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I do not see Iraqi Kurdistan becoming
independent in the near future, a US professor says
24.9.2008
By Namo Abdulla
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September
24, 2008
" I do not see the Kurdistan region of Iraq becoming
independent in the near future. This is not because
of a lack of will from the Kurdish elite or the
Kurdish populations.
Various referendums have shown the emotional will to
have an independent Kurdistan. However, statehood is
not built upon emotions, no matter how legitimate
these claims may be," says US professor Natali in an
exclusive interview with The Hawler Tribune.
Dr. Denis Natali is an American political scientist
currently teaching Comparative Politics at the
University
of Kurdistan-Hawler. She is an expert in the Kurds
and has followed Kurdish issue for about two
decades. She has written a number of incredible
academic articles about the Kurds and a book
entitled “The Kurds and the State”.
Here, in this interview, in detail she talks about
the nature of the Kurdistan Regional Government and
some other crucial ongoing issues concerning the
Kurds in Iraq.
If you classify governments where do you put
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)? Democracy or
Non-Democracy?
I would classify the KRG as a transitional
democracy. That is, a system attempting to move from
a former authoritarian to a democratic structure.
The KRG has attempted to incorporate some elements
of democracy, particularly in the institutions
established; a parliament in which laws are debated
and created,www.ekurd.net
civil society
organizations, some free press, and election
processes. However, like most transitional
democracies, the KRG has not been able to
consolidate democracy. Important structural
constraints and political culture hinder regular and
open elections. The socio-economic and political
system is controlled by the political parties and
there is limited space for individual liberties.
Scholars of democracy often talk about a ‘democratic
spirit’ that must coincide within institutions to
help advance the transition process. The Kurdistan
region is still lacking in this spirit, although not
entirely.
Given Max Weber's classification: Is KRG
traditional, Charismatic, or Bureaucratic?
The Kurdistan region is a transitional society
moving from traditional agrarian economy to one
based on market exchanges outside the family unit.
Part of this transition involves the political
institutions, and the attempt to move from a wasta-based,
personality-driven system to a rational,
bureaucratic one. Given the ongoing role of tribal
and traditional power structures in the political
system, the KRG has components of traditional and
charismatic systems. The large and expanding
bureaucratic function has not necessarily led to
rational decision-making, or weakened the role of
personalities in decision-making. Thus, I would
place the KRG closer toward a traditional system
than a modern one, although attempting to modernize.
By looking at the general image of the KRG, to what
extent is current Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
legitimate to govern its people?
A government is legitimate to the extent to which it
has the confidence of the people it governs. One can
question the very legitimacy of the first KRG by
examining its particular nature of representation
and system of governance. I first came to the
Kurdistan region in July 1992 to interview the first
parliamentarians of this government. I remember
clearly the euphoria of the situation and the
initial willingness of both political parties to
work together in the “fifty-fifty split”. However,
from an institutional perspective, there was little
legitimacy in this structure. The parliament had no
opposition party, the KNA could not call a vote of
no-confidence of the prime-minister, and new
elections were not held systematically. The
government was essentially a refabricated version of
the Kurdistan Front. Much has changed since then,
particularly as the newly unified KRG has become
more representative of the diverse ethnic and
religious communities in the region. Still, an
important component of legitimacy is open and free
elections for both a leader and the government. The
other is the nature of representation of the
legislature. In this sense, the KRG must re-new or
recreate its legitimacy in the post-Saddam era
through these mechanisms of democratic governance.
Kurdish main political parties claim that they are
secular parties believing that "no secularism, no
democracy" as this matters in the West that if you
are not secular, you are not a democracy. Where is
the relation between being secular and being
democracy?
It is difficult to find any democratic country today
that is entirely secular, that is, where religion is
separated from the state. The United States claims
it is, but the Christian Right under the influence
of George Bush has been active in chipping away at
the once secular system of the US. France could be a
good case in point, although it is ultimately a
“Catholic” country.
Even then, trying to making such a correlation
depends upon how you define democracy. If you take a
strict interpretation of liberal democracy, assuming
a minimal level of civil liberties,www.ekurd.net
institutions that assure
free and regular elections, checks and balances of
the political system and a support of individual
rights, then one can argue that any religion or
ideology based on underlying values of communalism
can be at odds with liberal democratic values
because individual rights takes priority over
everything else. Francis Fukayama makes this
argument when examining “Confusician and democracy”,
arguing the role of ideology and political cultures
counter to democratization. Similarly, other
scholars have shown the failure of democratic
transitions in the Middle East, using the ideology
of Islam as an impediment to such change.
To the extent that democracy is more than
institutions and the machinery of government, I
agree that a certain type of ‘political culture’,
values, or social structure is necessary. One can
have a parliament and a prime minister but no
democracy. The ‘spirit of democracy’ requires
commitment and protection of individual liberties.
This can only come from the way of thinking,
political socialization processes and culture of a
society based on the rule of law. At minimum,
religion and religious beliefs must be separated
from the state.
