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Federalism, Not Partition: Iraq's national
security adviser
19.1.2008
By Mowaffak al-Rubaie
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System Devolving Power to the Regions Is the Route
to a Viable Iraq
January 19, 2008
BAGHDAD, -- Iraq's government is at a
stalemate. As in the United States, there is much
discussion here of the need for political
reconciliation. What does that mean? That the
majority Shiites and the minority Sunnis and Kurds
must find a way to govern collectively at the
national level. As national security adviser to the
head of Iraq's governments since March 2004, I have
participated in the development of democracy in my
country. I strongly support the government and
applaud its achievements. But I understand that the
political objectives of Iraq's three main
communities are unrealizable within the framework of
a unitary, centralized state.
It has been impossible to maintain a political
consensus on many important issues. For one thing,
the U.S.-dominated coalition, which has its own
objectives, must be accommodated. The regional
"superpowers" (Iran and Saudi Arabia) meddle in
Iraq's affairs, and their own sectarian tensions are
reflected in the violence here. The absence of truly
national political parties and leadership that reach
the Iraqi people exacerbates the problem.
Overall, Shiites see their future based on two
fundamental "rights": Power must be exercised by the
political majority through control of governmental
institutions, and institutional sectarian
discrimination must be eliminated. Kurds see their
future bound to their "rights" of linguistic,
cultural, financial and resource control within
Kurdistan. Sunni Arabs are driven by resistance to
their loss of power, as well as fear of revenge for
past wrongs and the potential for reverse
discrimination.
The current political framework is based on a
pluralistic democratic vision that, while admirable,
is entirely unsuited to resolving this three-way
divide. It ignores underlying issues and expects
that a consensus will emerge simply by enacting a
liberal constitutional legal order.
Pluralistic democracy will not take root unless the
national political compact recognizes and
accommodates the fears and aspirations of Iraq's
communities. Resolution can be achieved only through
a system that incorporates regional federalism, with
clear, mutually acceptable distributions of power
between the regions and the central government. Such
a system is in the interest of all Iraqis and is
necessary if Iraq is to avoid partition or further
civil strife.
Only through a new political compact among Iraq's
main communities will a viable state emerge. A key
condition for success is that the balance of power
should tip decisively to the regions on all matters
that do not compromise the integrity of the state.
The central institutions must earn their legitimacy
from the power that the three main ethnic groups are
prepared to give them. Iraq needs a period during
which the Shiites and the Kurds achieve political
control over their destinies while the Sunni Arab
community is secure from the feared tyranny of the
majority.
The shape of a reconstructed, federal Iraq could
vary, but it should permit the assignment of nearly
all domestic powers to the regions, to be funded out
of a percentage of oil revenue distributed on the
basis of population. The federal government should
be responsible only for essential central functions
such as foreign policy (including interregional
affairs), defense, fiscal and monetary policy,www.ekurd.net
and banking. Regional
parliaments and executives would govern their areas.
A federal parliament with a new upper house could
manage governance at the national level. A regional
political structure would allow for the development
of religious, cultural and educational policies more
suited to areas' populations than a central
government could create. A regional framework for
economic policy would also fit better with
traditional trade patterns and markets.
Iraq's political geography suggests five likely
federal units: A "Kurdistan province," including the
current Kurdistan and surrounding areas; a "Western
province," including Mosul and the upper Tigris and
Euphrates valleys; a "Kufa province," built around
the Middle Euphrates governorates; a "Basra
province," including the lower Tigris and Euphrates
valleys; and a "Baghdad province," built around
Greater Baghdad, which may include parts of Diyala
and Salah ad Din Governorates. The Kurdish region
would be given a special constitutional status as a
recognized society and culture with a unique
identity (similar to the Canadian province of
Quebec).
The new, national Iraqi identity will be forged over
time as a result of peaceful, respectful
participation in governance and growth, not by fear
and terror as in our past. Iraq's constitution was
ratified before its communities reached agreement on
many vital issues, such as provincial powers.
Without a process aimed at reaching a broad
political consensus on the makeup of the Iraqi
state, order and democracy are unlikely. This
consensus would form the backdrop to a referendum on
a reformed constitution. Each of Iraq's communities
has leaders up to the task of creating a new
political consensus. It is time for them to begin
work.
The writer is Iraq's national security adviser.
The views expressed here are his own and do not
constitute an official position of the government of
Iraq.
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