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Iraqi Government in Crisis – Sectarianism,
Corruption and Dissent
18.4.2011
By Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli - MEMRI |
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April
18, 2011
Introduction
It took nine months after the Iraqi parliamentary
election in March 2010 for a new government to be
formed, in a process dotted by bargaining, haggling,
threats, compromises and even foreign intervention.
It took the political skills of Massoud Barzani, the
president of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to
fashion a compromise of national partnership that
finally gave birth, in December, to the new
government under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Government Born in
Disharmony and Dissent – Survival Increasingly
Questioned
The new Iraqi government has suffered since its
birth from a number of problems:
· The absence of shared political principles that
glue a coalition government together and underpin
its performance
· The notion of national partnership and
power-sharing anchored in personal preferences
rather than in governing principles and quickly
placed in deep freeze
|
Map of Iraq |
· The failure to appoint three
key ministers, namely those for the ministries of
interior, defense and national security
· A fragile security situation
· Wide-scale corruption and Poor Services
The Absence of Shared
Political Principles
The Iraqi government is a coalition government; by
their very nature, such governments are not
homogeneous political bodies. In the case of Iraq,
the coalition government is handicapped by ethnic,
sectarian and religious diversity. Influential
elements within the government and parliament are
closely linked to foreign interests, which often
exercise significant influence on the
decision-making process. Other elements within the
government show animosity towards and distrust each
other.
Sectarianism remains a potent force across Iraq,
with each minister assigning senior posts in his
portfolio to his political or ethnic group. Nepotism
is also rampant.
While sectarianism has been present since the
establishment of the modern Iraqi state in 1920,
after the 2003 invasion it became institutionalized.
The appointment of the Iraqi Governing Council in
2003 was the first time in the political history of
Iraq that a national governing body selected its
members on purely sectarian basis. Subsequently,
muhasasa, the distribution of positions at all
political and administrative levels along ethnic and
sectarian groups, has become an ingrained feature of
the Iraqi political culture. Trying to satisfy all
of the coalition partners, the new government
comprises 41 ministers, although three of them are
yet to be appointed.
National Partnership and
Power Sharing
From among the many political groups which competed
in the March 2010 parliamentary election, two key
political blocs emerged, with an almost identical
number of seats. Al-Iraqiya, a list headed by a
previous Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, attracted Sunni
and secular votes and gained 91 seats in the
325-seat parliament. State of Law, the group headed
by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, was second
closest bloc, gaining 89 seats. According to the
constitution, al-Iraqiya, with the largest number of
seats, should have formed the government. However,
under pressure from Iran, two additional Shi'a
blocks, namely those of the Sadrists and the Supreme
Islamic Council, joined the State of Law to form the
National Alliance, which controlled the largest
number of votes in parliament and the right to form
the government.
Although al-Maliki needed the votes of the Kurdish
Alliance to form a government, neither the Kurds nor
the Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Council would
support al-Maliki as prime minister unless al-Iraqiya
was incorporated into the new government. They
argued that excluding al-Iraqiya would mean
excluding the Sunnis, who accounted for most of its
votes. Further, al-Iraqiya insisted that they were
entitled to form the new government. The stalemate
that persisted for almost nine months and ended only
with the intervention of Massoud Barzani, who
summoned the feuding parties to Erbil, the capital
of KRG, to hammer out a compromise.
Under the compromise hammered out by Barzani, the
principle of "national partnership" or "power
sharing" was adopted. This principle rested on
allocation of a number of ad hoc political benefits
of strictly personal nature: Jalal Talabani, an
Iraqi Kurd,www.ekurd.netremains
president of Iraq for a second term; Nouri al-Maliki
remains prime minister, also for a second term;
ministerial portfolios were distributed among the
partners; and a new office of Supreme Council for
Strategic Policies was created, tailor-made for Ayad
Allawi, the head of al-Iraqiya bloc which emerged
from the general election with the largest number of
seats in parliament. The Council was meant to
articulate national and strategic policies and
priorities.
