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Wikileaks statements about Iran Syria and
KRG are showing True Talabani
8.12.2010
By Hamma Mirwaisi - ekurd.net
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December 8, 2010
Soon the people will ask who killed Talabani. It
will be interesting to get Iranian, Turkey and
Syrian document and comparing to the US document
below. No doubt he is going to talk very bad about
the US Government too.
Talabani betrayed Iranian Government here very well
while he work for them and asking them always to
help him with Iraqi shi’a political parties. The
Iranian Government especially Iranian President and
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) helped him
to be appointed twice as President of Iraq.
Here he is advising the US Government to deprive
Iran from the Chinese market too just like what they
did with Russian. |
Hamma Mirwaisi |
“Citing increased Russian pressure on Iran, Talabani
said he thought U.S. policies had been "wise." He
offered that it would be
helpful if China reached a similar decision with
respect to its willingness to further pressure Iran,
and suggested that increased Iraqi oil production
could help mitigate.
On China
China's dependence on Iranian oil, potentially
freeing China to pursue a harder policy on Iran's
nuclear program”.
Talabani betrayed Syria while his entire life
received help from late President Hafez al-Asad and
now portraying President Bashar al-Asad as stupid,
see what he is saying below.
“Talabani replied that while Hafez al-Asad had been
an excellent player, Bashar was still young.
Referring to Bashar's leadership style, he said
Arabs jokingly described Syria as a "Jamluka", a
play on the Arabic words "Jamahuriya" (Libya's
"state of the masses") and "mamluka"
("monarchy")”.
Talabani betrayed Iraqi shi’a Government and
accusing them that they are not giving the US Oil
companies contract.
“Talabani expressed surprise that companies from the
U.S., which "liberated Iraq and therefore earned the
right", had not won more contracts during Iraq's
recently-concluded Second Petroleum Licensing Round
("bid round")”.
Talabani did not betray Turkey last year but he did
few weeks ago openly?
Talabani betrayed his own friends in Goran, this is
the people who fooled them for over fifty years.
They fought for his ideas and many of them die for
his dream. This is how he is paying them back
calling them stupid and dumb.
Feltman's question about what Goran meant for
Kurdish internal politics, “Talabani characterized
the movement as an expression of dissatisfaction
with the status quo”.
He did not betray the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament
Speaker, he was trying to take revenge because
speaker killed Ali Askery and other friend of
Talabani based on order from Massoud Barzani.
Oh he has singed mafia family’s agreement with his
counterpart Massoud Barzani. It is based on their
strategically important agreement for Kurdish
nation. That was last year statement from Talabani
but for last few months he used Iran against Barzani
mafia family too.
One thing is clear Kamal (Mohammad) Kirkuki is more
Kirkuki than Jalal Talabani he claims to be. And he
is not as foolish as you are.
One wonders Kurds do not have country because of
statements like you Talabani and your partner in
crime Massoud Barzani.
Responding to Ambassador Hill's question about
whether Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Dr. Kamal
Kirkuki would participate in the Kurdish Alliance
List's negotiating team, Talabani characterized
Kirkuki as "a foolish man" and joked that he was not
really a doctor, not really named Kamal and was not
actually from Kirkuk, as his surname Suggested.
References
On Iran
Feltman gave the U.S. assessment that the Iranian
regime's failure to respond positively to elements
of the October 1 proposal reflected divisions within
the regime's leadership and an inability to reach a
decision on its nuclear aspirations. Talabani
cautioned against ignoring "the real crisis" Iran's
regime now faced. Opposition born of the regime's
heavy-handed response to election protests had
clearly demonstrated that the regime lacked the
support of a majority of Iranians. Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei does not want to lose the
sympathy of the Iranian street, but "cannot afford
to appease it, either." Talabani expressed his view
that recent remarks by Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani
decrying. "plots" against Iran's nuclear program
also constrained Khamenei's room for maneuver and
threw into stark relief the internal political
crisis the regime faces. There is "no security and
no stability in Iran now", Talabani said.
MULTI-ETHNIC POPULATION CHALLENGES IRAN'S REGIME
--------------------------------------------- ---
-9. (C) Compounding longstanding fissures in the
political landscape is Iran's multi-ethnic
population, which had become an increasingly
prominent source of friction, according to Talabani.
Noting 14 Kurdish intellectuals were recently
sentenced to death for peacefully opposing the
Iranian regime, Talabani highlighted what he termed
the emerging "partisan war" between the regime and
ethnic Azeris. Talabani flatly said there had been
"interference in and falsification of" election
results by the regime.
IRGC ANTAGONIZING IRANIAN ARMY AND BAZAARIS
-------------------------------------------
-10. (C) A/S Feltman observed that Iran,s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was taking
advantage of political instability and the
leadership's paralysis to expand its writ. Talabani
agreed, but noted that while the IRGC's leadership
is united at the senior levels, divisions exist
among the rank and file. The IRGC was not popular,
he said: Iranian Army leaders were unhappy that the
IRGC, a rival for resources and influence, was
expanding its domain and Iranian merchants were
unhappy about the IRGC's increasing involvement in
economic Activities.
