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Remarks to Lvin magazine seminar in Iraqi
Kurdistan
2.1.2011
By Michael Rubin |
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January 2, 2011
SULAIMANIYAH,
Kurdistan region 'Iraq'
Michael Rubin, Ph.D.
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School
I would like to begin by asking for a moment of
silence in memory of Soran Mama Hama and Sardosht
Osman, two courageous journalists who were murdered
because they sought a free press and equality under
the law for all in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Thank you. They will not be forgotten.
I also want to thank Lvin for organizing this
seminar. I am honored to come to Kurdistan as a
guest of a truly independent organization, rather
than simply as someone who was invited by the
Kurdistan Regional Government.
Ten years ago this month, while I was a lecturer at
the University of Sulaimaniyah,
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Michael Rubin (R) at the Lvin magazine seminar in
Sulaimaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan region, December 20,
2010. Photo: Lvin Magazine |
I gave my first seminar
in Iraqi Kurdistan. I spoke about American politics
and the election of 2000 which was, at the time,
still undecided. Today, I will talk about another
topic: The Kurdish lobby in the United States and
how the Kurdish government might become more
effective in its American outreach.
Today, Kurds do not have an effective lobby in
Washington. This should be obvious. Right now,
relations between the United States and Turkey are
at their worst in 50 years. The Wikileaks documents
demonstrate this. Many people in the United States
talk about Turkey more as an enemy than an ally.
Why, then, has the Kurdistan Regional Government
been so powerless to develop a strong relationship
between the United States and Iraqi Kurdistan?
It is necessary, however, to acknowledge the
strengths of Iraqi Kurdistan:
The region’s development is amazing. I have been
coming to Iraqi Kurdistan for a decade. When I first
arrived, there was great uncertainty among Iraqi
Kurds. The threat of Saddam Hussein loomed over the
region. In December 2000, for example, Saddam’s
forces probed international resolve around Baadre. A
professor at the University of Salahuddin which the
Kurdistan Democratic Party’s foreign relations
office assigned as my point-of-contact as I adjusted
to Kurdish society quietly excused himself, saying
he was afraid that if he helped an American, he
could suffer consequences once Saddam returned.
Let us fast forward ten years. I have been very
critical of rampant corruption and nepotism on the
part of the major Kurdish political parties, and the
Kurdistan Regional Government’s increasing
repression. Nevertheless, it is also true that Mam
Jalal, Hero Khan, and Barham Salih deserve credit
for the region’s development. It is good to see that
Gorran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa,www.ekurd.netformer
Sulaimaniyah governor Dana Majid, and the rest of
the Gorran leadership have both continued and built
upon this legacy. Kurds and Americans must also
thank the peshmerga, whose courageousness in the
face of Saddam Hussein, enabled the opportunity
which Iraqi Kurds enjoy today.
Freedom is not consistent across Iraqi Kurdistan,
however. Sulaimaniyah enjoys more openness than
other areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The difference
between Sulaimaniyah and Erbil today, for example,
is analogous to the difference between Lebanon and
Syria. Neither is completely free, but Lebanese have
far more civil space than Syria, which remains a
police state.
It is a credit to Sulaimaniyah that two days ago,
courageous students, intellectuals, and ordinary
people stood up against the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s law restricting peoples’ right to
demonstrate. Peaceful public protest can only happen
in Sulaimaniyah; it is no longer possible in Erbil
or Duhok.
Iraqi Kurdistan has long considered the United
States an ally; it is no secret that Iraqi Kurdistan
is the most pro-American region of Iraq, at least
for now. Why, then, is the Kurdistan Regional
Government failing in its relationship with America?
Why does the United States not support the Kurdish
position more?
There are several reasons.
First, the Kurdish leadership fails to maintain both
dignity and credibility. Too often, the leadership
of the Kurdistan Regional Government will say “We
are a democracy.” Democracies, however, do not
murder journalists and then lie about it.
Democracies do not threaten independent newspapers
with $1 billion lawsuits, sue writers who pen
critical editorials, or bankrupt journalists who ask
tough questions. Nor do democracies have one set of
laws for the children of party leaders, and another
set of laws for ordinary people.
The Kurdistan Regional Government’s declarations of
entitlement also play poorly. Too often, the
Kurdistan leadership says, “We are your allies. You
owe us.” It is true that the Kurds were great
American allies in 2003. Americans appreciate this.
