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Response to “American Scholar says Kurdish
leverage declines in Iraq”
27.5.2010
By Denise Natali for ekurd.net
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May 27, 2010
I would like to respond to the
article, “American Scholar Says
Kurdish leverage declines in Iraq”, written by
Wladimir van Wilgenburg and posted on eKurd.net on
May 25, 2010. That the author of this article did
not contact me first to verify the quotes and
statements is not only unprofessional but
misrepresentative of the content of my presentation.
On May 10, 2010 I attended a conference sponsored by
the Gulf Research Unit at Oslo University. The panel
I participated in was called, “The Next Iraqi
Government” and included eminent scholars such as
Dr. Rend al-Rahim and Dr. Reidar Visser. My
presentation, called “Kurdish Kingmakers in Iraq?:
Opportunities and Challenges to Coalition Building”
addressed the issues involved in post-election
politics and coalition-building for the Kurds and
the Kurdistan Region.
Mr. van Wilgenburg was correct to re-state my key
claim that two main trends are occurring in the
Kurdistan Region 1) dissipation of the strategic
agreement and rise of the KDP as an establishment
party, and 2) decline of Kurdish leverage in Iraq.
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Denise Natali is the Academic
Dean of Students and Research Centers Director at
the American University of Iraq-Sulaimaniyah,
Kurdistan region. |
Yet, I was dismayed to read how
Mr. van Wilgenburg presented my arguments and
detailed information, some of which is taken out of
context. Certainly, much of this misunderstanding is
based on Mr. van Wildenburg’s poor command of the
English language. Some of the sentences are
incomplete or misquoted. Here are a few that I
refute or which require clarification:
1.“The Kurds have limited objectives and
opportunities to form coalitions with Arab parties.”
Given the very detailed program that the Kurds
developed as part of their “Roadmap to Baghdad”,
which I explained and which was not presented in the
article, the Kurds do indeed, have clear objectives
based on a nationalist platform. Despite their
declining leverage in Iraq, the Kurds also have some
opportunities and political interests to create
coalitions with Iraqi parties in Baghdad. The
problem is how long these potential coalitions can
be sustained, given the particular nationalist
demands the Kurds are making as part of their
coalition.
2. The Strategic Agreement did not come “to a dead
end because of the loss of PUK power to Gorran”.
This is simplistic. Rather, it has been unwinding
over time, with greater clarity after the July 2009
Iraqi Kurdistan Parliamentary election results and
the March 2010 Iraqi parliamentary election results.
At the same time, there has been rising KDP power
and its consolidation as an establishment party. The
weakening PUK influence in Sulaimani is only partly
due to the rise of the Gorran movement.
3. “We see the oil companies as colonizers”, she
said. Mr. van Wildenburg must be referring to
Gorran’s opinions, because this is certainly not
mine and should not be written as “we”. I am not
part of Gorran or any other political party here. I
personally think the oil companies have played and
continue to play a crucial role in developing the
economy of the region and Iraq. The production
sharing agreements require oil companies to engage
in socio-economic development and give back
financially, to local community projects. Some Iraqi
groups and certain Kurdish leftist politicians may
hold this viewpoint, but it certainly is not mine.
4. “But PUK only wants to talk when they get Kirkuk
from Baghdad, while KDP’s priority is the oil
contracts”. I am not sure what Mr. van Wildenburg’s
point is here, but I certainly do not think that the
PUK or any other Kurdish group will refuse to
negotiate with Baghdad unless they get Kirkuk. The
statement needs more nuance. Such a position would
lead to political and economic stalemate, and I do
not think, given the current situation, that the
Kurds would or could put themselves into such as
corner.
5. “The strategic agreement could result in the
Obama effect’ and a loss of support for Gorran, due
to the increasing control of KDP”. This makes no
sense. My statement about the Obama effect was made
in reference to Gorran losing some of its
supporters, much the way President Obama has since
assuming office, because of the alliances it has
made with the Kurdistani List as part of the Kurdish
coalition in Baghdad. Some supporters see this
compromise as “selling out” and have criticized
Gorran accordingly. It has nothing to do with the
strategic agreement.
6. “The PUK is very weak and as a result KDP has
family members in high positions” . “The PUK.. does
not have anybody to replace Jalal Talabani..” The
KDP always has had family members in high positions,
which is not a result of the PUK political
situation. It is part of the party morphology and
internal structure of the KDP. Also, the issue of
PUK succession was taken out of context. When
talking about the future PUK leadership, the key
point is how someone will be able to follow in the
footsteps of Mr. Talabani, who is a legendary
Kurdish and Iraqi leader. This is a formidable
challenge even for the most skilled politician. My
comments should be taken as a complement to Mr.
Talabani and not be turned into an insult to anyone
else.
Thank you,
Dr. Denise Natali
Research Centers Director,
American University of Iraq-Sulaimani
Sulaimaniyah, Iraq
Dr. Denise Natali is an honorary research fellow
at the Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies,
Exeter University and currently is the Academic Dean
of Students and Research Centers Director at the
American University of Iraq-Sulaimaniyah. Over the
past fourteen years she has conducted independent
field research in the Kurdistan regions of Iraq,
Turkey, Iran, and Syria and is the author of
numerous publications on Kurdish nationalism,
politics, and identity, including, The Kurds and the
State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey,
and Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
2005), and The Kurdish Quasi State: development and
dependency in post-Gulf War Iraq (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, forthcoming). Her current
research, supported by a fellowship from The
American Academic Research Institute in Iraq (TAARI),
focuses on the political economy of Iraq and the
Kurdistan region since 1991, and the role of
external aid in shaping transition patterns in
conflict-prone and post-conflict societies.
In addition to her expertise on the Kurds and
Kurdistan, Dr. Natali has worked in the field of
disaster relief and humanitarian affairs. She has
held posts as information officer for the U.S.
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in
Iraqi Kurdistan, the American Red Cross
International Disaster Relief Services, the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and
cross-border director for a healthcare NGO in
Peshawar, Pakistan, where she also served as a
liaison to the Afghan Interim Government’s Ministry
of Public Health.
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