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Kurds and the US: from myth to reality
24.1.2008
By Azad Jindiani |
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A Perusal for the other Side of Michael Rubin’s
Report.
January 24, 2008
We must first realize that Michael wrote his
report
to affect the official and public opinions in the
U.S.A. and wishes to introduce himself as a
strategist for a new American era.
Michael’s strategic view of the world is not
parallel to other strategists views’ of the world in
the neo-liberal wing of the Republican Party along
with a part of the Democratic Party who see in their
strategic view of the world ,what exists in the
Middle East or what the neo-liberals called the
great Middle East, as a transitional stage. |
Azad Jindiani is Member of PUK Leadership Committee,
and Head of PUK Central Media Office. |
They rely on the
political notion that the future of those regions,
due to many internal and external factors and the
strategy set during President Clinton’s era. They
see influential factors exactly opposite to the
present time. They see principles of diplomacy and
policy in this region that they will totally change.
Behind Michael’s views we see that he thinks that
the general political lines of the American strategy
in this region is the same as ever, or it is in
American interests to remain as it is. Undoubtedly
this is sort of admitting that American is unable to
change the formula in the region in a way so that
the conflicts create another strategy in the region.
If the US Neo-Liberals perusal has been that the
factor of regional forces will be so soft and easy
to the extent that changes the US ground strategy,
thus, it is not possible that Mr. Rubin has the same
opinion. He believes that the new emerging force
factors in the region, Kurds, for instance are not
the factors for setting a successful and guaranteed
strategy for US. He believes the circumstances do
not allow new friends for the US which, in other
American equations, isolate and driving out the
others. He, for example openly asserts that Turkey
is the factor that can always change the equations
and oblige the US to improve its attitude towards
them, but on the Kurds expense! That’s why Rubin
wants to prove in his report that the Kurds cannot
be an alternative alliance for Turkey resorting to
two things: first, the unpreparedness of the Iraqi-
Kurdistan experience to become a reliable model with
a future. That’s why,www.ekurd.net
as what he believes,
because the Iraqi- Kurdistan experience has no
historic chance ahead and the leaders of that
experiment, in Rubin’s opinion, do not deserve and
are not capable of making the model successful.
Second: He thinks that Iraqi Kurdistan follows a
kind of policy which makes US to stand before only
one choice; the choice of the Iraqi Kurds.
Here Mr. Rubin builds his strategy views for the
U.s. ABOUT HIS COMPARISON BETWEEN Turkey and
Kurdistan. Unfortunately we must admit that there
are some deficiency in our authority governance and
some faults of Kurdish leadership setting there
policy. Especially in regional policy, that gives
some pretexts to Mr. Rubin in order to build his
strategic view about them.
I haven’t any knowledge that Mr. Rubin might be one
of Turkish lobbyists in U.S., but in his article all
indications show that Mr. Rubin is not with a notion
to put Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey on the same
balance by US. It might be a real policy for
America. In order to prove this strategic view to
introduce Turkeys position in the region pursuant to
its traditional position but he also tries to
indicate that the Iraqi Kurdistan experience as a
failure one. He gives a pessimistic notion about the
role that the Kurds could play in the region in the
interest of U.S. he obviously criticizes those
American officials who always see Kurdistan region
as U.S ally without paying attention to the
deficiencies of Iraqi Kurdistan experience. Rubin
considers such explanation as short-sightedness.
He also believes that Anti-Americanism has taken
hold within Iraqi Kurdistan without pointing out the
political and social force which stand behind this
hostility. I think he keeps this issue ambiguous to
indicate to the American public that the Iraqi
Kurdistan leadership and its behavior, way of
governance has created the hostility to American
thought it has always an American ally. Since any
writer or any strategist wants to talk about
hostility to America truthfully or an academic
independent purpose, he must explain that, before
America came to this area more or less there were
some traditional anti-Americans feeling in some
circles of Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan
geopolitics have been already a contributing factor
to the existence of a relative portion of this
hostility. In this point Mr. Rubin refers to the
Kurdistan Islamic Union party’s critical policy
towards America’s policy on the principle of
conspiracy theory. But he avoids identifying which
political force in Iraqi Kurdistan represents an
obstacle to the emergence of hostility towards U.S.
