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The Kurdish Front
7.2.2008
By David L. Phillips
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February 7, 2008
Continued democratization and economic development
is the best way for Turkey to drain the swamp of
domestic support for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
A comprehensive solution also requires cooperation
between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional
Government, from whose territory the PKK operates.
Instead, Turkey has gone for the military option,
risking a regional conflagration that would
destabilize Iraq.
After U.S. President George W. Bush agreed on Nov. 5
to provide actionable intelligence on the PKK to
Ankara, Turkey launched a series of air strikes
against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Though nearly 30
PKK members were killed in the first attack in
December, subsequent sorties only struck some empty
caves and abandoned settlements, inflicting little
damage to the terrorists' infrastructure or
capabilities.
The Iraqi Kurdish leadership -- Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani, president of the
Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government -- has reacted
calmly. |

David L. Phillips is
project director of the National Committee on
American Foreign Policy and a visiting scholar at
Columbia's Center for the Study of Human Rights. |
They are prepared
to put up with an air strike or two if it helps
mollify Turkish hard-liners and prevent a
large-scale ground invasion. But their patience is
not without limit. Fear is spreading among Iraqi
Kurds, who demand a tougher response from their
leaders. Turkish air strikes also endanger civilians
nearby, and the regional Kurdish government may have
to deal with refugees if the strikes continue.
There is also a growing outcry against the United
States among Iraqi Kurds, who are among Washington's
strongest allies in the country. They feel betrayed
by America's complicity in Turkey's attacks. The
U.S. sold out the Iraqi Kurds twice in recent
history -- once in 1975 when the CIA ceased support
for them, and then again during the U.S.-Iraq war in
1991, when Washington encouraged the Kurds to rebel
against Saddam Hussein only to abandon them later
when the Baath regime struck back. Iraqi Kurds fear
history might be repeating itself.
Knowing that it is in their interest to reduce
cross-border violence, Messrs. Talabani and Barzani
recently convinced the PKK to announce a cease-fire
and intervened to secure the release of eight
Turkish soldiers held captive by the PKK.
They have also targeted the PKK's financing and
information infrastructure. The Kurdistan Regional
Government stepped up efforts to interdict PKK cash
couriers by bolstering security at local airports.
Checkpoints have been established around PKK bases
in Iraq's Qandil Mountains,www.ekurd.net
monitoring the flow of
goods and barring all foreign and local press to
stop the PKK from using the media for propaganda.
The government closed all official PKK offices and
shuttered other Iraqi Kurdish groups, like the
Democratic Solution Party, that espouse violence
against Turkey.
While the regional government is ready to put
pressure on the PKK, it is not ready to confront
them militarily. Mr. Barzani, whose forces joined
Turkish troops in operations against the PKK twice
in the 1990s told me that thousands of his men were
"martyred" attacking camps that even Saddam believed
were too well fortified to destroy.
While taking practical steps to contain the PKK, the
regional government has also tried to foster better
relations with Ankara. Iraqi Kurds promised Turkey
lucrative business opportunities in the region's oil
and gas sector once Iraqi legislation on production
sharing agreements with foreign partners has been
passed. But Turkey has responded with a cold
shoulder, rejecting the offer until the PKK problem
has been solved.
Worse, it is threatening economic sanctions against
the Kurdistan Regional Government for harboring the
PKK. While slowing trade at the Harbur Gate on the
Turkey-Iraq border, Ankara is also dragging its feet
on an agreement to open a second border crossing to
facilitate travel and trade with Iraq. Ankara
believes its economic leverage will pressure Iraqi
Kurds to confront the PKK. But economic sanctions
will also hurt Turkish businesses, which have
received the lion's share of reconstruction
contracts in Northern Iraq.
Ankara also refuses to have any meaningful
diplomatic contact with Iraqi Kurdistan Regional
Government officials. Nor has it responded to the
Iraqi Kurdish proposal for a summit on regional
security cooperation among the U.S., Iraq, Turkey
and the regional government.
With winter immobilizing the PKK in its Qandil
stronghold, there is a window of opportunity for the
United States to use its influence over Turkey and
the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to foster trilateral
cooperation. Not only is the Kurdistan Regional
Government key to solving the PKK problem.
Trilateral cooperation is critical for the surge in
Iraq, where Iraqi Kurdish units fight side by side
with the U.S. military, whose supplies are
transported via Turkey.
Instead, the PKK has been able to push the U.S. into
the unenviable position of taking sides between
Turkey and Iraq's Kurds. No doubt the PKK welcomes
Turkey's military action because it fuels Kurdish
nationalism and undermines moderates seeking a
peaceful solution. And the PKK will surely respond
to Turkey's attacks by striking back.
The escalation of this deadly conflict also plays
into the hands of Turkey's "deep state" -- a web of
military and security officials, the bureaucracy,
and corrupt politicians with ties to Mafia types
waiting in the wings to reassert their power and
privileges. Seeing themselves as the defenders of
secularism,www.ekurd.net
these forces are deeply
distrustful of the Justice and Development Party's
Muslim leadership (AKP), which just moved to lift a
ban on wearing head scarves in public universities
and arrested ultranationalists suspected of
political killings. The "deep state" would surely
like to use the resurgent PKK as an excuse to crack
down on the AKP, thereby shrinking the space for
democratic participation and radicalizing Turkey's
Islamists. This would also reduce Turkey's chances
of joining the European Union.
Instead of giving a green light to further Turkish
military actions, the Bush administration should
intensify its diplomacy to achieve a nonmilitary
solution to the PKK problem. The U.S. should
encourage the Kurdistan Regional Government to
ratchet up pressure on the PKK by arresting its
leaders on Interpol's "Most Wanted" list. And
Washington should urge Turkey to deepen and
accelerate democratic reforms. This needs to be done
quickly before a new round of PKK terror attacks
sabotage prospects for conciliation and cooperation
among the U.S., Turkey and Kurdish leaders in Iraq.
Mr. Phillips is project director of the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy and a visiting
scholar at Columbia's Center for the Study of Human
Rights.
wsj com
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