A/S Feltman underscored potential short-term dangers
stemming from increased IRGC influence. An example
was the increased IRGC naval presence in the Persian
Gulf, where the U.S. and Iranian navies had
longstanding experience with each other's operations
and established bridge-to-bridge communication
protocols to mitigate potential miscommunication.
-11. (C) Agreeing that the IRGC was trying to extend
its influence, Talabani said the IRGC had to approve
the appointments of most Iranian ambassadors,
including all those appointed to "important states".
He stressed the importance of differentiating
between "what they (IRGC leaders) say and what is in
their hearts". In their hearts, IRGC leaders are
afraid; however, they adopt a maximalist public line
in the belief it will help the regime reach the best
possible deal with the U.S. and Europe on the
nuclear program and other issues. Talabani
attributed significant changes in the IRGC's
leadership cadre to concerns about loyalty stemming
from the widely-repeated view that 70 percent of
IRGC officers voted for reformist former Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, and presumably
remain sympathetic to the reform movement.
IRAN "A VERY DIFFICULT COUNTRY"
-------------------------------
-12. (C) Noting that the U.S. had pursued bilateral
and multilateral approaches, but had not been able
to prompt Iran's regime to respond, A/S Feltman
asked Talabani what Q-Iran's regime to respond, A/S
Feltman asked Talabani what advice he might offer.
After a long pause, Talabani sighed and conceded
that Iran is "a very difficult country". While some
Iranians claimed nuclear weapons were un-Islamic,
the regime was making "quick progress" towards
acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Talabani said
he believed there were more secret sites than the
recently disclosed one at Qom, and assessed that the
Iranian regime sought to approach turn-key status
with respect to its ability to initiate production
of nuclear weapons. He noted the potency of the
nuclear program as a "national issue" with which the
regime could rally the Iranian people and deflect
attention from shortcomings in domestic programs.
Citing increased Russian pressure on Iran, Talabani
said he thought U.S. policies had been "wise." He
offered that it would be helpful if China reached a
similar decision with respect to its willingness to
further pressure Iran, and suggested that increased
Iraqi oil production could help mitigate
on China
China's dependence on Iranian oil, potentially
freeing China to pursue a harder policy on Iran's
nuclear program.
On Iraq and Syria
IRAN-IRAQ-SYRIA RELATIONS
-------------------------
-13. (C) While Iranian leaders' views on individual
Shi'a Iraqi leaders were "not homogeneous" (some
supported former PM Jaafari, others supported PM
Maliki), they are united in their desire for a Shi'a-led
government and fear of a resurgent Ba'th Party.
Talabani said a contact told him during his last
visit to Iran that Muhammad Nassif Khayrbek, the
former head of Syria's General Intelligence
Directorate and a senior advisor to President Bashar
al-Asad recently visited Tehran and proposed that
Iran and Syria cooperate to bring Iraq's Ba'th Party
back to power as "a bridge between Iran and Syria".
(Note: Talabani flew to Iran on/about November 22 to
appeal for the lives of Iranian Kurds sentenced to
death. End note.)
A/S Feltman noted that while Iran and Syria agree on
much, a major point of divergence is Iraq. Talabani
agreed, noting that Syria heavily supported Iraqi
Ba'thists, while Iran opposed them. Syria is
actively working to change Iranian leaders' minds;
however, Syria's support for the Iraqi National
Movement coalition that includes, among others,
former PM Ayad Allawi (secular Shi'a) and Saleh al-Mutlaq
(Sunni with Ba'thist ties) "worried Iran."
-14. (C) Talabani said the Syrian regime approached
him one month ago through a friend to ask that he
help mediate between Syria and Iraq to reduce
tensions stoked by PM Maliki's accusation of Syrian
complicity in recent bomb attacks against GOI
facilities in Baghdad. The emissary said Talabani
should contact President Bashar al-Asad directly,
and that Syria was willing to "cease all support for
action against Iraq" if an accommodation could be
reached. A/S Feltman noted that the U.S. was trying
to identify ways to improve relations with Syria.
Talabani stressed that if there were any improvement
on the Israeli-Palestinian track, better U.S.-Syria
relations could be possible. Recalling an exchange
several years ago with Bashar in which he asked what
Syria wanted from the U.S., Talabani said Bashar
answered that he wanted the Golan back and a stable
Iraq that would not work agains Syria, in that
order. Talabani said he asked Bashar if the order
could be reversed, pointing out that strong
Syria-Iraq ties could help Damascus with respect to
Israel.
