|
Making an Iraq of Kurdistan
3.8.2007
By James G. Poulos. opinion
|
|
|
|
August 3, 2007
Nobody likes it when American allies are left
holding the bag. Those on the right complain that we
abandon friendly regimes out of weakness of will,
whereas those on the left use our exit to blame the
U.S. for ever getting in. For these reasons
abandonment feels like an order of execution, or at
least of life imprisonment. South Vietnam was not
the first little state to be swallowed up in our
wake. The one criticism Americans lob at Churchill
concerns his infamous complicity in Stalin's
carve-up of Eastern Europe, sealed with a
hand-lettered map on a napkin. And now we wonder if
Iraq is next.
Freedom of thought is a good thing, like freedom of
movement on the battlefield -- especially when
wiggling through the tight spots of foreign affairs.
For too long in Iraq, "stay the course" has meant
not just strategic but tactical obduracy. But now,
the humble returns on our massive investment have
led some commentators to advocate, instead of an
inst-o-matic exit from Iraq, an audible known as the
"Kurdish Option." By redeploying to Kurdistan, the
case is made, we can salvage four worthy goals:
1. Our troops will depart a lethal, intractable
civil war between Sunni and Shia. |
James G. Poulos, Essayist, free lance, & doctoral
candidate in Political Theory at Georgetown, James
G. Poulos is Doctor of Laws (Univ. of So.
California) & Bachelor of Political Science (Duke
Univ.).
Postmodern Conservative |
2. The U.S. will retain
the force necessary to hunt and kill al Qaeda in
Iraq from a secure forward base.
3. The defense of Kurdistan will help ensure that
democracy and the rule of law flourish for at least
one ventricle in the heart of the Middle East; and
4. Americans will prove to the Kurds, to the world,
and to ourselves that we don't leave close friends
in the lurch when the going gets tough for us.
Of these, Goal 4 is paradoxically the most important
-- though it has the least to do with hard-headed
military and geopolitical strategy. But judging the
other three goals, on the likelihood of their
success after a Kurdish redeployment, suggests that
the best way to fail the Kurds might actually be to
send them bulk of our armed forces.
START AT THE TOP of the list. First, the attractions
are obvious for a policy of disentanglement. Iraq's
rival factions are caught in a conflict only
politics can solve, without recourse to all-out war.
But whether the warring parties will halt magically
at the Kurdish border is doubtful. Nothing is more
important, whether winning or losing a civil war,
than an ally of convenience with a good army, and
the Kurds' PeshMerga is certainly that. The
strategic city of Mosul is a frontier jewel, an
irresistible draw sure to worry, and entice, the
Kurds accordingly. The more important Kurdistan
becomes -- and the greater the percentage of U.S.
troops there, the more that it does -- the more at
the mercy of their neighbors are the Kurds.
This must have slim appeal. The Turks have already
pressured the U.S. to decapitate the PKK, widely
recognized as a terrorist organization comprised of
unbending Kurdish guerrillas. Our undersecretary of
defense for policy has confessed we intend to oblige
our NATO ally. This situation can only worsen when
Sunni Iraqis begin casting about for allies against
Iranian-backed Shia militias.
Pulling back to Kurdistan will get us out of the
thick of it only to inspire the thick of it to
follow us there.
Second, the hope that our concentrated forces can
launch effective attacks against al Qaeda from
Kurdistan fades on close inspection. Prior to that
mission, we would very likely face a gauntlet,
because we'd have to:
1. Put down Kurdish terrorists, a move guaranteed to
irritate both local government and rank and file.
2. Massage Turkish expectations as their army awaits
along the border; and
3. Fend off incursions and overtures from Sunni and
Shia alike, none too pleased with our decision to
favor neither side as they bleed themselves dry.
If, that is, we do manage to stay somehow neutral.
In reality we will follow Iran's lead and support
one or both sides, betting the way campaign
contributors do. Our hands, in short, will be full,
precisely because we withdrew to Kurdistan. This is
very little gain for a very lot of trouble.
Third, it's now apparent that the pressures our
occupation will place upon the Kurds -- even at
their behest -- will greatly challenge their ability
to run a model democracy. Kurdistan is a
pro-American but not terribly democratic land.
Tribes and militias have won what independence the
Kurds have been able to earn. The PeshMerga is a
force as deserving of local trust and loyalty as it
is unconducive to civilian government. This is not a
dig against the Kurds. But it is another proof that
undue expectations are the ruin of good hopes. We
ought not dare foist the same dreams of hearts and
flowers that distorted our view of Iraq upon the
last portion of that country that seems capable of
seeing to its own affairs without great violence.
THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION is that a relocation to
Kurdistan will probably not solve any of our present
problems and will likely make all of them worse. The
pain will be particularly awful because of the
sensation that the Kurds are our last ditch proteges.
It will be terribly hard, if the going gets tough,
not to egg on a declaration of Kurdish independence,
which will give the Turks apoplexy and hasten the
dismemberment of Iraq. Accompanying this will almost
certainly be another round of strife as Kurds
struggle to abandon their eternal aspirations (and
brethren) in Turkey. There is nothing outlandish in
expecting a rush of Turkish Kurd refugees after
that.
Though we could gain the approximation of a formal
colonial relationship, where rules are clearer and
force can effectively be applied, we would lose a
great deal in the bargain. Not least would be the
embarrassment of having tried shiny, happy
quasi-imperialism -- only to be stuck with the
ignominious, old school version. Occupying Kurdistan
would invite grand dreams, and feverish, almost
desperate hopes, of a success all the more important
for its diminished scope and higher stakes. But
relocating to Kurdish territory would also invite
the worst of all possible worlds: the surrender of
Iraq to its fate and the shackling of our own troops
to whatever fate awaits them -- in a Kurdistan that
we will guarantee is unable to escape the Iraq we
left behind.
James G. Poulos is an essayist, attorney, and
doctoral candidate in Government at Georgetown. He
operates
Postmodern Conservative.
Source: spectator org
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the content of news
information on this page
|
® 