Daily Online News
Independent daily Newspaper
  Home - Advertise - About - Email

  Know Your World, Fresh Perspectives in News ©  Link to us

 Flights to Kurdistan

 News RSS Feed News Archive Today in the History  

 

Download 




IKB Travel & Tours Ltd. Youshouldtravel.com
Direct Flights from London to Sulaimaniyah, Kurdistan-Iraq
A d v e r t i s e m e n t
 

Custom Search over 70,000 pages on Ekurd.net
 

 

 Wikileaks statements about Iran Syria and KRG are showing True Talabani

 Analysis — Opinion
  The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author

 


Wikileaks statements about Iran Syria and KRG are showing True Talabani  8.12.2010   
By Hamma Mirwaisi - ekurd.net     

Share |












December 8, 2010

Soon the people will ask who killed Talabani. It will be interesting to get Iranian, Turkey and Syrian document and comparing to the US document below. No doubt he is going to talk very bad about the US Government too.

Talabani betrayed Iranian Government here very well while he work for them and asking them always to help him with Iraqi shi’a political parties. The Iranian Government especially Iranian President and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) helped him to be appointed twice as President of Iraq.

Here he is advising the US Government to deprive Iran from the Chinese market too just like what they did with Russian.                          

Hamma Mirwaisi
“Citing increased Russian pressure on Iran, Talabani said he thought U.S. policies had been "wise." He offered that it would be

helpful if China reached a similar decision with respect to its willingness to further pressure Iran, and suggested that increased Iraqi oil production could help mitigate.

On China

China's dependence on Iranian oil, potentially freeing China to pursue a harder policy on Iran's nuclear program”.

Talabani betrayed Syria while his entire life received help from late President Hafez al-Asad and now portraying President Bashar al-Asad as stupid, see what he is saying below.

“Talabani replied that while Hafez al-Asad had been an excellent player, Bashar was still young. Referring to Bashar's leadership style, he said Arabs jokingly described Syria as a "Jamluka", a play on the Arabic words "Jamahuriya" (Libya's "state of the masses") and "mamluka"
("monarchy")”.

Talabani betrayed Iraqi shi’a Government and accusing them that they are not giving the US Oil companies contract.

“Talabani expressed surprise that companies from the U.S., which "liberated Iraq and therefore earned the right", had not won more contracts during Iraq's recently-concluded Second Petroleum Licensing Round ("bid round")”.

Talabani did not betray Turkey last year but he did few weeks ago openly?

Talabani betrayed his own friends in Goran, this is the people who fooled them for over fifty years. They fought for his ideas and many of them die for his dream. This is how he is paying them back calling them stupid and dumb.

Feltman's question about what Goran meant for Kurdish internal politics, “Talabani characterized the movement as an expression of dissatisfaction with the status quo”.

He did not betray the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker, he was trying to take revenge because speaker killed Ali Askery and other friend of Talabani based on order from Massoud Barzani.

Oh he has singed mafia family’s agreement with his counterpart Massoud Barzani. It is based on their strategically important agreement for Kurdish nation. That was last year statement from Talabani but for last few months he used Iran against Barzani mafia family too.

One thing is clear Kamal (Mohammad) Kirkuki is more Kirkuki than Jalal Talabani he claims to be. And he is not as foolish as you are.

One wonders Kurds do not have country because of statements like you Talabani and your partner in crime Massoud Barzani.

Responding to Ambassador Hill's question about whether Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Dr. Kamal Kirkuki would participate in the Kurdish Alliance List's negotiating team, Talabani characterized Kirkuki as "a foolish man" and joked that he was not really a doctor, not really named Kamal and was not actually from Kirkuk, as his surname Suggested.

References

On Iran

Feltman gave the U.S. assessment that the Iranian regime's failure to respond positively to elements of the October 1 proposal reflected divisions within the regime's leadership and an inability to reach a decision on its nuclear aspirations. Talabani cautioned against ignoring "the real crisis" Iran's regime now faced. Opposition born of the regime's heavy-handed response to election protests had clearly demonstrated that the regime lacked the support of a majority of Iranians. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei does not want to lose the sympathy of the Iranian street, but "cannot afford to appease it, either." Talabani expressed his view that recent remarks by Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani decrying. "plots" against Iran's nuclear program also constrained Khamenei's room for maneuver and threw into stark relief the internal political crisis the regime faces. There is "no security and no stability in Iran now", Talabani said.

MULTI-ETHNIC POPULATION CHALLENGES IRAN'S REGIME
--------------------------------------------- ---
-9. (C) Compounding longstanding fissures in the political landscape is Iran's multi-ethnic population, which had become an increasingly prominent source of friction, according to Talabani. Noting 14 Kurdish intellectuals were recently sentenced to death for peacefully opposing the Iranian regime, Talabani highlighted what he termed the emerging "partisan war" between the regime and ethnic Azeris. Talabani flatly said there had been "interference in and falsification of" election results by the regime.
IRGC ANTAGONIZING IRANIAN ARMY AND BAZAARIS
-------------------------------------------
-10. (C) A/S Feltman observed that Iran,s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was taking advantage of political instability and the leadership's paralysis to expand its writ. Talabani agreed, but noted that while the IRGC's leadership is united at the senior levels, divisions exist among the rank and file. The IRGC was not popular, he said: Iranian Army leaders were unhappy that the IRGC, a rival for resources and influence, was expanding its domain and Iranian merchants were unhappy about the IRGC's increasing involvement in economic Activities.

