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Maliki Bolstered by Basra Sweep
29.4.2008
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April
29, 2008
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent crackdown on
militias in Basra has opened a fresh chapter in
Iraqi politics, given the army new impetus, and
restored a degree of public confidence in the
state's ability to enforce the rule of law.
But building on this success will depends greatly on
his next move, an operation to clear the northern
city of Mosul of al-Qaeda and Baathist militants.
When the operation codenamed "Charge of the Knights"
was launched in Basra around the beginning of April,
many saw it as a make-or-break moment for the prime
minister and for the Iraqi army. |
Hiwa Osman is a Baghdad-based journalist and a
former media advisor to President Jalal Talabani. |
Maliki's declaration that he would pursue the
"outlaws" to the end won him new allies and rallied
the country's political leaders behind him.
His Sunni opponents, in particular, hailed the
assault on the lawless paramilitary groups that
effectively controlled Basra as a bold step in the
right direction.
The major Sunni political bloc, the Accord Front,
had withdrawn from the cabinet, but has signalled
its desire to return to government as a result of
the Basra operation.
As Accord Front leader Adnan al-Dulaimi made clear,
one of the bloc's demands was to "hunt down and
disband the militias and curb the outlaws".
Sunni leaders have since indicated that the Maliki
government has taken sufficient action on addressing
their concerns to allow them to end their boycott.
Another gain for the prime minister was the
rapprochement he achieved with Iraqi vice-president
Tariq al-Hashimi, one of the most prominent and
powerful Sunni figures engaged in the political
process. The often strained relationship between the
two men was one of the factors that led to the Sunni
boycott of the cabinet.
Hashimi has publicly backed the Basra assault, and
now sits together with the prime minister in the
crisis operations room that is considering how to
handle the next issue on Maliki's agenda – Mosul.
Maliki has also won broader backing, reflected in a
declaration issued by the Political Council for
National Security, a 19-member body that brings
together the three-member presidency,www.ekurd.net
the Iraqi president
himself, the prime minister and deputy premiers, the
speaker of parliament and his deputies, the heads of
the various blocs in the legislature, the president
of the Kurdistan region and the head of the Iraqi
judiciary.
The document, which outlines the principles by which
Iraq's political system should operate, is broadly
supportive of Maliki.
Significantly, the only reservations were expressed
by the Sadrists, the supporters of radical Shia
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr whose armed faction, the
Mahdi Army, was one of the groups targeted in Basra.
From a military perspective, analysts and local army
commanders agree that the Basra operation was poorly
prepared.
Nevertheless, as the first real test of the new
Iraqi army, it was overall a resounding success.
By and large, the troops obeyed orders to fight
militiamen even when they shared the same Shia
affiliation.
There were some deserters, reluctant to fight
against fellow-Shia and Sadrists. Yet at 1,500 out
of the 30,000 men deployed for the operation, the
incidence of desertion was viewed as insignificant
and no cause for alarm.
Defence sources in Baghdad even welcomed the fact.
As one source close to the defence ministry put it,
"It was a good way to weed out the bad elements and
the unprofessional soldiers."
At the same time, the desertions highlighted the
military's need for more training, as well for a
proper vetting system during the recruitment
process.
All in all, though, the operation represented an
important step towards establishing a truly
national, professional army.
The government was given a further boost when Sadr
issued a statement urging the government to accept
the deserters to return to their army duties.
More recently, Sadr's appeal for calm and the
avoidance of bloodshed has generally been
interpreted as an admission of failure, and as a
sign that Maliki's drive to control Basra has been
at least partly successful.
Although the government now controls large areas of
the city including the port areas, there are still
parts of Basra that remain beyond its reach, and
many of the militia leaders are still at large.
After Basra, the prime minister has ordered similar
operations against Shia militias in other parts of
Iraq, in the face of repeated calls – largely
prompted by Iran – for an end to the campaign.
If he wants to maintain the current level of support
he is getting from across the political spectrum,
Maliki will have to show continued resolve to go
after the militias wherever they are. That will be
no easy task, since it will be unpopular among the
prime minister's own Shia constituency.
Maliki's leadership qualities both as prime minister
and commander-in-chief of the armed force are being
put to the test.
He was elevated to power in 2006 as the result of a
political deal between the diverse political blocs
that had won seats in parliament. Over the past two
years, however, many questions have been raised
about his capacity to lead a government of national
unity and to act as a truly non-sectarian prime
minister.
To an extent, the Basra operation has quelled those
doubts.
By the time he embarks on a military operation to
regain control over Mosul, he will need to have
removed the last traces of doubt that he is a prime
minister for all Iraqis, and that Shia and Sunni
"outlaws" are to be dealt with in exactly the same
manner.
By the same token, the current level of Sunni
support will need to be sustained when it comes to
the Mosul operation, especially as it is expected to
be a lot more difficult than Basra was.
Winning the backing of leading Sunni politicians to
take on wayward Shia militias is one thing; asking
them to approve military action in a city regarded
as a hotbed of Sunni Islamists and Arab nationalists
is quite another.
In Mosul, the enemy is an amalgam of al-Qaeda and
diehard Baathists. These forces are a lot less
visible, and a good deal more effective, than the
Mahdi Army.
Another problem is that unlike the western Sunni
provinces, Mosul has not seen the emergence of
strong "awakening councils" – the local groups which
have taken up arms against al-Qaeda.
In short, much of what was achieved in Basra is
going to be sorely tested in the Mosul operation.
Basra was about demonstrating that Iraq has one army
and one commander-in-chief. Mosul will test whether
Sunni political groups really subscribe to this
notion.
Hiwa Osman is IWPR Country Director for Iraq.
Before taking up this post earlier in 2008, he
served for over two years as Media Advisor to
President Jalal Talabani.
The views expressed in this article are not
necessarily the views of IWPR.
Copyright, respective author or news agency, iwpr
net
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