the
heightening tensions between the KRG and the Al-Maliki
government do not subside; and, if the international
community does not actively engage in the
negotiations over the implementation of the Article
140 of the Iraqi constitution relating to the Kirkuk
and the other disputed regions by the end of 2008,
then a spoiled armed conflict would be inevitable.
Turkey has been itching to see the downfall of the
KRG. Its military leaders, also known as the
“deep-state actors,” would love to claim victory
over Kurdish aspirations for. However, attacking the
KRG forces under the pretext of securing Turkey’s
national interests would certainly diminish Turkey’s
chances to join the European Union.
Iran’s ambition to dominate the Persian Gulf region
requires the US withdrawal not only from Iraq, but
also from the entire Arab Gulf states. To achieve
this goal, the nuclear ambitious Iran would not
hesitate in fully supporting the Iraqi Shi’ite
government’s actions against the Kurds.
Finally, Syria would love to support Iraq against
the Kurds in exchange for a greater Ba’athist
influence over the Iraqi Sunni population.
Inevitably, Israel’s position in the region would be
weakened; and the national interests of the United
States in the Middle East would face enormous
challenges, particularly by the growing Islamic
radical trends. Moreover, such foreseeable scenario
would position China as well as Russia to have
greater influences over politics in the Middle East.
Last but not the least, the American democratization
of the Middle East and North Africa would be kissed
goodbye.
How to prevent this
scenario from happening?
Since Iraq is still under the US occupation, it is
the responsibility of the United States to make sure
that Iraq is building its democratic institutions
throughout its transitional developing phases.
Although Iraq has passed the dangers of outright
civil war just recently, it has a long way to go
from slipping back into the hands of the former
Ba’athist Generals who are now commanding the IA
operations throughout Iraq.
The US government needs to understand that the Iraqi
military segment has been deeply amerced in the
culture of instigating troubles and government
overthrowing. In fact, since 1941, IA Generals have
been involved in at least ten coup d'états with five
successful ones. Therefore, it is critical not let
the Iraqi force generation and force moderation
processes be solely handled by the US and Iraqi army
generals. Civilians from both sides must involve in
such strategic planning.
The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) leads 14
divisions manned by 264,000 soldiers. Only 2.5% of
this force is of Kurdish origin (Kurdistani New:
2008). Compared to the 23% of Kurdish population in
Iraq, this low percentage raises real fears with
Kurdish elites who are challenged to keep their
lightly armed 100,000 Peshmergas, let along training
and modernizing them. In generating forces, the US
diplomats and army planners in Iraq should have
decentralized the IGFC by setting up three regional
commands: one in the North to lead 60,000 Peshmergas,
one in the center to lead 60,000 Sunni Arab
soldiers, and one in the south to command 150,000
Shiite Arab soldiers. This initial separate
diversification of the IGFC would, in the long run,
create professional soldiers and eliminate any
chances or attempts to grab power by undemocratic
means. In addition, the Al-Maliki government
critically needs to generate ethnically diverse
forces to operate in the disputed areas with joint
Iraqi and Kurdish command. Such need will ease the
primordial animosities between the IA and the
Peshmerga leaderships.
In reorganizing and diversifying the IA into three
regional commands, the Al-Maliki government would be
saved from pitfalls of victory sensations—been
enjoyed in recent months—due to the defeat of the
elusive insurgency. In so doing, the Al-Maliki
government would have a better chance to demonstrate
its wiliness to meet the constitutional obligations
toward the Kurds. In contrast, if Article 140
remains at impasse, then Al-Maliki government needs
to layout its best alternative solution that would
be negotiable by the KRG. Respectively, the US
government as well as the UN needs to “step in and
propose a solution that addresses all sides’ core
concerns without crossing their existential red
lines” (ICG: 2006). For example, the reversal of all
Arabization abuses by previous regimes in the
disputed areas so their population can decide either
to join the KRG or remain within their repective
governorates; an equitable federated
“city-power-sharing” limited to the boundaries of
the City of Kirkuk; and the accession of former
Kirkuk districts—where Kurds constituted the
majority of the population according to the 1957
census—by the KRG.