A/S Feltman underscored potential short-term dangers stemming from increased IRGC influence. An example was the increased IRGC naval presence in the Persian Gulf, where the U.S. and Iranian navies had longstanding experience with each other's operations and established bridge-to-bridge communication protocols to mitigate potential miscommunication.
-11. (C) Agreeing that the IRGC was trying to extend its influence, Talabani said the IRGC had to approve the appointments of most Iranian ambassadors, including all those appointed to "important states". He stressed the importance of differentiating between "what they (IRGC leaders) say and what is in their hearts". In their hearts, IRGC leaders are afraid; however, they adopt a maximalist public line in the belief it will help the regime reach the best possible deal with the U.S. and Europe on the nuclear program and other issues. Talabani attributed significant changes in the IRGC's leadership cadre to concerns about loyalty stemming from the widely-repeated view that 70 percent of IRGC officers voted for reformist former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, and presumably remain sympathetic to the reform movement.

IRAN "A VERY DIFFICULT COUNTRY"
-------------------------------
-12. (C) Noting that the U.S. had pursued bilateral and multilateral approaches, but had not been able to prompt Iran's regime to respond, A/S Feltman asked Talabani what Q-Iran's regime to respond, A/S Feltman asked Talabani what advice he might offer. After a long pause, Talabani sighed and conceded that Iran is "a very difficult country". While some Iranians claimed nuclear weapons were un-Islamic, the regime was making "quick progress" towards acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Talabani said he believed there were more secret sites than the recently disclosed one at Qom, and assessed that the Iranian regime sought to approach turn-key status with respect to its ability to initiate production of nuclear weapons. He noted the potency of the nuclear program as a "national issue" with which the regime could rally the Iranian people and deflect attention from shortcomings in domestic programs. Citing increased Russian pressure on Iran, Talabani said he thought U.S. policies had been "wise." He offered that it would be helpful if China reached a similar decision with respect to its willingness to further pressure Iran, and suggested that increased Iraqi oil production could help mitigate

on China

China's dependence on Iranian oil, potentially freeing China to pursue a harder policy on Iran's nuclear program.

On Iraq and Syria

IRAN-IRAQ-SYRIA RELATIONS
-------------------------
-13. (C) While Iranian leaders' views on individual Shi'a Iraqi leaders were "not homogeneous" (some supported former PM Jaafari, others supported PM Maliki), they are united in their desire for a Shi'a-led government and fear of a resurgent Ba'th Party. Talabani said a contact told him during his last visit to Iran that Muhammad Nassif Khayrbek, the former head of Syria's General Intelligence Directorate and a senior advisor to President Bashar al-Asad recently visited Tehran and proposed that Iran and Syria cooperate to bring Iraq's Ba'th Party back to power as "a bridge between Iran and Syria". (Note: Talabani flew to Iran on/about November 22 to appeal for the lives of Iranian Kurds sentenced to death. End note.)

A/S Feltman noted that while Iran and Syria agree on much, a major point of divergence is Iraq. Talabani agreed, noting that Syria heavily supported Iraqi Ba'thists, while Iran opposed them. Syria is actively working to change Iranian leaders' minds; however, Syria's support for the Iraqi National Movement coalition that includes, among others, former PM Ayad Allawi (secular Shi'a) and Saleh al-Mutlaq (Sunni with Ba'thist ties) "worried Iran."

-14. (C) Talabani said the Syrian regime approached him one month ago through a friend to ask that he help mediate between Syria and Iraq to reduce tensions stoked by PM Maliki's accusation of Syrian complicity in recent bomb attacks against GOI facilities in Baghdad. The emissary said Talabani should contact President Bashar al-Asad directly, and that Syria was willing to "cease all support for action against Iraq" if an accommodation could be reached. A/S Feltman noted that the U.S. was trying to identify ways to improve relations with Syria. Talabani stressed that if there were any improvement on the Israeli-Palestinian track, better U.S.-Syria relations could be possible. Recalling an exchange several years ago with Bashar in which he asked what Syria wanted from the U.S., Talabani said Bashar answered that he wanted the Golan back and a stable Iraq that would not work agains Syria, in that order. Talabani said he asked Bashar if the order could be reversed, pointing out that strong Syria-Iraq ties could help Damascus with respect to Israel.