Free Market is a mark of liberal democracies. What
is Free Market? Does Kurdistan have Free Market?
A free market usually is referred to as an economic
system in which the state is separate from the
economy, or one in which the government does not
intervene in or control the market. There is no
really free market in the world today. Even in the
US, which prides itself on having a free market
liberal democracy, the government in Washington, as
well as within federal states, have intervened to
regulate prices or assist in times of turmoil. Look
at the recent housing crisis in the US. The US
government has attempted to ‘bail out’ homeowners
and assist in regulating the crisis. Yet, overall,
the market is one that is ‘self-regulating’ in that
prices of goods and services are determined by
competition of the market, and supply and demand.
This can be opposed to controlled market economies,
or those in centrally planned economies with a large
government role, like the former Communist states
and current day France. A free market should also
have mechanisms in which private loans can be
available as well as an independent banking system.
Given its historical legacies and institutional
weaknesses, the Kurdistan region does not have an
entirely free market. The Kurdistan region has a
“controlled Free Market”. The political parties and
leading families monopolize certain sectors, such as
telecommunications and lucrative projects. The fact
that borders have opened a various cheap goods from
China have been dumped on the Kurdistan markets does
not mean a free market has emerged. Rather, it
reveals the absence of quality-assurance and
controls of goods entering the region. Further, a
real free market would also be a market in which
employment opportunities would be enlargened to
private sector opportunities, and not one in which
the government provides over 76% of its income to
pay for jobs of its local populations. This is
counterproductive and a hindrance to a health
productive semi-free market economy.
You have written a book entitled, the Kurds and the
State, how do you see the close future of the Kurds?
Are they going toward becoming independent?
No. I do not see the Kurdistan region of Iraq
becoming independent in the near future. This is not
because of a lack of will from the Kurdish elite or
the Kurdish populations. Various referendums have
shown the emotional will to have an independent
Kurdistan. However, statehood is not built upon
emotions, no matter how legitimate these claims may
be.
My forthcoming book is called “The Kurdish
Quasi-State” and it essentially argues that the
logic of quasi-statehood leaves the Kurdistan region
weak and dependent. That is, without external
sovereignty the Kurdish quasi-state needs an
external patron (the US), international support, a
weak central government for its economic and
political survival. There are no quasi-states in the
world today that have attained statehood. The
Kosovars recently declared independence with the
tacit support from the US and its NATO allies,
however, the UN and international law has not
recognized this declaration.
The logic of quasi-statehood also means that the
Kurdistan region can receive the “benefits of
stalemate”, which allow it to maintain its political
legitimacy and economic development in a federal
Iraqi state. Some of these benefits include about
eight billion USD budget in 2008, and ongoing
support from international corporations and
governments.
Finally, the very structural constraints inside the
Kurdistan region – weak institutions, traditional
social structures, lack of social capital – prevent
a self-sustaining region at this time. The Kurdish
elite will first have to establish a generation of
highly education citizens committed to the idea of
Kurdistan and to be proud to be part of the
Kurdistan region. This sense of pride has certainly
weakened since I have first arrived here, and it is
an important component for any potential
nation-state.
Parag Khana, senior researcher in New American
Foundation, predicts that by 2016 the Kurds would
have their own independent state with being 20,000
American troops based in.
• What do you make of this prediction?
• Do you have the same prediction?
In general, I avoid point predictions because they
are contingent on a variety of factors, particular
when it relates to the Kurds and Kurdistan. I find
it hard to be so certain that by 2016 the Kurds will
have an independent state with such a certainty of
US troop level! There are important geopolitical
conditions that need to be considered before making
such as prediction, such as the resolution of the
Kurdish problem in Turkey, the PKK issue in Turkey
and in Iraq, the role of political Islam in shaping
future Kurdish nationalism, and the extent to which
the Kurdish secular nationalist parties will reform
and attain legitimacy from their populations. One
could also predict that if the Kurdish nationalist
parties continue on their road to corruption,www.ekurd.net
then Islamic groups will
have an increasingly open avenue to penetrate the
political system, just like they did in Turkey and
Palestine. This could affect the regional balance of
power and internal dynamics of the nationalist
project. There is nothing linear about the move
toward independent statehood, and at any point in
the trajectory of the Kurdish quasi-state, a crisis
or key transforming moment can move the nationalist
project on a different path. Thus, for instance, one
can also predict that if the security and economic
situation in Baghdad significantly improves and the
Kurdistan region stagnates or becomes unstable, then
the likelihood of this 2016 deadline for
independence weakens.
You are as an American, how do you interpret current
US-policy regarding the Kurds?
I will answer this as a political scientist first
because I do not see any relationship between my
national origin and analysis of US policymaking.