SYRIA ERRS IN TRYING TO RESTORE IRAQ'S BA'TH PARTY
--------------------------------------------- -----
-15. (C) On Syria's support for those conducting
attacks in Iraq, Talabani said Syria made "a big
mistake" in thinking it could return the Ba'th Party
to power in Iraq, which was their ultimate goal. The
nadir of Syrian-Iraqi relations coincided with the
period in which the Ba'th ruled Damascus and
Baghdad. Syrian leaders wanted to play the role of
"fraternal helpers" in restoring Iraqi Ba'thists to
power. Baghdad's offer to reopen pipelines, supply
gas and open points of entry on the Syria-Iraq
border had been viewed suspiciously by Damascus,
which did not believe a Maliki-led government would
honor such commitments.
-16. (C) A/S Feltman noted that in conversations
with Syria, the SARG always raised Iraq. The U.S.
recently asked Syria to stop broadcasts from
Damascus of Ba'thist-backed satellite channels
glorifying terrorism and violence, but had not seen
any action. Talabani offered that Syria was
Qhad not seen any action. Talabani offered that
Syria was waiting for the results of Iraq's upcoming
elections, in which they hoped a strong Sunni bloc
would emerge, before making any decisions on its
Iraq policy. Noting that the SARG was good at
collecting cards,A/S Feltman asked Talabani when
they might actually play their hand. Talabani
replied that while Hafez al-Asad had been an
excellent player, Bashar was still young. Referring
to Bashar's leadership style, he said Arabs jokingly
described Syria as a "Jamluka", a play on the Arabic
words "Jamahuriya" (Libya's "state of the masses")
and "mamluka"
("monarchy").
On Turkey last year
-20. (C) Talabani assessed Turkey's role with
respect to Iraq as generally good and said his
relations with Turkey were "excellent". Noting
improved relations between Ankara and the KRG, he
pointed to Turkish FM Gul's recent visit to Erbil.
Turkey could play a positive role in the region and
Ankara's policy towards Kurds (Iraq) and Alawites
(Syria) was generally positive, despite opposition
from the Turkish General Staff and some quarters of
Turkey's parliament. He offered that Turkey could
play a positive role with respect to Syria.
On Iraq again
SECOND OIL BID ROUND
--------------------
-21. (C) Talabani expressed surprise that companies
from the U.S., which "liberated Iraq and therefore
earned the right", had not won more contracts during
Iraq's recently-concluded Second Petroleum Licensing
Round ("bid round"), held December 11-12 in Baghdad.
(Note: As reported ref E, only three of the seven
pre-qualified U.S. companies attended the bid round
and only one (Occidental Petroleum) submitted a bid.
No U.S. companies were awarded contracts during the
second bid round; however, ExxonMobil and Occidental
won contracts in the first round potentially
allowing them to develop nearly three million
barrels per Qallowing them to develop nearly three
million barrels per day of future Iraqi oil
production, representing nearly a third of the
potential total increase in Iraqi oil production
from the two bid rounds. End note.) Ambassador Hill
underscored that U.S. oil and gas service companies
were expected to garner significant business as part
of the effort to increase Iraqi oil production under
the new contracts. He also noted that with the
second bid round, companies from all five UNSC
permanent members had production contracts in Iraq.
Noting that Iraq's oil production could rival Saudi
Arabia's in 10-15 years, Talabani said the second
bid round would help allay concerns about Iraq's
credit worthiness and highlight its potential to
become a wealthy country.
-22. (U) A/S Feltman cleared on this message.
FORD
On Goran
Feltman's question about what Goran meant for
Kurdish internal politics, Talabani characterized
the movement as an expression of dissatisfaction
with the status quo. Criticizing Goran's "negative
agenda", he claimed the movement lacked an organized
party structure, a program and leadership. Sharply
criticizing Goran, he claimed its members were
"politically immature" and did not understand
politics outside the IKR. Dismissing Goran's
significance for internal Kurdish politics, Talabani
claimed "thousands" who had supported the party in
July's KRG parliamentary elections had been
disappointed by it and were now Q-elections had been
disappointed by it and were now leaving. Talabani
claimed many of those were joining Kurdish Islamic
parties, whose ranks were swelling, to register
opposition to the existing PUK-KDP bipolar order
SAUDI-SYRIA THAW PROMPTS CLOSER EGYPTIAN-IRAQI TIES
--------------------------------------------- ------
-17. (C) A/S Feltman asked Talabani what the visit
to Damascus in October by Saudi Arabia's King
Abdullah after a five-year hiatus in Saudi-Syrian
relations meant for Iraq. Talabani laughingly said
King Abdullah told him "You and Iraq are in my
hearts, but that man (Maliki) is not". Citing
Maliki's "failed promises" to Saudi leaders,
Hamma Mirwaisi is the author of the book, "Return
of the Medes". Born in Kurdistan, he
is a US citizen and has lived in the US for over 35
years. He currently works as a speaker and business
consultant for the Middle East region where he hopes
to some day aid in the establishment of an “Economic
Union” in the area spanning from Pak to Turkey and
from Kurdistan to the former Soviet Union. He can be
reached at hmirwaisi@gmail.com. Return of the Medes
is available now
Buy.
Mirwaisi is a regular
contributing writer for ekurd.net.
The views expressed are the author's alone.
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