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Iraqi Kurd official says Kurds unequal US
ally
27.1.2008
By
Farid Asasard, Kurdistani Nwe.
OSC Translated Excerpt
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The
USG Open Source Center translates an opinion piece
from a major Kurdish Iraqi newspaper containing
quotes from a Kurdish official about the Kurdish-US
relationship. The piece maintains that the alliance
is one of convenience on the US side; is not as
strong as that between Washington and Kuwait; and
may not last if the interests of the two diverge.
[This disillusionment may derive from the green
light the US has recently given Turkey to bomb
Kurdish villages in northern Iraq that are suspected
of harboring guerrillas of the Kurdish Workers Party
or PKK.] Juan Cole.
January
27, 2008
Excerpt from opinion piece by Farid Asasard - fourth
in a series of articles - entitled "Kurdish-US-
relations between desire and fact with an
introduction by the editorial secretary of
Kurdistani Nuwe: |
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The fall of the former
regime was the basis for Kurdish-US common
interests", carried by Iraqi Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) newspaper Kurdistani Nuwe on 24
January (Introduction by editor) The alliance or
friendship between the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and
the USA is often discussed by Kurdish officials and
occasionally the Americans indicate that they are
friends of the Kurds and support their democratic
experience.
What is the truth about that friendship and
alliance, if it exists? How, and on what criterion
and basis of clear interests the Iraqi Kurds are the
friends of the USA or the USA is the friend of the
Kurds? In which written text,www.ekurd.net
agreement or document
has that friendship been recorded? Does the essence
of that friendship have an official and strategic
basis or is it the outcome of a common perception
regarding some of the events in Iraq and having some
common interests in Iraq and the region? Does the
friendship include moral commitment and obligation
regarding the interests of both sides or is it just
about the Kurds going along with US interests and
adapting themselves to the wishes of the superpower?
How does the Kurdish leadership view the friendship?
How confident are they about it and can they rely on
it? To what extent is the friendship without a
future? What are the long-term conditions of this
friendship?
Do the Kurds have other superpowers to rely on for
support as regards their rights and political
demands in Iraq? Do the Kurds have a strong card to
bind the USA to the supposed friendship with the
Kurds? What would happen to the Kurds' political
standing if the USA finds other reliable friends in
Iraq? Is there a possibility that the USA would one
day turn its back on the Kurds and their friendship
and at what stage would that take place? Have the
Kurds considered the possibility that the US may
withdraw its friendship with the Kurds for whatever
reason?
The Kurdish leadership needs to have a clear
perception of the truth about its relationship with
the US in order to have a clear political vision.
Would they need to take the friendship to a
strategic level and find out how to do that?
What is the Kurdish status in the recently-signed
strategic accord between Iraq and the USA? What kind
of consideration has been given to us and does the
USA view the Kurds within the framework of Iraq or
would they be given special treatment?
(Head of Strategic Study Centre Farid Asasard) The
Kurds supported the US in its 2003 war against the
former regime in Iraq. In fact that war marked a
turning point in Kurdish-US relations and the Kurds
and the US became allies in that war.
All the Kurdish alliances in the 20th Century ended
in defeat for Kurdish interests. This applies to
Kurdish alliance with the Kemalists (referring to
followers of Turkey's first President Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk) against Greece and Britain up until their
alliance with Iran during the eight-year war between
Iran and Iraq.
The Kurds in 1990 were exasperated with alliances
but decided to take part in the US plan without
consulting the US. Thus, the Kurdish-US alliance in
the 2003 war was the first in which the Kurds gained
something. As much as the alliance was unclear in
2003, it remains so until now. The Kurdish-US
alliance resembles an alliance between a mouse and a
lion. However, the roots, framework, the path
followed and perseverance will show which one is the
lion and which one the mouse (as published).
It is possible to overlook the issue and consider
the alliance as one between a small nation and a
world power, and it is like a card game for the
small nation; it will either win well or lose badly.