Preoccupied with their own personal rewards, the
leaders who met in Erbil made no attempt to touch
upon the pressing economic problems facing the
country, such as a high rate of unemployment, a
crumbling infrastructure, the poor provision of
public services and widespread corruption. Nor was
there any mention made of strategic or foreign
policy nature pertaining to Iraq's future relations
with the United States, the suffocating influence of
Iran in the internal affairs of the country, or how
to deal with terrorism and violence.
Once approved by parliament as prime minister, al-Maliki
reneged on many elements of the compromise
agreement, particularly with regards to
establishment of the Supreme Council for Strategic
Policies, claiming that no government can operate
with two heads. Al-Maliki did all in his power to
drain the proposed council of its powers and then
sought to pack it with his supporters. Out-maneuvered
and out-foxed by Nouri al-Maliki throughout the nine
months leading to the formation of the government
and four months since then, Allawi decided he no
longer wished to preside over an emaciated body.
Failure to Appoint Security
Ministers
Nothing more vividly demonstrates the dissent
within, and the sectarian nature of, the Iraqi
government than the failure of the coalition
partners to agree on the nominees for the three of
the most significant cabinet posts, namely those of
defense, interior, and national security. Almost
four months after this government was voted into
office on December 21, 2010, these three cabinet
posts remain vacant because the prime minister and
the leaders of the other blocs – indeed, even al-Maliki's
bloc, the National Alliance, itself – could not
agree on candidates that would get the parliament's
vote of confidence. Al-Maliki was reported to have
said that he was prepared to wait a year until he
was ready to submit to parliament names of
candidates to his liking.[1] As a result, al-Maliki
has since been the acting minister for all three
ministries.
Unstable Security Situation
While there has been improvement in the security
situation, daily acts of violence and terrorism
continue to bedevil the security agencies of the
government. The Islamic State of Iraq, the local
branch of al-Qaeda, has not been defeated. The
principal agencies of government, including the
offices of the prime minister and most ministries,
operate from the confines of the well-protected
Green Zone. Senior officials travel in convoys on
streets often blocked in advance to insure safe
passage. A government operating from behind high
walls remains disengaged from the daily concerns of
the people and unable to take their pulse.
Iraqi observers maintain that al-Qaeda has recently
changed its strategy. Rather than holding territory,
the organization is bent on carrying out showcase
acts of terrorism that will inflict death and injury
in numbers too great to go unnoticed. Two such acts
in 2011 dramatize the new strategy: the attack on
February 1, 2011 on the Assyrian Catholic church in
Baghdad, which caused the deaths of dozens of
parishioners, followed early April 2011 with a major
assault on the government compound of Salahuddin
provincial government in Saddam Hussein's city of
Tikrit, which resulted in the deaths of 63 people
and the wounding of more than 100. Whoever was
behind the terrorist act in Tikrit, it is clear that
the capacity of the Iraqi security forces is
constrained by poor training and poor morale. Not
surprisingly, it took a joint U.S.-Iraqi military
force to reclaim the provincial government building
from the hands of a group of armed men, three of
whom blew themselves up to inflict the highest
number of casualties and to obstruct evacuation.[2]
Critics argue that even after years of training by
the U.S., the Iraqi security forces continue to
suffer from poor performance and low morale.
The absence of security has meant the absence of
investments, domestic and foreign. No foreign
investor ventures into a situation that puts his
life and the life of those working for him in
jeopardy. The exception is the foreign oil companies
which entered into contract with the Iraqi
government to develop the oil sector. These
companies are accustomed to working in politically
troubled area and they have the wherewithal to
protect their workers and their expensive equipment.
The economy would have been in a complete state of
paralysis were it not for the flow of oil revenues
of $40 billion in 2010 and perhaps a larger amount
in 2011.
Wide-Scale Corruption and
Poor Services
The Iraqi people are becoming increasingly restless
and frustrated by the massive scale of corruption
across the board and by the poor supply of public
services, particularly electricity and drinking
water. Businesses and industry cannot flourish in
darkness. The shortage of electric power cannot be
blamed on the shortage of funding, however. Billions
of dollars have been stolen or squandered on
fictitious contracts or non-existing projects,
particularly in the ministry of electricity.
