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The Future of Iraq
23.8.2007
By Joseph Puder
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August
23, 2007
On September 15, 2007, General David Petraeus is
scheduled to deliver his report on Iraq to the U.S.
Congress. President Bush has stated that he would
follow General Petraeus recommendations. According
to the Times of London (8-16-07) Petraeus “would
recommend troops reductions by next summer, but
cautioned against a significant withdrawal.” The
Times reported that Petraeus qualified his remarks,
saying that the “U.S. footprint in Iraq would have
to be a good bit smaller by next summer.”
At the same time Petraeus also signaled “the surge
would continue into next year” and, he gave warning
against a quick and hefty withdrawal that “would
surrender the gains we have fought so hard to
achieve.” The German weekly Der Spiegel reported on
Aug. 18, 2007 that a new study released last
Wednesday in Berlin on the Iraqi situation concluded
that Iraq’s future is “not too bright,” and that
“already today, the main priority is to prevent Iraq
from breaking apart completely.” The study concluded
that there is little hope of a centralized power in
Iraq and that the country’s future depends on
walking the fine line between decentralization of
power and a civil war.” Guido Steinberg, a terrorism
and Middle East expert authored the study titled
Iraq Between Federalism and Collapse, published by
the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs.
Steinberg’s basic assumption is “that a federalist
solution will be the only possibility to maintain
Iraq as a single country. The most important role
(for) German and European policies should therefore
be that of supporting steps toward a peaceful
federalist solution.” If federalism fails, Steinberg
asserts, “the result would be devastating, including
the possibility of full scale civil war complete
with foreign intervention.”
General Petraeus’ report notwithstanding, the
current Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki is
dysfunctional, and the likelihood that Maliki will
be able to create a viable government is in doubt.
The recent withdrawal of Sunni cabinet members has
basically sealed the fate of the Mailiki government.
Of the 18-benchmarks set up for the Iraqi government
to act upon, key ones have been ignored or remain
unfulfilled.
A unitary government in Iraq is a pipe dream that
the Bush administration will be compelled to abandon
sooner or later - preferably sooner. Like Humpty
Dumpty, Iraq - once broken cannot be put together
again. Under the cruel and punishing rule of Saddam
and his Baathist predecessors, Iraq trudged through
by force. The minority Sunni-Arabs lorded over a
majority of Shiite and Kurds since 1932. And now the
Iraqi Army is gone, as is the Baathist fear
apparatus. No mechanism currently exists that could
compel the Kurds and the Shiites to be subjugated
once again to a Sunni minority rule. The Sunnis
however, believe in their “right” to rule Iraq, and
will never allow Iraq to be dominated by the Shiites
- whom they consider heretical.
Winston Churchill contributed a great deal to the
survival of democracy and the defeat of Nazism. He
was perhaps the greatest statesman of the 20th
century. But even Churchill made fatal errors. One
of them being the arbitrary and irrational creation
of Iraq - an inorganic mix of disparate and
antagonistic groups that he hoped would allow
British interests control over oil in the Kurdish
north and the Shiite south.
The Kurds, who had sought independence from
Ottoman/Turks, Arab, and Iranian rule, were promised
autonomy in the Treaty of Sevres (1920), but had
their rights to any form of self-determination
squashed when the Allies signed the Treaty of
Lausanne in1923. The British ignored their rights as
well as those of the majority Shiite Arab
population.
Today, the Kurds with their capital in Erbil, are
conducting themselves as an independent state. The
regional government of Kurdistan has its own
assembly, flag, army, and constitution and serves as
the best example of a functioning state and a
nascent democracy. The Shiites in Southern Iraq are
also building their own state institutions, albeit,
an Islamic state modeled after the theocracy in
Iran. The Sunni Arabs remain uncompromising in their
quest for reversing reality. Arrangements for a fair
distribution of oil revenues might help persuade the
Sunnis to join in a federated Iraq, which might
create a measure of stability and eventually end the
current Sunni insurgency against the Shiite
dominated government.
The argument for a multi-religious and/or
multi-ethnic federalized Iraq is however weakened by
the Yugoslav experience. Held together by its
strongman Josip Broz Tito until 1980, the federation
unraveled within a decade of his death, coinciding
with the end of Soviet domination over the
East/Central European states (former Soviet Bloc)
and the emergence of nationalism and democracy. In
Yugoslavia, it culminated in a series of wars
between the Serbs (Orthodox Christians) and the
Croats (Catholic), and between the Serbs, Croats,
and Muslims in Bosnia. The wars led to the
independence of all the components of former
Yugoslavia.
While Iraq’s prospects as a federal state are still
unclear, there are visible indications that the
Kurds and the Shiites are opting for independence.
Justice requires that the Kurds be granted the right
of self-determination. America owes the Kurds much
more than the Palestinians (the Bush administration
is currently pushing for an independent Palestinian
state), and a free and democratic Kurdistan would
leave the Bush administration with a proud legacy.
As hopeful as General Petraeus’ report might be, it
will not change the political realities in Iraq.
Neither the U.S. government nor General Petraeus
will be able to accommodate the demands of the three
main groups that make up the current Iraq: Shiite
Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and non-Arab Kurds. To prevent
an Iranian takeover (perhaps unavoidable in the
Shiite south) of Iraq or interference by outside
forces, the U.S. might consider stationing its
reduced troop levels in friendly and pro-America
Kurdistan (despite the fact that the Bush Sr.
administration abandoned them to Saddam Hussein’s
genocide after encouraging them to rebel).
The Kurds would welcome American bases in Kurdistan
as protection from the Turks (who have threatened
invasion if they declare their independence) and for
economic reasons. U.S. bases in Kurdistan would keep
our troops safe while within striking distance of
all points in Iraq, Iran and Syria.
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