February 9, 2010
With a population approaching 30 million, roughly
the size of Canada's, the Kurds are the fourth
largest ethnic group in the Middle East, after the
Arabs, Turks and Persians.
Their lament, of course, is that they do not have a
country of their own, living as they do in parts of
Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.
Nor do they speak a common language or practise a
single religion, although most are Sunni Muslims.
Instead, what binds these dispersed Kurdish
communities together is a shared and often violent
history.
This is why the recent execution of Ali Hassan al-Majid,
Saddam Hussein's cousin and loyal follower — known
to much of the world as Chemical Ali — has been
treated with such jubilation in Kurdish Iraq.
Almost as much as Saddam himself, al-Majid was the
face of the slaughter that was unleashed upon Iraq's
Kurds in the late 1980s, in particular the chemical
weapons attack on the community of Halabja.
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A Kurdish woman shows off her ink-stained finger at
the polling station in Kurdish Iraq in July 2009.
There has been political stability in the north but
not the economic boost Kurds were expecting. Reuters
photo |
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After Kurdish
leaders, seeking more cultural and political control
over the oil-rich north, decided to side with Iran
during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, Iraq
unleashed a policy of terror against its Kurdish
population known as the al-Anfal (spoils of war)
campaign.
Put in charge of maintaining order in the region,
al-Majid played a leading role in planning and
overseeing the operation, and in destroying the
rural communities that were the backbone of Kurdish
rebellion.
Change for the better?
Iraq's Kurdish region is often held up as a success
story in the troubled history following the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Kurdish is now an official language in Iraq
alongside Arabic. Hoshyar Zebari, a prominent Kurd
is Iraq's foreign minister while Jalal Talabani, a
former Kurdish rebel leader, serves as the country's
president.
As well, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has
had its autonomy over everything except foreign and
defence policy officially recognized in Duhok, Erbil
and Sulaimaniyah, the three northern provinces under
its control.
Depending on the outcome of a future (and
long-delayed) referendum, the regional government's
reach might yet extend to cover the province and
city of Kirkuk, whose oil field makes up around 13
per cent of Iraq's proven reserves.
Perhaps most importantly, the violence that has
plagued the rest of Iraq has not been seen in Iraqi
Kurdistan.
The problem, though, is that very little of the
change has trickled down. Much of the population,
particularly outside of major cities such as Arbil
and Suleymaniya, lack access to clean water,
electricity and adequate hospitals.
More importantly, judging by a recent bout of very
public protests, Iraq's Kurds seem to believe that
their leaders are failing them and that they have
not felt the improvements to their lives that were
expected to follow the U.S. invasion of 2003.
Halabja again
Photo (In March 2006, Kurdish protesters set fire to
the memorial to the 5,000 people killed in a gas
attack on Halabja in 1988. Security forces had
opened fire to disperse the protestors, killing one
and wounding eight. (Twana Osman/Reuters)
Halabja is a good
example. In March 2006, hundreds of Kurds, young and
old, took to the streets to protest against
government corruption, in the process setting fire
to a museum built as a memorial to Halabja victims
and destroying a monument erected in their honour.
They accused local officials of using the tragedy
for their own benefit by pocketing millions of
dollars donated by the international community for
roads, hospitals, schools, access to clean water and
job creation.
It was the largest protest Iraqi Kurdistan has seen
in 15 years and was followed by several other
violent demonstrations held in response to similar
concerns.
That feeling of betrayal has not gone way. In late
December, large crowds again confronted security
forces in riots that broke out in Pirmargrun,www.ekurd.neta
town on the outskirts of Sulaimaniyah.
Again, the demands of the protesters were the same:
jobs, schools, hospitals, clean water, electricity.
The KRG's response to these outbursts is that Iraqi
Kurdistan is still trying to overcome the legacy of
war and the brutality of Saddam Hussein.
Social and economic transformation, Kurdish leaders
say, will take decades and they must be given time
to craft the necessary policies that will attract
more foreign investment, particularly in the oil
fields that hold the region's future potential.
Movement for change
The fact that war-torn societies can't be
transformed overnight is obvious. But at the same
time the problems of Kurdish Iraq are much more
complex and deep-rooted.
Opening a business here often depends on one's
willingness to give a cut of the profits to one or
both of the region's two main parties, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK).
The ruling Talabani and Barzani families have
amassed impressive fortunes through their dominance
of trade, private businesses and land.
The many civil society organizations in Iraqi
Kurdistan — which the KRG regularly boasts about and
presents as symbols of an emerging democracy — are
almost always controlled by the KDP and PUK.
The same is true for the media and criticizing any
of this carries the risk of imprisonment and even
torture.
In July 2009, a challenge to the ruling parties was
made by the Gorran (change) movement, which captured
23 per cent of the vote in local parliamentary
elections.
Whether Gorran can succeed in cleaning up government
is unclear as the Kurdish security forces are still
ruled over by the two old-line parties and Gorran
activists have already come under violent attack on
occasion.
For all its promise, therefore, the future of Iraqi
Kurdistan looks bleak.
The KRG could well end up fighting the central
government for Kirkuk — which could lead to the
dismemberment of Iraq.
And even if the Kurds win control of the oil-rich
territory, there is no guarantee — given the power
fiefs that exist — that these oil profits will flow
to the poor and deserving,www.ekurd.netthose
victims of Saddam's brutality who had set so much
store in the cultural and political rights obtained
in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion.
- Peter Fragiskatos is a PhD candidate at Cambridge
University. His research focuses on aspects of
peacebuilding, economic development and
democratization, with particular reference to the
Middle East, South Asia and Western Africa.
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