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PKK triumphant as Ankara retreats from
Iraqi Kurdistan
4.3.2008
By David Romano - opinion
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March 4, 2008
After only eight days, Turkey abruptly ended its
military incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan on Friday
February 29. The withdrawal of Turkish troops caught
many observers, as well as the Turkish public, by
surprise.
Only one day earlier, Turkish Chief of Staff General
Yasar Buyukanit refused to announce a withdrawal
date following pressure from U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates and President George W. Bush.
Both Gates and Bush publicly asked Turkey to keep
its incursion “as short as possible,” to which
Buyukanit responded, “The shortest time is a
relative concept. It may be one day or it might mean
a year" (NTV, February 28). Turkish media at the
same time reported about the Turkish military’s
plans to go as deep as 50 kilometers into Iraq and
capture the main Qandil base of the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) (Yeni Safak, February 26).
The abrupt withdrawal only one day after Gates’s
request and visit to Ankara led to accusations that
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government had
caved into U.S. pressure to end the operation. While
both Erdogan and the Turkish military insisted that
the withdrawal was already planned for February 29
and not the result of outside pressure, various
observers speculated otherwise. Writing for one of
Turkey’s most widely read newspapers, columnist
Yilmaz Ozdil speculated that
Turkey received its recent $6.2 billion World
Bank loan in return for ending the operation.
He added that “Bush asked us to get out. We got out.
When on holiday, you can’t even check out of your
hotel room that quickly” (Hurriyet,www.ekurd.net
March 1). Today’s Zaman,
on the other hand, cited reports that the military’s
withdrawal surprised even the Turkish government:
“...[on Friday] Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
had to revise the text of an address to the nation
to take into account the troop withdrawal. In the
text, Erdogan spoke of continued operations” (March
3). Turkish opposition leader Deniz Baykal (CHP)
added that “We all wish that the operation had
achieved lasting results. This is not possible in
eight days" (Today’s Zaman, March 3).
The PKK claimed victory from the withdrawal.
Speaking from his still very much intact base in the
Qandil Mountains, PKK leader Murat Karayilan
announced that Turkey “attacked our forces on three
fronts in the Zap region, but failed to achieve
their goals even though the Turkish army has
advanced technology and jet fighters that flew over
the combat zone and bombed us non-stop” (AFP, March
1). While the Turkish army claims to have killed
some 250 PKK militants and lost 24 soldiers, the PKK
admits to only a handful of losses and claims 130
Turkish soldiers killed and one helicopter downed
(which Turkey admits to as well). Karayilan also
tried hard to portray the Turkish incursion as an
attack on all Kurds, rather than just the PKK. Other
Kurdish sources claim that in addition to the PKK’s
stiff resistance, the heavy snows of this remote
part of Iraqi Kurdistan forced Turkey to abandon the
operation (Kurdistan Observer, February 29).
From the Iraqi Kurds’ perspective, the difficulties
that the Turkish operation faced vindicates their
reluctance to move against the PKK militarily. If
Turkey, with advanced attack helicopters, F-16s,
heavy artillery, tanks, and airborne commandos can
not dislodge the PKK,www.ekurd.net
how can the Kurdistan
Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) be expected to do
so? KRG representative Safeen Dizayee commented to
Turkish media that “5,000, even 50,000 troops” could
not control Qandil, just as Saddam never managed to
control the area either (Hurriyet, February 28).
Although Turkey undoubtedly caused the PKK some
damage with this latest incursion, guerrilla forces
typically disperse quickly in the face of large
scale attacks, leaving few casualties. Lost supply
depots and recruits can then be replaced in short
order, particularly if the fighting raises the
profile and legitimacy of the guerrillas. In fact,
Iraqi Kurdish leaders told Jamestown that they
suspect that the latest round of fighting made a
weak and isolated PKK more politically relevant than
before (Interview with Qubad Talabani, KRG
Representative to the U.S., March 1).
The tally of casualties for the PKK and Turkey in
this latest round of fighting may remain difficult
to determine conclusively. In the larger scheme of
things, it may not matter much either: if the PKK
manages to portray itself as having given the
Turkish army a bloody nose this time around, the
group will have burnished its Kurdish nationalist
credentials, legitimacy, and stature – which are the
main objectives in this kind of guerrilla war.
To really undercut the PKK’s legitimacy and support
base, Ankara would need to go further in convincing
Kurds in the country that there is little
justification for the PKK’s resort to violence.
Prime Minister Erdogan’s government may now turn
around and tell Turkey’s public and powerful
military that a change in strategy is needed, and to
push more economic development in the southeast as
well as human rights, minority rights, and other
political reforms. This kind of political program
might also get a more willing collaboration from the
Iraqi Kurds. KRG officials are eager to act as
intermediaries in negotiations for a political
settlement that would bring the PKK down from their
mountain camps. The PKK itself has called for this
dialogue. Such a strategy has a better chance of
scoring a real victory against the PKK, in contrast
to the frequently proclaimed, but ever elusive,
military solutions.
jamestown org
** Kurds are not recognized as an official minority
in Turkey and are denied rights granted to other
minority groups. Under EU pressure, Turkey recently
granted Kurds limited rights for broadcasts and
education in the Kurdish language, but critics say
the measures do not go far enough.
The use of the term "Kurdistan" is vigorously
rejected due to its alleged political implications
by the Republic of Turkey, which does not recognize
the existence of a "Turkish Kurdistan" Southeast
Turkey.
Others estimate over 40 million Kurds live in Big
Kurdistan (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia),
which covers an area as big as France, about half of
all Kurds which estimate to 20 million live in
Turkey.
Turkey is home to over 25 million ethnic Kurds, a
large Turkey's Kurdish community openly sympathise
with the Kurdish PKK for a Kurdish homeland in the
country's mainly Kurdish southeast of Turkey.
Before August 2002, the Turkish government placed
severe restrictions on the use of Kurdish language,
prohibiting the language in education and broadcast
media. The Kurdish alphabet is still not recognized
in Turkey, and use of the Kurdish letters X, W, Q
which do not exist in the Turkish alphabet has led
to judicial persecution in 2000 and 2003
The Kurdish flag flown officially in Iraqi Kurdistan
but unofficially flown by Kurds in Armenia. The flag
is banned in Iran, Syria, and Turkey where flying it
is a criminal offence"
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan (
Kurdistan-Turkey)
wikipedia
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