Americans have also helped protect the Kurds in
1991, actions we should have replicated with regard
to the Shi‘a. Americans
Certainly, the Kurds were American allies in the war
in 2003. Americans appreciate this. And Americans
have helped the Kurds, helping to protect the Kurds
in 1991 as we should also have protected the
Shiites. Americans defended the no-fly zone. Kurds
may not understand why, in such circumstances,
Americans do not trust the Kurdish leadership more,
and why our partnership with Iraqi Kurdistan is not
stronger. The problem is not with the Kurdish
people, but rather with the Iraqi Kurdish
government. Sometimes officials in Washington have
private conversations with Kurdish leaders. The
words are meant to be between Sar-e Rash and the
White House. Within one hour, it seems, however,
that senior Kurdish leaders betray the American
confidence to Qasim Sulaymani, the Iranian Qods
Force general who is responsible for plotting the
murder of Americans. Too often, it seems, senior
Kurdish officials see American confidence as
something to be auctioned off to the highest bidder.
Americans are guilty as well. A corrupt American
policeman or a corrupt American army colonel can
come to Kurdistan and become a prince. They may tell
officials they are well-connected in Washington. But
if they are known as thieves in Washington, then
people ask, “Why does the Kurdish leadership
surround itself with such dishonest people?”
The Kurds say they have no friends but the
mountains. Certainly, the root of this quip is the
repeated betrayal which Kurds have suffered. In
1975, for example, Henry Kissinger withdrew American
support from the Kurdish uprising without regard to
the human cost of his decision. The Kurds, however,
are also responsible for their lack of true friends.
Kurdish officials—especially party members—act
crudely toward Americans and other foreigners.
In 2000-2001, I spent an academic year in Iraqi
Kurdistan. While the Kurdish authorities provided me
with a place to stay and a small allowance for food,
I did not receive a salary from the Kurdistan
Regional Government, nor did they fund my university
program or think-tank, nor did I seek to be included
in their ever-expanding circle of advisors. My time
in Iraqi Kurdistan was instead financed by a small
grant from the Carnegie Council for Ethnics in
International Affairs (www.cceia.org).
I advocated a close Kurdish partnership with the
United States because I saw it as an American
interest. I advocated effectively for Kurdish human
rights and to raise awareness about the threat
Saddam Hussein posed to Iraqis of all ethnicities
and religions. I also wrote about ethnic cleansing
in Kirkuk, the aftermath of the genocidal Anfal
campaign. By comparing Iraqi Kurdistan under
sanctions with the rest of Iraq under the same
sanctions, I was able to show that the problem in
Iraq was not sanctions, but the dictatorial regime
of Saddam Hussein.
That was not good enough for many Kurdish officials
and party members, because I did not agree with them
completely, nor was I willing to conduct their
propaganda blindly. I recognized the growing
corruption in Kurdish society and, even though I
know my position may not be popular in this room, I
also disagreed with many Kurdish officials with
regard to the PKK [the Kurdistan Workers Party]
which both then and now the American government
classifies as a terrorist group. We can debate that
issue another day. My point is that I agreed with
Kurdish authorities perhaps 75 percent of the time.
Too many Kurds, however, say, “You either agree with
us 100% of the time, or you are our enemy.”
Now, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan
Region President Masud Barzani are sophisticated.
But many members of Talabani’s Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) and Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) are not. Mid-level officials think, “I
will attack this American. I will say that he is a
Turkish agent, or an Israeli agent, or that he hates
Kurds.” They believe that if they badmouth
foreigners, that they can impress Talabani and
Barzani with their loyalty. This has happened not
only to me, but also to many other Americans.
Make no mistake: This is one reason why Kurds lose
friends. As Republicans lost popularity before the
2008 presidential elections, Kurdish officials in
the United States began to attack Republicans; they
found a new hero in Senator Joseph Biden, who would
soon become Vice President. The Kurdistan Regional
Government’s representative in Washington even went
so far to send an article on his office’s email
criticizing the Republicans for liberating Iraq, in
order to please Democrats who said Republicans lied
in order to invade Iraq. Now, two years later, as
Democrats suffer in the polls, they attack Biden and
praise Republicans. Such behavior may work in an
autocratic society, but it does not in a democracy
like the United States. The people whom the Kurds
attack—even if they do so only in Kurdish and only
behind the backs of their victims—never forget.