Regionally, the US needs to exert more pressure on
Turkey not to interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs,
especially with regard to the Kirkuk issue. Also,
the US needs to deploy some of its forces along the
Turkish-KRG borders for two reasons: Confidence
building measures between the Turkish troops and the
Kurdish Peshmergas on the one hand, and to deny any
cross-border insurgent activities on the other hand.
This in turn will help the Turkish authorities to
accept the legitimacy of the KRG and considerably
reduce Kurdish animosities on both sides of the
border toward the Turkey. Furthermore, the US
government needs to work harder in its isolation
policies toward Iran and Syria. A regionally
contained Iran and Syria will ensure greater
stability in the Middle East. Isolating Iran and
Syria with coercive diplomacy will lead to a
successful and stable democratic Iraq. The US
government needs to moderate and train the Peshmerga
forces to prevent Iranian intelligence penetrations
into the KRG in route to other governorates of Iraq
to support radical insurgent elements.
Failure by the US and the UN to act decisively could
well lead to a rapid deterioration of the already
charged situation. The result would be violent
intrastate conflict, spreading civil war and,
possibly, regional military intervention. It is
doubtful that the post-2003 Iraq would survive yet
another major bloodshed in oil-rich areas where
large Iraqi diverse communities do live.
In the event of all-out regional war, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) must intervene and
play a dominant role in forming a Multi-National
Military Force (MNMF) to sanction the warring
parties. However, if sanctioning proves to be
ineffective, the use of force must become an option
to stop the belligerent parties. Simultaneously, the
MNMF has to intervene in the Iraqi intrastate war by
segregating the Kirkuk city and establishing buffer
zones between the warring factions. Once that
achieved, the UNSC has to form a non-bias
fact-finding mission to determine a best course of
action for the status of Kirkuk. After establishing
security to protect the civilians, the MNMF has to
develop a binding three phase resolution plan.
The first phase should have a short-term plan by
which institutional capacity building has to take
place in order to establish rule-of-law. The second
phase should have a transitional med-term plan for
initiating economic and political developments to
the satisfaction of the contending parties. The last
phase should sustain and improve the achievements
gained through the previous phases where all sides
recognize the criticality of cooperation and
democratic means to manage their communal affairs
peacefully and harmonically.
Conclusion
This paper attempted to provide a historical
background for the Arabization of Kirkuk and the
other disputed regions between the post-2003 Iraqi
government and the KRG. The author suggests that in
the event of an impasse over the implementation of
Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, parties to
the issue must explore acceptable alternatives
rather than resorting to fight. Also, in the event
of possible war, the paper suggests that the United
States and the international community must work
together to contain it and eventually stop it by
means of negotiation and capacity building measures.
1. Ali, Burhan, The deportation of Kurds and the
Arabization of Kirkuk in the Ba’ath documents.
Suleimani: University of Suleimani, 2008.
2. Amin Zaki, Muhammad. A Brief History of Kurds and
Kurdistan. Arabic trans. Muhammad Ali Awni, (2nd
Ed.) Baghdad: Baghdad House, 1961.
3. Edmonds, C.J., Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics,
Travel and Research in North Eastern Iraq,
1919-1925. Oxford: Oxford Press, 1957.
4. Ismail, Khalil. The geographic distribution of
the Turkmans in Iraq. The International Politics
Journal, No. 8, Arbil, 1993, p. 22.
5. Khesbak, Shaker, Northern Iraq. Baghdad: Shafiq
Publishing, 1973.
6. Kurdistani Nwe Daily Newspaper, issues No. 3451,
3453, 3456: August 11, 13, 16, 2008. Suleimani: PUK
Central Media Publishing.
7. OLeary, B. and Bateman, D., “Article 140: Iraq’s
Constitution, Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories,”
Paper for the Conference at Rayburn House,
Washington D.C. May 9 2008.
8. Talabany, Nouri. The Kurdish Question and
International Law: Perspectives of Southern
Kurdistan in a Regional and Supraregional Context.
Berlin: The Centre for Kurdish Studies in Germany,
1999.
9. Talabany, Nouri. The Arabization of the Kirkuk
Region (2nd Ed.) London: 2000.
This article has been written by Saeed Kakeyi in
June 15, 2008
Copyright © 2011 ekurd.net
Top |
The opinions
expressed in this commentary are solely those of the
author
|
®