Foreign policy is about assuring one’s national
strategic interests – it has nothing to do with
charity or philanthropy. This all sounds very
Kissingerist, but the US is only doing what any
other country would do in the region - to protect
its national security interests. The US came into
Iraq in 2003 to overthrow Saddam Hussein, not to
create an independent Kurdistan. Although the US has
made unpardonable errors in the southern and central
Iraq, it has enabled the Kurdistan region to realize
important financial and political gains.
My criticism of US policy is that it is a
non-policy. There still is no specific policy toward
the Kurds or the Kurdistan region, and in fact, an
imbalance and contradictory approach to dealing with
the different Kurdish communities. One can no longer
divide the Kurds into neat categories by country of
origin and devise policies accordingly. The
transnationalization of the Kurdish problem means
that the Kurdish problem in Iraq must be managed
alongside the problems in Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
Failure to address the larger Kurdish problem,
particularly that in Turkey, is likely to result in
a more expansive and lingering Kurdish problem in
the future. More simply put, the US is going to have
to put more real pressure on Turkey to resolve its
Kurdish problem if it wants to see stability and
prosperity in the region.
You, as an expert of the Kurdish issue, how do you
see the level of successfulness of Kurdish foreign
policy makers with the US and other sects in Iraq?
The Kurdish leaders have managed to use their
leverage well since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. They
have compromised their nationalist agenda, worked
with the Americans and reaped the “spoils of peace”
from the war. Instead of demanding independent
statehood they played by the new rules of the
federalist game, which often required more
compromises, to attain economic benefits of
stalemate.
Some people have criticized the Kurdish leaders for
having pulled out of Kirkuk or negotiated away key
territories or issues immediately after the war. I
disagree. The Kurdish leaders were actually
pragmatic and had little real alternatives. They
could have unilaterally occupied Kirkuk with their
peshmergas, but would have lost the legitimacy and
support from the US and international community they
have worked so hard to attain over the past years.
Even today, with 95% of the budget of the KRG
derived from Baghdad, the only route is for
compromise and negotiation with the central
government, as well as regional states. One cannot
forget that the KRG has new forms of leverage, but
it is still a landlocked region surrounded by states
hostile to the idea of Kurdish nationalism. These
states will continue to impede Kurdish nationalist
activities.
Second, the Kurdish elite have also pursued a path
of economic development first as a means of
increasing their leverage and stability of the
region. I think this is a wise strategy because the
emotional calls for nationalism and the decade of
victimization has ceased, or at least weakened. It
is time to focus on economic strength and
reconstruction, which can only further legitimize
the Kurdistan region and its economy in the ideas of
foreign governments and international investors.
Once this stability and economic power is
established, then they can possibly open social and
political avenues as well.
Turkey was a strategic allay of the US and it
supported the US logistically in almost all its
military in preserving safe-heaven for Kurdistan.
How do you interpret the current Turkish paranoia
about a possible Kurdish independence? Was it a
short-sightedness by the Turkish foreign policy?
The Triangular strategic relationship between the
US, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds is not mutually
exclusive. The US needs both Turkey and Iraqi Kurds
for regional stability, and Iraqi Kurds and Turkey
also need each other for economic and political
development, as well as quelling their own political
problems. The fact that Iraqi Kurds and the
government of Turkey have differing views on the PKK
or the Kurdish problem in Turkey does not
necessarily make them “the Nemesis” of each other.
Politically some components of the Turkish
establishment, mainly the military, continue to
refuse to recognize the KRG and its leadership,
particularly the Barzani family. However, there are
moderate civilian leaders, policymakers and
intellectuals that argue that the government must
recognize the KRG and that the Kurdistan region’s
quasi-independence is a reality. The current AKP
government is making efforts to close this gap and
reach some type of accord with the Kurdish
leadership in Iraq.
Secondly, one should look beyond the political
landscape to realize the important economic
interrelationships that have emerged between Turkey
and the Kurdistan region since 2003. The Turkish
government exports nearly 4 billion USD worth of
goods to the Kurdistan region and has important
investment projects that are likely to continue for
decades ahead. I believe that as economic linkages
become more closely intertwined, avenues for
political cooperation can become possible. In this
regard there is a high level of cooperation between
the countries.
Look at this recent military incursion that barely
lasted a week. I was here in the early 1990s and
traveling throughout the Kurdistan region of Turkey
during the civil war. Silopi was bombed out and
there was no business to talk about. The Iraqi Kurds
had no real economic stake or leverage on Turkey,
and the Turkish military had no important
investments or commercial interests in Iraqi
Kurdistan. The military incursions went on, often
for weeks, and with the cooperation with the
different Iraqi Kurdish political parties as a means
of keeping the border open.
The political and economic context today has
fundamentally changed in the sense that both sides
have more to risk financially, as well as
diplomatically. If I were an Iraqi Kurdish
entrepreneur or political elite I would try to
entrench Turkish commercial interests in the region
as much as possible, with guarantees that can be
established along the way.
Copyright, respective author or news agency,
The Hawler Tribune
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