|
30 Years of Massacres and Political
Executions in Kurdistan, Iran: Part I 26.8.2010
By Shahabaddin Sheikhi, translated by Siavosh Jalili
for P2E |
|
|
|
August 26, 2010
Part I- Revolution Yes,
*Devolution No!
[*Devolution is the transfer of power or authority
from the central government to local and regional
governments)
In autumn 2009, when warnings were announced of the
imminent execution of Kurdish political prisoner
Ehsan Fattahian on the charges of waging war against
God (Moharebeh) and membership in a Kurdish
opposition party, a wave of opposition [protests]
were launched in Iran and abroad.
Attempts by national and international organizations
to
halt
Fattahian’s
execution
failed and human rights activists turned their
attention to save the lives of 14 other Kurdish
prisoners on death row. |
Shahabaddin Sheikhi |
Some may believe that
mass trials and executions is a new and isolated
occurrence in Kurdistan’s history, however, in an
attempt to shed light on this painful story that has
lasted 30 years, this report will deal with the
history of executions and massacres in the Kurdistan
province.
There are two accounts on how conflicts were shaped
in the wake of the 1979 Islamic revolution. The
common account, which is the one that the state
presents, claims that the Kurds took advantage of
the revolution’s instability and the central
government’s weakness to separate the Kurdistan
province from Iran. That is why the government, in
order to protect the territorial integrity of Iran,
uses full force against the separation of a part of
its land, thus conflicts occur between Kurds and the
central ruling establishment.
The Kurds, however, present a different account.
Kurds believe that in the negotiations that took
place before the revolution outside Iran between
Kurdish parties and other groups involved in the
revolution against the Pahlavi regime, the Kurds
were promised the right to self-determination and
autonomy. Nevertheless, once the revolution
succeeded, and in the course of post-revolutionary
turbulences and events, those promises, which were
never formalized in the form of an official
resolution or agreement, were forgotten. The Kurds,
however, insisted on their historical demand of
“democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan”. The
autonomy that the Kurds had in mind involved
political, cultural, and regional leadership of
Kurds over Kurdish regions: Governors and other
political officials would be elected by residents of
the Kurdish region; the Kurdish language (and mother
tongue) would be taught in schools; the content of
school books would be determined based on Kurdish
culture and customs; Kurds would be entitled to a
certain funding and budget; and they would have the
right to use and distribute this budget. Kurds
insisted that they will remain Iranian, and in
matters like national security, military, and border
disputes, it was agreed upon that the central
government would be the decision-making authority.
Abdolrahman Ghassemlou, then secretary general of
the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, had repeatedly
stated that the Kurds wanted their national rights
to be guaranteed and were not after an independent
government (E’tela’at daily, March 8, 1979). ”What
people of Kurdistan demand includes securing the
national rights within the country of Iran and not
separating Kurdistan from Iranian soil as claimed by
reactionary and opportunist elements. In our view,
issues concerning financial and banking affairs,www.ekurd.netparticularly
the design on banknotes and long term economic plans
deemed important on national and economic levels,
are within the jurisdiction of the central
government. Other issues (E.g. cultural,
bureaucratic, and social) pertaining to the
autonomous region are run by the autonomous
government. While the military and army are managed
by the central government, local police forces are
controlled by the self-governing authority.” (Kayhan
Daily, March 10, 1979). While the Democratic Party
of Kurdistan is fighting for autonomy for Kurdistan,
it also supports freedom and independence for Iran.
Autonomy is a demand that can be realized within a
democratic Iran. Our demands, be it national,
political or social, are expressed as part of and
within a united Iran (E’tela’at daily, April 5,
1979).
Despite such a clear and explicit stance, and while
army posts and other government offices were
liberated by Kurdish fighters and partisans, the
central government broke its promise and did not
agree to grant autonomy to Kurdistan. The nearly one
year-long negotiations between the Kurds and the
central government, that were even published in
newspapers at the time, failed and did not bear any
results. The Kurds, in turn, refused to accept the
authority of the newly installed government and
declared that they will either control their own
areas or the government will agree to their plans
that consist of several terms. After this
declaration, the government adopted a military
approach and launched an unprecedented military
campaign proportionate to a full-scale war. Many
Kurdish analysts view the reactions of the Kurds to
the government’s campaign as legitimate self defense.
Regardless of whether the former or the latter
account is the correct one, the reality is that the
wars and conflicts, unfortunately, resulted in
bloodshed and caused the death of countless innocent
youth, women, and children.
One has to consider that the new regime took power
through one of the more violent social-political
means of change, a revolution. The events that
unfolded as a result of face offs between the ruling
establishment and the Kurdish resistance were armed
with revolutionary propaganda.
Consequently, people who lacked experience and
competence and who were only revolutionary by name
were granted a large amount of responsibility [in
the government] and held important positions. The
impact of the actions of these officials was far
more significant than other elements.
It is noteworthy that before the various waves of
executions in Kurdistan, a lack of structure that
supported detentions and trials formed into
continuous bloody conflicts that inevitably led to a
trend of massacres. This does not mean that the
Kurds and Kurdish partisan and guerrilla groups did
not kill anyone from the other side, but government
forces were attacking populated areas, which
intentionally or not, resulted in the killing of
civilians.
In his blog
www.shahabaddin.com
titled *Neither My Type or that of Yours, writer
Shahabaddin Sheikhi reviews the history of
executions and massacres of the Kurdish population
in Iran post 1979 Islamic Revolution. [*the title of
the blog is a direct translation. The name of the
blog in Persian is "Na Az Jense Khodam Na Az Jense
Shoma"]
Copyright, respective author or news agency,
persian2english com
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the content of news
information on this page
|
®