At the end of March 2011, the International Monetary
Fund issued a report on Iraq which is highly
critical of the slow progress in the implementation
of the five-year plan, 2010-2014. There has been
little progress in the building of the crumbling
infrastructure and utilities. Few, if any, major
development projects have been implemented. Both the
industrial and agricultural sectors remain
constrained by lack of funds and clear economic
strategy.[3] The country was shocked to learn that
$40 billion had been withdrawn from the country's
Development Fund with no visible trace.[4]
Despite government efforts to contain the public
rage intensified by the political turmoil in the
region, a wave of mass demonstrations spread across
Iraq during most of the month of March and continues
to date, calling for improvement in public services
and an end to corruption. While professing a
commitment to the constitutional rights of Iraqis to
demonstrate, al-Maliki's government resorted to
restrictions and even violence to limit the access
of the demonstrators to public squares on February
25, 2011 (the Day of Rage).
Feeling the heat, al-Maliki decided to cancel the
purchase of 18 F16 fighter jets to free up money for
spending on projects aimed to ease growing tensions
arising from inadequate supply of food items under
the ration card system. A day after the mass
demonstration in Baghdad on February 25, al-Maliki
gave his ministers 100 days to take measures to
combat corruption and improve performance. He said
that after the 100-day deadline he would personally
evaluate the performance of each minister to
determine who should keep his/her post.[5] However,
he set no benchmarks for performance, and critics
have characterized the whole procedure as a
charade.[6] Recently, a question was raised as to
who will rate the performance of al-Maliki as acting
minister over the three security ministries. [7]
The corruption in government and its failure to
provide adequate public services has been sufficient
to alienate the highest Shi'a clerical authority in
the country – Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Al-Sistani
has refused, in recent weeks, to meet with Iraqi
leaders because of what he perceives to be the
failure of the government to respond to the
legitimate demands of the people.[8]
Signs of Government Breakup
Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki finds himself
under siege from all directions, no less than from
his coalition partners who snipe at him and at the
government in which they serve. Taking the lead is
the erratic leader of the Sadrist movement, the
Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr who keeps threatening
to unleash his supporters onto the streets if the
government fails to deliver on its promises with
regard to the provision of public services and the
creation of jobs.[9]
Feeling snubbed by Prime Minister al-Malaki, Ayad
Allawi, the head of al-Iraqiya, is scheming to bring
the government down. Allawi keeps reiterating that
there is no genuine "national partnership" unless
the agreement brokered by Barzani is carried out
fully. He has criticized the prime minister for
centralizing so much power in his hand and for
avoiding the creation of proper procedures under
which the council of ministers would operate.[10]
Even politically moderate and temperamentally sound
Ammar al-Hakim – the head of the Supreme Islamic
Council, which is a member of the National Alliance
– is complaining that his group is being
marginalized and that he prefers to serve as loyal
opposition rather than as marginal partner in
government. A spokesman for al-Hakim revealed that
political blocs are actively trying to bring al-Maliki's
government down. There are indications that
al-Hakim, Allawi and al-Sadr are coordinating their
activities to do exactly that at the expiration of
the 100 days al-Maliki gave his ministers and
provincial governors to meet people's
aspirations.[11]
Al-Maliki must also contend with the speaker of
parliament, Osama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni politician
from the northern city of Mosul and a member of al-Iraqiya
bloc, who is critical of the prime minister and
prone to challenge him.