(Passage omitted)
Kurdish-US alliance is not bound by any declared
pledge, agreement or written text, which leads to
the absence of a framework for clearly identifying
common interests. No alliance can exist without
common interests, but the issue here is not about
common interests because a number of factors, other
than common interests,www.ekurd.net
affect and ensure the
establishment and persistence of common interests
and under certain conditions they could become the
basis for the development of these interests, while
under different conditions they could destroy them
and bring about dramatic changes and wipe off their
traces. (Passage omitted)
The Kurds' immediate interest was in the fall of the
former regime, and it was on the basis of the
destruction of the former regime that common
interests between Kurds and the US are being
established. Prior to the fall of the former regime,
the US was busy planning the creation of a new Iraq
and they had gained experience in that area in
Germany, Japan, Greece and Italy. The US strategic
planning was for Iraq to spearhead change in the
region. The plan, which was put into action after
the fall of the regime, was established on the
following pillars:
1. A democratic Iraq where power is exercised
constitutionally and peacefully with the state of
law and protection of human rights, where all the
constituents participate in running the country.
2. Consolidation of a progressive economy that could
compete at the international level.
3. An Iraq with a peaceful policy in line with US
objectives.
The US wanted to present Iraq to the region as a
model of a democratic and stable state with a
progressive economy. They wanted to turn Iraq into a
catalyst for change throughout the region. (Passage
omitted)
We are not concerned that the US needs the Kurds at
this juncture in Iraq because the Kurds can be an
essential element in consolidating US objectives;
after all, the US plan is in their interest.
However, that is only one aspect of the issue and
the other aspect is that the Kurds need the US more
than the US needs the Kurds, and the US can find an
alternative to the Kurds but the Kurds cannot find
an alternative to the US. This means that the US is
the source of the Kurds' strength while the US's
strength comes from within.
It would be useful here to compare the US-Kuwaiti
alliance with the Kurdish-US alliance because in
both cases the US is the powerful side while the
other two are weak, bearing in mind that there is a
strategic partnership between the US and Kuwait.
However, in addition to being a strategic ally of
Kuwait, the US is also the protector of that
country. Kuwait's value to the US is largely in
ensuring fuel for its industrial machinery.
Therefore, any attack on Kuwait would be considered
an attack on the US, and by protecting Kuwait the US
is protecting its own interests.
US-Kurdish alliance is well behind US-Kuwaiti
alliance. The value of the Kurds to the US lies in
that the US needs Kurdish help at this difficult
juncture in Iraq and it may not need the Kurds in
the way it does now when the difficulties end. An
important aspect of the issue is that the Kurds have
not considered that the US has special conditions
for alliances. As soon as the cold war ended with
the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the alliance
conditions changed. The only condition set by the US
for its allies during the cold war was opposition to
communism and in exchange it turned a blind eye on
the behaviour and policies of all its allies. Now,
with the globalization of democracy and human
rights, the removal of boundaries of the transfer of
knowledge and raising influence of public opinion,
the US is no longer able to turn a blind eye on the
shortcomings of its allies and considers it its
responsibility to draw their attention to many
issues which did not matter in the past.
The growth of Kurdish-US alliance requires the
element of need. On the basis of this judgment,
there is no hope in any plan for political and
economic reform in the region with this
administration, which demonstrates much disorder - a
reminder of the 19th Century principalities - and
has been subjected to all kinds of schemes; with
this political system which has not been able to
revitalize the administration departments to manage
and provide the required services; with the little
transparency that exists; with this economic system
which is controlled by some families, political
parties and groups and has an adverse impact on the
freedom of work and service resources. All that
leaves no basis for even a limited alliance with the
US. The US cannot conceive establishing a strategic
alliance with all these drawbacks that exist in the
region and the region cannot fulfil the conditions
that the US deems essential.
(Description of Source: Sulaymaniyah Kurdistani
Nwe in Kurdish -- daily newspaper published by Iraqi
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK))
Juan Cole is President of the Global Americana
Institute
juancole com
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