in Iraqi Kurdistan.www.ekurd.net
He is avoiding any
reference to this fact and telling the Americans not
to pin their any hopes on Iraqi Kurdistan. Here he
says (perhaps U.S. strategists might forgive this if
the Iraqi Kurds demonstrate that they would advance
U.S. regional interests. Unfortunately they have
not.) In order to make Americans hesitant towards
Kurds, he embarks questioning the nature of the
relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran. Of
course everyone knows that one of U.S. main
complexes in the region is Iran. U.S. public opinion
is seriously prepared against Iran, that’s why
playing public opinion on this basis would have
influence.
Thus, Mr. Rubin does not consider the example of
"The Iranians arrest in Erbil prior to informing
Iraqi officials" as (insanity of diplomacy), but
sees that (American diplomats do not trust Kurdish
officials). When referring to the U.S. and Iran
considering Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and
Kurdistan Democratic Party, Mr. Rubin says (They are
befriending Iran and betraying Washington). Here, if
we even assume that Kurdistan’s relation with Iran
is at the expense of U.S., while it is not, why does
not he explain the assumed reasons behind U.S.
public or official opinion? Why does not he explain
in their case the assumption that whether Iraqi
Kurdistan leadership's policy is responsible for the
U.S attitude itself that made Kurdish public
opinion? Why Mr. Rubin, who pretends to be so
knowledgeable events in Iraqi Kurdistan and to know
about secrets like leaders bank accounts, do not
give indications of how the political leadership
whom he wants public and private Americans to
distrust and worry about, can be asked by Kurdish
public opinion whether is the U.S. a real Kurdish
ally? In both newspapers which Rubin already
mentioned, dozens of respective articles had been
published and there have been many critiques of the
subject opposite to Kurdistan region officials.
Despite some of his essential views which deserve to
be considered by Kurdish leaders, Rubin calls for
the U.S. and Kurds meanwhile to build their alliance
on none mythic basis expanding it to an important
partnership. But he attributes this partnership to
the existence or non existence of PKK in Iraqi
Kurdistan areas.
In short, Mr. Rubin demands a policy towards the
Kurds which does not damage the relations between
the US and Turkey. In this respect, he sees Iraqi
Kurdistan leadership as the core of the problem. It
is certainly a one-dimensioned perspective, because
Kurds and Iraqi Kurdish leadership are not solely
responsible for destabilizing the regions balance,
although there are defects in governance and policy.
It is also the U.S. concern. In accordance with the
American and Kurdish relations, Mr. Rubin has given
some clear indications, for instance saying (It is
time for both Washington and Erbil to re-assess
their policies) further saying (If Iraqi Kurdistan
is to be a good ally, a force for stability and a
hedge against corrosive ideologies of both Arab
nationalism and Islamism, U.S.strategy must focus on
long- term interests. But Rubin’s problem with Iraqi
Kurdistan’s view is where he does to see the U.S.
long-term interests? Does he believe that the Kurds
should occupy in the center stage of the balance
between the interest of the U.S. and Turkey in
relation to U.S. local policy or think that the
Kurds would be just a contributor to the balance?
Perhaps the Kurds are eager to understand the case,
if would not, it must be clear that Iraqi Kurdistan
would resort to other games, though they might be
dangerous. Taking Kurds away from those kinds of
games is also American’s concern to make its local
strategy succeed. Kurdish political leadership also
should examine those fruitless games that would be.
* In writing this article, the translation of Mr.
Rubin’s article published in (Hawlati) is relied on.
* All the quotations in the article are Mr. Rubin’s.
* Azad Jindiani is Member of PUK Leadership
Committee, and Head of PUK Central Media Office.
Translated by: Faidullah Braim Khan
pukmedia com
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