|
How Iraq’s Religious Parties Attempted To
Seize Power In The Post-Invasion Vacuum
2.12.2011
By Joel Wing - ekurd.net |
|
|
|
December 2, 2011
In April 2003, the government of Saddam Hussein
fell. With it went the bureaucracy and the security
forces. Into this vacuum stepped local Shiite
clerics and exile political parties, all attempting
to take advantage of the chaos to seize power. The
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in coordination
with Iran moved in thousands of its militiamen.
Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers tried to take over in
major cities, and killed one of his main rivals. The
SIIC and Sadrists were not only able to take control
of some areas of the country during this period, but
set the stage for them to become the new leaders of
Iraq.
The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) was one of
the largest and most well organized parties to step
into the void created by the overthrow of Saddam. As
early as November 2001, the SIIC’s militia, the Badr
Brigade met with friendly tribes, to begin planning
for post-Saddam Iraq. Badr told the sheikhs to take
over government offices after the impending U.S.
invasion. This was coordinated with the Iranians,
which the SIIC had close ties to. The Supreme
Council’s founders Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim
and Sayid Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who came from one of
Iraq’s leading religious families, fled to Iran
during the Iran-Iraq War where they created the
party. They pledged allegiance to Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
created the Badr Brigade to help in its war with
Baghdad.
The Supreme Council would later forge ties with the
Americans, participating in various opposition
meetings before the March 2003 invasion. The U.S.
ended up picking the SIIC as being the main Shiite
party it would work with, despite its ties to Iran.
This was partly due to its connections with other
leading opposition parties like the Kurds and the
Iraqi National Congress, all of which the SIIC had
worked with for years. In the new Iraq, the Hakims
were hoping to play upon their name, opposition to
Saddam, support from Tehran, and organization to
take advantage of the U.S. invasion. This gave it an
early lead to become one of the new powers in the
country.
Immediately after the March 2003 invasion, the SIIC
sent in thousands of its Badr Brigade fighters into
Iraq. They positioned some in Kurdistan before the
attack, while others moved in from Iran. The United
States was aware of these moves, and warned Badr
that it would be attacked if it were encountered
during the invasion. In April 2003, the U.S.
deployed peshmerga and Special Forces into Diyala
province to try to block Badr from entering from
Iran there. Neither of these actions deterred the
Supreme Council however. The Badr Brigade was able
to seize key cities in Diyala, and ended up fighting
Baathists, Sunni tribes, and the Iranian-opposition
party Mujahedeen e-Khalq in the province.
This forced the United States to try to disarm the
Badr, which only partially worked. The SIIC also
moved to seize power in southern Iraqi cities like
Basra, Najaf, and Karbala.
|
Badr Brigade fighters in Iran (SIIC)
Ayatollah Haeri appointed Sadr his representative in
Iraq, and called on Shiites to seize power in Iraq
after the fall of Saddam (New York Times) |
In Kut, the capital of Wasit for example, SIIC
cleric Sayid Abbas Fadhil claimed control of the
city, and took over the city hall before U.S. forces
arrived. The Badr Brigade also began assassinating
Baathists. While being nominally aligned with the
United States, the Supreme Council proved to have
its own agenda. The SIIC had been waiting for twenty
years for the fall of Saddam, and were not going to
pass up the opportunity to assert itself across
Iraq. They moved into Shiite areas of northern and
southern Iraq, went after their opponents like
former regime members, and set themselves up as the
new government in parts of the country
Moqtada al-Sadr was also active during this period.
First, Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri, a
leading cleric based in Qom, Iran, appointed Sadr
his representative in Iraq on April 7, 2003. The
next day, al-Haeri issued a Fatwa calling on Shiites
to seize power, and to oppose the United States. At
the same time, Sadrists began asserting their
control over Sadr City in Baghdad and southern Iraq,
setting up offices, banning alcohol, and making
women wear veils. On April 10, Sadr’s followers
assassinated one of Moqtada’s main rivals, Sayid
Abdul Majid al-Khoei in the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf,
and surrounded the house of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
the most senior cleric in Iraq, threatening him as
well. Like the Supreme Council, the Sadrists tried
to take over local administration in several of the
country’s cities. Sadr’s followers also began
working at the grass roots level with their offices
that distributed social services to build up its
support. Sadr went on to directly challenge his
rivals by assassinating Sayid Khoei and threatening
Ayatollah Sistani. Those events set the trend for
the Sadrists as they would become the main movement
of the Shiite poor, as well as one of the more
violent militias.
Both the Hakims and Sadr were able to translate
their early moves after the U.S. invasion into
political power in post-Saddam Iraq. In 2003, Sayid
Abdul Aziz Hakim became a member of the Iraqi
Governing Council put together by the Coalition
Provisional Authority. The Sadrists led two revolts
in 2004, and became the major Shiite opposition
group to the Americans. In 2005, the two parties
decided to work together in the United Iraqi
Alliance, which ended up winning the most seats in
parliament in the two elections held that year. They
then took over local administrations,www.ekurd.net
provincial councils, governorships, and police
forces in southern Iraq as a result. They then
turned on Sunnis in response to the constant
sectarian attacks by groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq,
as well as fighting each other for dominance of
southern Iraq. The United States was caught
flatfooted to deal with any of this. They did not
expect the government to totally collapse in the
wake of the invasion, and did nothing during the
chaotic weeks that followed when the war was
officially over. That space allowed groups like the
Supreme Council and Sadrists to rise to prominence.
The SIIC turned out to be the party, the United
States decided to work with, because it was willing
to cooperate with them, while the Sadrists were
considered a threat, because they constantly called
for the Americans to leave the country, and were
willing to use force to achieve that. Today, both
parties remain members of the government, which is
in part, the result of their aggressive moves to
seize power in the wake of the U.S. invasion.
SOURCES
Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East
Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003
Ashour, Mohammed, “sistani’s rule,” Niqash, 5/27/10
Byman, Daniel, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle:
Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” Security Studies,
October 2008
Chivers, C.J., “A Nation At War: Northern Front;
Attention Now Shifts to the Role of the Kurds,” New
York Times, 4/10/03
Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist
Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January
2009
Collier, Robert, “Iraq’s Shiites show strength on
once-banned pilgrimage,” San Francisco Chronicle,
4/23/03
Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil
War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007
Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy
in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08
International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In
Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07
Landay, Jonathan and Strobel, Warren, “No real
planning for postwar Iraq,” Knight Ridder
Newspapers, 9/11/03
Lochhead, Carolyn, “Shiite clerics challenge U.S.
goal in Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/24/03
PBS Frontline, “Interview Jon Lee Anderson,” Beyond
Baghdad, 2/12/04
Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling
In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Shiite Clerics’ Rivalry Deepens
In Fragile Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/21/06
Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take
power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03
Strauss, Valerie, “Pentagon: Ex-Iraqi Leader Aziz Is
in Custody,” Washington Post, 4/24/03
Ware, Michael, “Inside Iran’s Secret War For Iraq,”
Time, 8/22/05
Wilkinson, Tracy, “U.S. overseer tours Baghdad,” San
Francisco Chronicle, 4/22/03
Joel Wing, with an MA in International Relations,
Joel Wing has been researching and writing about
Iraq since 2002. His acclaimed blog, Musings on
Iraq, is currently listed by the New York Times and
the World Politics Review. In addition, Mr. Wing’s
work has been cited by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the Guardian and the
Washington Independent. You may visit his Blog
Musings On Iraq at musingsoniraq.blogspot.com
Copyright © 2011 ekurd.net
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the
content of news information on this page
|
®