SYRIA ERRS IN TRYING TO RESTORE IRAQ'S BA'TH PARTY
--------------------------------------------- -----
-15. (C) On Syria's support for those conducting attacks in Iraq, Talabani said Syria made "a big mistake" in thinking it could return the Ba'th Party to power in Iraq, which was their ultimate goal. The nadir of Syrian-Iraqi relations coincided with the period in which the Ba'th ruled Damascus and Baghdad. Syrian leaders wanted to play the role of "fraternal helpers" in restoring Iraqi Ba'thists to power. Baghdad's offer to reopen pipelines, supply gas and open points of entry on the Syria-Iraq border had been viewed suspiciously by Damascus, which did not believe a Maliki-led government would honor such commitments.

-16. (C) A/S Feltman noted that in conversations with Syria, the SARG always raised Iraq. The U.S. recently asked Syria to stop broadcasts from Damascus of Ba'thist-backed satellite channels glorifying terrorism and violence, but had not seen any action. Talabani offered that Syria was
Qhad not seen any action. Talabani offered that Syria was waiting for the results of Iraq's upcoming elections, in which they hoped a strong Sunni bloc would emerge, before making any decisions on its Iraq policy. Noting that the SARG was good at collecting cards,A/S Feltman asked Talabani when they might actually play their hand. Talabani replied that while Hafez al-Asad had been an excellent player, Bashar was still young. Referring to Bashar's leadership style, he said Arabs jokingly described Syria as a "Jamluka", a play on the Arabic words "Jamahuriya" (Libya's "state of the masses") and "mamluka"
("monarchy").

On Turkey last year

-20. (C) Talabani assessed Turkey's role with respect to Iraq as generally good and said his relations with Turkey were "excellent". Noting improved relations between Ankara and the KRG, he pointed to Turkish FM Gul's recent visit to Erbil. Turkey could play a positive role in the region and Ankara's policy towards Kurds (Iraq) and Alawites (Syria) was generally positive, despite opposition from the Turkish General Staff and some quarters of Turkey's parliament. He offered that Turkey could play a positive role with respect to Syria.

On Iraq again

SECOND OIL BID ROUND
--------------------
-21. (C) Talabani expressed surprise that companies from the U.S., which "liberated Iraq and therefore earned the right", had not won more contracts during Iraq's recently-concluded Second Petroleum Licensing Round ("bid round"), held December 11-12 in Baghdad. (Note: As reported ref E, only three of the seven pre-qualified U.S. companies attended the bid round and only one (Occidental Petroleum) submitted a bid. No U.S. companies were awarded contracts during the second bid round; however, ExxonMobil and Occidental won contracts in the first round potentially allowing them to develop nearly three million barrels per Qallowing them to develop nearly three million barrels per day of future Iraqi oil production, representing nearly a third of the potential total increase in Iraqi oil production from the two bid rounds. End note.) Ambassador Hill underscored that U.S. oil and gas service companies were expected to garner significant business as part of the effort to increase Iraqi oil production under the new contracts. He also noted that with the second bid round, companies from all five UNSC permanent members had production contracts in Iraq. Noting that Iraq's oil production could rival Saudi Arabia's in 10-15 years, Talabani said the second bid round would help allay concerns about Iraq's credit worthiness and highlight its potential to become a wealthy country.

-22. (U) A/S Feltman cleared on this message.
FORD
On Goran
Feltman's question about what Goran meant for Kurdish internal politics, Talabani characterized the movement as an expression of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Criticizing Goran's "negative agenda", he claimed the movement lacked an organized party structure, a program and leadership. Sharply criticizing Goran, he claimed its members were "politically immature" and did not understand politics outside the IKR. Dismissing Goran's significance for internal Kurdish politics, Talabani claimed "thousands" who had supported the party in July's KRG parliamentary elections had been disappointed by it and were now Q-elections had been disappointed by it and were now leaving. Talabani claimed many of those were joining Kurdish Islamic parties, whose ranks were swelling, to register opposition to the existing PUK-KDP bipolar order

SAUDI-SYRIA THAW PROMPTS CLOSER EGYPTIAN-IRAQI TIES
--------------------------------------------- ------
-17. (C) A/S Feltman asked Talabani what the visit to Damascus in October by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah after a five-year hiatus in Saudi-Syrian relations meant for Iraq. Talabani laughingly said King Abdullah told him "You and Iraq are in my hearts, but that man (Maliki) is not". Citing Maliki's "failed promises" to Saudi leaders,

Hamma Mirwaisi is the author of the book, "Return of the Medes". Born in Kurdistan, he is a US citizen and has lived in the US for over 35 years. He currently works as a speaker and business consultant for the Middle East region where he hopes to some day aid in the establishment of an “Economic Union” in the area spanning from Pak to Turkey and from Kurdistan to the former Soviet Union. He can be reached at [email protected] Return of the Medes is available now Buy.

Mirwaisi is a regular contributing writer for ekurd.net
. The views expressed are the author's alone.

Copyright © 2010 ekurd.net. All rights reserved.

 

Top

  The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author

 
 

Copyright © 1998-2014 Kurd Net® . All rights reserved. Ekurd.net
All documents and images on this website are copyrighted and may not be used without the express
permission of the copyright holder.