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The Iraqi political machine's "tricky
path"
29.3.2010
By Bashdar Ismaeel,
a
longtime contributing writer for ekurd.net
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March 29, 2010
Resolution of Iraq's issues
not without their "perils and dangers"
As the painstaking election process stumbles to a
close in Iraq, the intricate political work has just
begun.
Arranging and preparing for the national elections
in Iraq was complicated enough. The elections,
finally held on March 7, 2010, were hailed by
Western powers and generally observed as successful;
however, this was after much wrangling over the
election law that saw the elections postponed, a
highly contentious decision to ban hundreds of
alleged ex-Baathists weeks before the elections, not
to mention deadly suicide bombings on Election Day
designed to deter would-be voters.
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Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel, senior UK Editor |
However, the convoluted and tricky path for the
Iraqi political machine is very much ahead. If the
holding of relatively successful elections in the
face of a number of challenges was painstaking
itself, the formation of a new government to appease
embittered Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites against a
backdrop of mistrust will be an even tougher task
that will drag on for months longer.
Political jostling, with only handfuls of ballots
left to be counted, has already commenced with the
key parties vying for power already well on the path
of seeking coalition partners, with no group alone
likely to win the 163 seats required to form
government. The power for government is augmented
with the fight for the key positions of President,
Prime Minister, and Parliament speaker. The position
of President, for example, has already become heated
by remarks in some nationalist circles that since
Iraq has an "Arabic" identity, the post should be
held by an Arab.
However, even before tiresome negotiations ensue,
the Iraqi High Independent Electoral Commission (IHEC)
will have its work cut out to address claims and
counter-claims of voter fraud and irregularities,
particularly in Kirkuk. The IHEC is already under
fire for the labored nature of announcing the votes,
which has aided claims of electoral mishaps and even
calls for a full recount in some circles.
A different flavor
At least on paper, the elections present a good
prospect of facilitating cross-national
reconciliation. The political parties attempted to
undercut the sectarian divides, with Nouri al-Maliki's
State of Law coalition and his closest contender and
former premier, Iyad Allawi's al-Iraqiya,
encompassing a number of political parties across
sectarian lines.
With the Sunni turnout showing a marked increased
from the boycott of 2005, the competitive nature of
the elections was evident with divisions present
within traditional Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish
alliances.
The race for the hot seat
Whilst Maliki's hard-line leadership alienated a
number of groups, he was equally heralded for
installing security in Iraq and possessing the right
credentials as the nationalist leader that Iraq
required. On the back of the highly successful
showing at the 2009 provincial elections, results
revealed to date put Maliki in prime position to win
a majority once all votes are tallied up.
State of Law coalition is ahead in the symbolic
Baghdad constituency, which remarkably represents
one-fifth of the overall seats on offer. Al-Maliki
was ahead in several Shiite-dominated provinces with
the predominately Shiite Iraqi National Alliance
(INA) a close second in a number of these provinces,
as well as leading in three southern provinces.
Against the popular view that religious parties have
not fared as well, the Sadrist bloc of the INA has
gained a credible number of seats, and their
influence as well as that of neighboring Iran may
well dictate the shape of the future coalitions. A
strong showing by Moqtada al-Sadr is particularly
bad news for Maliki, who instigated the infamous and
bloody crackdown of his militia in 2008.
Whilst Maliki may be a leading contender, his quest
to reassume power in Baghdad is far from sealed. His
old foes and newly created adversaries will almost
certainly jockey ardently to ensure that he does not
win a critical second term in office.
In contrast, the surprising contender for the hot
seat is Allawi. Results show that the secular and
nationalistic agenda of al-Iraqiya bode strongly
amongst Sunni voters in north and western provinces,
many who remain sceptical at Maliki's Iranian
connections and Shiite control of security forces.
Al-Iraqiya gains include Nineveh, which has the
second highest number of seats up for grabs. As a
result of the strong electoral showing, Allawi is
neck-to-neck in the votes counted to date with
Maliki. Allawi could well strike a coalition
agreement with the Kurdish groups or the INA, as
well as other smaller parties.
In this respect, the coalition opportunities on the
table have far greater significance than ever
before. Depending on who can be enticed into the
political fold, a number of coalitions can be struck
and thus the jockeying promises to be as intensive
as ever.
Kurdish wildcard
The Kurds are widely acknowledged to assume the role
of kingmakers once more. With the Kurds looking to
achieve between 60-65 seats, this will have
significant bearing on who ultimately assumes the
premiership in Baghdad.
As far as the Kurds are concerned, if you have the
power to make a king, then you have to ensure the
"right" king is "made" at all costs.
Any future coalition will almost certainly require
the support of the Kurds, and this places great
leverage on the Kurdish bargaining position. The
Kurdish support for Maliki at crucial times arguably
helped to salvage the Baghdad government, especially
when Iraq was on a fierce downward spiral between
2006 and 2007.