Certainly, American officials will continue to
conduct their relationships with professionalism,
but cold professionalism and friendship are not the
same.
This brings us to another point: American politics.
Many Kurdish officials ask: “Who is better for the
Kurds, the Democrats or Republicans?” My answer is
this is the wrong question to ask. The difference
between Democrats and Republicans is something for
Americans to worry about. Why should a Kurd, unless
he is an American citizen, care? It would be wrong
for such a Kurd to pick one party or another, just
as it would be wrong for me to support any Kurdish
political party.
Make no mistake: I am not a Kurd, and so I will
never support the KDP, or PUK, or Gorran. As an
American policy analyst, I will look at Kurdish
politics only through the lens of American
interests. When I criticize the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s corruption, nepotism, ballot-stuffing,
and repression of civil society, I do so because I
fear if these problems are not corrected and if
Kurds associate them with U.S. support for the
Kurdistan Regional Government, then anti-Americanism
will grow.
So if Kurds should not favor the Democrats or the
Republicans, how should they approach American
politics? Kurds should look at individual American
politicians and ask who supports the Kurdish
position on Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution?
Who supports the Kurdish position on oil? Who
understands the Anfal? Who stood for the Kurdish
people against Saddam in the past and who will
oppose other Saddam’s now and in the future? If the
Kurds do this, they will find they can have friends
in both political parties, and that, therefore,
their interests will be secure regardless of from
which party the U.S. president comes.
Let me give you another example. The Democrats did
very well in the 2008 elections which saw Obama win
the White House. I am a Republican and wish the
Republicans had won, but the American people spoke,
and so I will respect President Obama as my
commander-in-chief. Not every race was settled on
November 4, 2008, however. In Georgia, there was a
run-off election between a Democrat and Republican.
The Kurdistan Regional Government’s office in
Washington helped organize support for the Democrat
because they wanted to please Obama. This was a bad
strategy for two reasons: First, the Republican in
Georgia won. Perhaps he now sees the Kurds as his
opponents. Now, two years later, the political
calculus in the United States has changed.
Republicans are resurgent. We are not Erbil or
Duhok: More than one party is allowed to win. By
playing American politics two years ago, the
Kurdistan Regional Government risks its influence
after 2012.
Despite past mistakes and miscalculations, there are
ways in which the Kurdistan Regional Government
representation in Washington can augment Kurdish
interests. The Kurdistan Regional Government invites
many retired generals, many businessmen, and many
writers to Iraqi Kurdistan. This is a good idea: The
more people that are exposed to Iraqi Kurdistan and,
for that matter, the rest of Iraq, the better. But,
Kurdish authorities mismanage these visits. When
Americans visit Iraqi Kurdistan as guests of the
Regional Government, all they do is see one minister
after another, and have feasts at every stop.
Americans already know that Kurds make the best
kabobs. But, is that really why the Kurdistan
Regional government is spending millions of dollars
to bring Americans over? Isn’t Kirkuk more
important? Why not bring American delegations to
Kirkuk, to learn about its history and its
importance to the Kurdistan Region today? Why not
bring Americans to places that suffered during Anfal
besides Halabja? I know that the Anfal was not just
in Halabja, but most American visitors do not. The
Anfal wiped out dozens of villages and Saddam
Hussein’s government used chemical weapons on a
number of occasions. As tragic as the Halabja attack
was, the Anfal was not limited to 5,000 people in
Halabja.
I have limited time and there is much more to
discuss, but I want to leave time for questions. So
with that, I thank you. Zur Spas.
Michael Rubin
is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute. His major research area is the Middle
East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and
Kurdish society. He also writes frequently on
transformative diplomacy and governance issues. At
AEI, Mr. Rubin chaired the "Dissent and Reform in
the Arab World" conference series. He was the lead
drafter of the Bipartisan Policy Center's 2008
report on Iran. In addition to his work at AEI,
several times each month, Mr. Rubin travels to
military bases across the United States and Europe
to instruct senior U.S. Army and Marine officers
deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan on issues relating
to regional state history and politics, Shiism, the
theological basis of extremism, and strategy.
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