Al-Nujaifi's most recent challenge to the prime
minister was his rejection in early April of the
latter's request to postpone the legislative process
on five proposed pieces of legislations dealing with
the Supreme Legal Council, Federal High Court,
Financial Control Boards, Public Inspectors, and the
Integrity Board. Al-Nujaifi declared the intension
of parliament to pass these legislations as a means
of fighting corruption and the corrupt officials in
government. [12]
Government of Political
Majority
Feeling the pressure from all sides and aware of a
potential vote of no confidence that his opponents
could muster in parliament, al-Maliki's supporters
are floating the idea of a new government with a
"political majority" in lieu of national
partnership. This concept of a political majority
has never been explained because the current
coalition government enjoys a majority in parliament
and can stay in power as long as its components
remain inside the coalition. One possible
interpretation of the concept of political majority
is to do away with national partnership by forcing
members of parliament to choose between being in the
majority bloc or in opposition. However, for al-Maliki
to keep his job, he will need to split al-Iraqiya
and obtain the support of those of its members who
are frustrated by Allawi's political incompetence
and his frequent travels outside the country. It is
also possible that the idea of a political majority
is a pre-emptive strike by al-Maliki to ascribe to
others the failure of government to deliver.[13]
Shadow Government
In response to statements attributed to a close
associate of al-Maliki about creating a political
majority, three disgruntled political leaders have
begun to consider the forming of a new government –
Ahmad Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National
Congress whose candidacy for the position of
minister of interior was vetoed by al-Maliki; Ayad
Allawi, who emerged from the general elections with
the largest number of seats but remains
empty-handed; and Adel Abd al-Mahdi of the Supreme
Islamic Council, who has withdrawn his candidacy as
vice president of Iraq because of the government's
decision to create three posts of vice president to
a president who lacks serious authority in the first
place. The three politicians are talking about "a
shadow government," a concept borrowed from the
British parliament, meaning an alternative
government in waiting. [14]
Conclusion
Measured against the repressive regimes in Iran,
Syria and Saudi Arabia, Iraq still maintains broad
latitude of free and open political debate and a
considerable degree of freedom of expression, as
evidenced by the existence of freewheeling press and
public media. The fact that dissent is broadly
tolerated provides a sound indication that democracy
in Iraq has so far survived many setbacks.
On the other hand, corruption and sectarianism
continue to dominate the political scene, and the
performance of government remains below par. While
paying lip service to democratic values such as
freedom of assembly and of the press, Prime Minister
al-Maliki is displaying worrying levels of
authoritarianism hardly alien to the Iraqi political
tradition. Although he has vowed not to seek a third
term as prime minister, the more immediate issue,
given the political turmoil in the country, is
whether he will be able to survive in power until
the next elections due in 2014.
It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies of Iraq's
modern political history that after suffering from
decades of violence and exclusion, the Kurds now
hold the key to al-Maliki's political survival;
indeed, no Iraqi government can survive without
their support.
Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is a senior analyst at MEMRI.
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)
explores the Middle East through the region's media
(both print and television), websites, religious
sermons and school books. MEMRI bridges the language
gap which exists between the West and the Middle
East, providing timely translations of Arabic,
Farsi, Urdu, Pashtu, Dari, Hindi, and Turkish media,
as well as original analysis of political,
ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and
religious trends in the Middle East.
Endnotes:
[1] Alsumaria.tv, March 22, 2011.
[2] Al-Zaman, Iraq, March 30, 2011; al-Sharq al-Awsat,
London, March 31, 2011.
[3] International Monetary Fund, Iraq – Second
Review under the Stand-By Arrangement, Country
Report No. 11/75 of March 28, 2011.
[4] Al-Zaman, February 22, 2011.
[5] Alsumaria.tv, February 26, 2011.
[6] Alsumaria.tv. February 26, 2011; al-Zaman,
February 26, 2011; al-Mada, February 27, 2011 and
al-Sabah, February 28, 2011.
[7] Al-Zaman, April 5, 2011.
[8] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 11, 2011.
[9] Al-Mada, March 27, 2011; Wasatonline.com, March
27, 2011.
[10] Al-Zaman, April 5, 2011.
[11] Al-Sharq-Awsat, March 31, 2011.
[12] Alsumarianews.com, April 5, 2011.
[13] Alsumarianews.com, April 4, 2011; al-Sharq al-Awsat,
April 7, 2011.
[14] Alrafidayn.com, April 7, 2011.
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