A number of Kurds grew increasingly sceptical of
Maliki, but with al-Iraqiya vying directly for power
with the Kurdistan Alliance in Nineveh and
especially in Kirkuk,www.ekurd.netwhere
they have based their support on promises to ward
off Kurdish attempts to annex Kirkuk, Allawi is
hardly a firm favourite either. Comments from al-Iraqiya
liking Kurdish attempts at wrestling control of
Kirkuk to Israeli settlements was hardly the right
tonic to sweeten the growing bitterness.
Either way, the Kurdish aspirations of peacefully
implementing Article 140, resolving the issue of
disputed territories and agreeing on a national
hydrocarbon law, will certainly hold fundamental
importance to any prospective Baghdad partnership.
With growing pressure from the Kurdish public and
political competition at home, the KDP and the PUK
under the Kurdistan Alliance umbrella can ill afford
to leave Baghdad without Kirkuk and the key Kurdish
demands.
Kurds must stay as close as they can to the throne
of power to safeguard Kurdish interests, and may
well support any legislation and lobbying further
south as long as their status quo is maintained and
ultimately enhanced.
Race for Kirkuk
If the hotly disputed race for Kirkuk needed any
incitement, the close race between al-Iraqiya and
Kurdistan Alliance for the province is increasing in
intensity all the time. If the Kurds assume a
majority as they did in 2005 and as they anticipate
once more, this will aid their claim to annexing
Kirkuk to Kurdistan, with many eying the elections
in Kirkuk as a de-facto referendum.
While the final figures may well be disputed under
contentious guidelines outlined in the election law
specific to Kirkuk, the planned census in October
2010 will ultimately serve as the real battle to
secure the future status of the city.
Change in Kurdistan
The three provinces that officially make up the
Kurdistan Region had the highest turnouts across
Iraq. With the new Kurdish opposition, Change
Movement (Gorran), entering the fray in dramatic
circumstances in 2009, the race for votes in
Kurdistan took on additional importance.
As expected, Gorran faired well in the province of
Sulaimaniyah, but the contest with the PUK was as
close as ever, with the PUK performing strongly in
Kirkuk where Gorran was expected to make inroads.
It is too early to say to what extent the fractious
nature of the Kurdish vote this time around hindered
their quest for influence in Baghdad, but what is
clear is that without a united Kurdish voice in
Kirkuk and particularly Baghdad, the new political
competiveness within the Kurdish scene may well
hamper Kurdistan.
Gorran may well use their newfound leverage in
Baghdad to indirectly pressure the Kurdistan
Alliance for the much-hyped "changes" they propose
in Kurdistan itself.
Furthermore, with the much higher turnout of Sunnis
than in 2005 and with an increased number of seats
in Parliament not resulting in the anticipated
number of seats in Kurdistan in proportion to the
population, the Kurdish position becomes more
tentative as the dust settles on the new political
climate in Iraq.
American Withdrawal
Months of protracted negotiations and heated
discussions will take place, all the while as the
U.S. increases its demobilization efforts in
anticipation of its iconic withdrawal by the end of
August 2010.
While the next government will be the first under
full Iraqi sovereignty and under a relative blanket
of security, this does not mask the key constraints
and challenges that may hinder Iraqi progress once
more.
Progress is very much reversible in Iraq, and with
emotive and historically entrenched angles on
critical national issues, the resolution of these
issues will not be without their perils and dangers.
Regardless of any election outcome, entities in Iraq
will still decree a significant share of the Iraqi
cake. While the system of proportional
representation is designed to reflect the overall
will of the electorate across the mosaic, the common
policy of appeasement will be evident. For example,
to keep Sunnis on the political stage, the
expectation is they will still assume key posts, a
key percentage of the armed forces, and so on. This
appeasement policy was a key reason for the decline
in Sunni insurgency and the newfound security in
Iraq, not necessarily just strong-handed tactics by
al-Maliki.
The greatest danger for America is that while Iraqis
bicker and the U.S. military arsenal wanes, this may
yet give encouragement for insurgents to reassume
center stage.
Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel is a London-based freelance
writer and analyst,
a regular
contributing writer for ekurd.net website.
Ismaeel whose primary focus and
expertise is on the Kurds, Iraq and Middle Eastern
current affairs. The main focus of his writing is to
promote peace, justice and increase awareness of the
diversity, suffering and at times explosive mix in
Iraq and the Middle East.
Most recently he has produced work for the
Washington Examiner, Asian Times, The Epoch Times,
Asia News, The Daily Star (Lebanon), Kurdish Globe,
Hewler Post, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), KurdishMedia, PUK Online and OnlineOpinion.
He has achieved seminar recommended readings for Le
High University (Pennsylvania) and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. His work has been
republished extensively elsewhere on the Internet.
You may reach the author via email at: bashdar (at)
hotmail.com
Copyright © 2010 ekurd.net. All rights
reserved
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