|
Iraq: The Long Road to a Government
27.5.2010
Analysis by Marina Ottaway, Danial Kaysi |
|
|
|
Analysis of the 2010 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections
May
27, 2010
Maneuvering to form a new
government in Iraq has intensified in recent days.
The recount in Baghdad is finished and the
distribution of seats remains the same. No coalition
has the 163 seats necessary to form a new
government. The new and rather shaky parliamentary
bloc that includes Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s
State of Law coalition and Iraqi National Alliance
is the closest with 159 seats. But Iraqiya—the
coalition headed by Iyad Allawi and supported by
most Sunni voters—emerged from the election with 91
seats and continues to hold out hope that it can
form the new government. Thus far, neither side is
willing to make the concessions necessary to form an
inclusive government that enjoys widespread support.
Maliki is determined to remain prime minister and is
currently the State of Law coalition’s only
candidate for the position. But State of Law only
has 89 seats in the new parliament, while Allawi’s
Iraqiya has 91. Thus, Maliki can only receive a
mandate to form the government if the new
parliamentary bloc announced by State of Law and the
Iraqi National Alliance in early May remains intact.
A break-up is unlikely, but not impossible.
INA-State of Law Remains
Shaky
None of the Shi’i parties in the Iraqi National
Alliance (INA) want Maliki to be prime
minister—opposition to him personally is what
prevented members of the INA from allying with State
of Law ahead of the elections—and they have
circulated alternate names. But Maliki has not shown
sign of relenting. Although the battle is far from
over, in recent days there seems to be growing
resignation among INA members that Maliki may get a
second term. As a result, Iraq is now witnessing the
paradox that part of the coalition choosing the new
prime minister—and one that will be part of the
government—wants to weaken the powers of the prime
minister.
A spokesman for the INA, Ibrahim Bahrul-Uloom, has
stated that the INA is proposing the creation of
three deputy prime minister positions, in charge of
the security, finances, and services, respectively.
At present, Iraq has one deputy prime minister.
However, the constitution does not call for a deputy
prime minister position (or positions) and it is not
clear whether the change proposed by the INA would
require a constitutional amendment. According to
Bahrul-Uloom,www.ekurd.netthe
INA has also presented to State of Law a 50-article
document that narrowly defines the job of the prime
minister, reducing the position to one of managing
the government, rather than being head of the
government. Shi’i parties thus remain quite divided,
despite the formation of the recently reunited bloc.
Discontent is not limited to the INA side. State of
Law is also worried that the agreement that allowed
to the formation of the National Alliance would be
difficult and cumbersome to implement. The agreement
included forming a dispute-resolution committee
comprised of equal numbers of State of Law and the
INA representatives. If this committee failed to
reach a consensus, Shi’i religious authorities
(interpreted as referring to Sheikh Ali al-Sistani,
who has neither confirmed nor denied his acceptance
of this role) would be empowered to make the final,
binding decisions. The arrangement is indeed
cumbersome, but it is doubtful that the INA would
have accepted to form the bloc without it. Trying to
modify the agreement could thus be dangerous.
Tactical Differences Among
Kurdish Parties
Fissures are also appearing among the Kurdish
parties, although they had announced after the
elections that they would participate in national
politics as a unified bloc. According to some
reports, the agreement reached by State of Law and
the INA when they formed the National Alliance
assumed the Kurds would back the Alliance, and that
they would keep the presidency in return for their
support. Statements made recently by various Kurdish
leaders call that idea into question. There is no
doubt that current President Jalal Talabani and his
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party want to retain
the presidency and will back the INA-State of Law
alliance as a result. But the leaders of Gorran, the
party that broke off from the PUK and remains its
main rival, is now suggesting that the Kurds should
not demand the presidency, but the speakership of
the Council of Representatives. Ostensibly, this is
because the latter position is more powerful. Not
incidentally, if the Kurdish parties accepted
Gorran’s position and opted for the speakership
rather than the presidency, Talabani would be
deprived of the position he covets. Even more
revealing of dissension among the Kurds is that fact
that Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan
region and the leader of the Democratic Party of
Kurdistan, appears to be distancing himself from
Maliki. Barzani has stated that Iraqi politicians
must respect the constitution and the people’s will,
and thus Allawi, whose Iraqiya coalition won the
largest number of seats, should receive the mandate
to form the government.
It is impossible to determine at this point whether
Barzani’s position is just an opening gambit to win
more concessions from the Shi’i parties or whether
there is a possibility that at least some Kurdish
parties will break ranks and back Allawi. Two
conclusions are clear, however. First, State of Law
is both angry and worried about Barzani’s position,
because it needs Kurdish support to form a
government. Speaking for the State of Law, Ali
Dabbagh angrily declared that the Kurds were welcome
to side with Iraqiya if they wanted, but then
thought better of it and denied having made such a
statement. Second, the Kurds are trying to exact a
high price for their support. Reports indicate that
they are demanding the implementation of Article 140
of the constitution, which calls for a referendum in
Kirkuk; control of the presidency plus at least one
of the sovereign ministries; an oil law that defends
their interests; and a commitment by the government
to provide funding for the peshmerga forces even
though the peshmerga have a degree of autonomy from
the Iraqi security apparatus. Baha’a Aaraji of State
of Law has declared that the Kurds will have to
reconsider their exorbitant demands if they plan to
negotiate seriously.
Allawi’s Chances Diminishing
The loser in this maneuvering appears to be Iyad
Allawi, who will probably not receive the mandate to
form the government. Only a serious misstep on the
part of Maliki (such as reneging on the terms of the
agreement that led to his coalition’s alliance with
the INA or too brazen a bid to exclude or break up
Iraqiya) could change Allawi’s fortunes. It seems
quite likely, though, that Iraqiya or at least
Iraqiya members will have to be included in a
governing coalition because Iraqiya received most of
the Sunni vote. On this point, too, State of Law and
the INA are divided. Al-Hakim has been open toward
Allawi and Iraqiya, and meetings have taken place on
a regular basis. Furthermore, al-Hakim, President
Talabani, and even Sadrist representatives have been
traveling to various Arab capitals, making a bid for
Iraq’s reintegration in the Arab world, in striking
contrast to Maliki’s aloofness. But Maliki has still
not met with Allawi, although he has repeatedly
promised that he will, once the time is right. Thus
Allawi remains in limbo at present. He is currently
keeping a busy international schedule (as are
al-Hakim and Talabani), and maintains contacts with
all political groups besides State of Law. He has
even gone to Najaf to pay his respect to Ayatollah
al-Sistani. But there is no sign that there has been
any breakthrough in his relations with Maliki.
It has become commonplace to say that the formation
of the new Iraqi government is still many months
away. Yes and no. The issues that need to be
negotiated before a government is formed need not
take months, unless all sides insist that all
outstanding issues be settled before hand—including,
for example, the referendum on Kirkuk and the oil
law. The INA’s insistence on imposing limits on the
prime minister’s power that require constitutional
amendments would throw the entire process into
disarray and cause longer delays. The real problem
at this point, though, is not that the issues to be
negotiated will take time, but that serious
negotiations do not appear to have started yet.
Iraqi politicians are still more focused on
posturing than on compromising.
Copyright, respective author or news agency,
carnegieendowment org
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the content of news
information on this page
|
®
