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Turkey vs. Iraq?
13.7.2007
By John Feffer
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July
13, 2007
While Capitol Hill battles the White House over
Iraq, another battle is brewing in the Middle East.
In the last week the Turkish military has moved
140,000 troops from across its country to the
southern border with Iraq. These troops represent an
invasion force meant to prevent the continued
terrorist activities of the Kurdish minority that
use northern Iraq as a safe haven. Turkey has
previously voiced its intent to attack elements of
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) after repeated
bombings and recent attacks on civilians in the
south of Turkey. If Ankara chooses to use military
force in the north of Iraq now, the results would be
dire for the future security and stability of Iraq.
The effects of Turkey conducting military operations
in northern Iraq would undermine the fragile
security environment that currently exists in two
major ways. First, the Kurdish soldiers that are
operating in Baghdad as part of the U. S. military
“surge” would be tempted to abandon their posts in
order to protect their homeland in the north.
Second, because Turkish troops would not likely
remain for long in the north of Iraq, the remaining
PKK fighters could regroup and continue to use
northern Iraq as a base of operations for its recent
offensive attacks in Turkey. Iraq would have
difficulty meeting either of these challenges. To
face both simultaneously would only exasperate and
quicken the destabilization of Iraq and the region.
Northern Iraq is more than just another piece of
territory for Kurds. It is a homeland: it is
Kurdistan. For decades Kurds have fought to secure
northern Iraq in order to build a Kurdish nation, a
nation that finally seems within reach. However,
Kurds are also an essential part of the future of
Iraq. Most recently, the Kurds have sent three
brigades of the Iraqi Army from the north, comprised
of a vast majority of Kurdish soldiers, into Baghdad
to assist in security operations as part of the
surge of U.S. forces. These three brigades represent
about 10,000 soldiers and are an essential part of
the strategy for securing Baghdad. This number does
not even account for the other Kurdish soldiers that
are serving in other units in Baghdad. Were Turkey
to attack Kurdistan, these soldiers would
undoubtedly leave Baghdad to defend their homeland,
choosing Kurdistan over Iraq. The loss of these
10,000 indigenous, well-trained soldiers would
threaten the already tenuous security situation even
more.
If Turkey did invade Kurdistan (northern Iraq), the
incursion would not lack precedent. In 1995 and
1997, Turkey used 35,000 soldiers to conduct raids
against the PKK. In both cases they remained in Iraq
for fewer than 60 days and did not completely
eradicate the Kurdish elements that they claimed
were responsible for conducting attacks. A future
invasion would be similar: a short incursion with
limited success. Indeed, an incursion by Turkish
forces against PKK elements would violate the new
perception of territorial sovereignty that has grown
in Kurdistan since the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
While most Kurds in Kurdistan (northern Iraq) are
not members of the PKK, a perceived violation of
territorial sovereignty of Kurdistan would unify the
Kurdish population to either support the PKK to a
greater extent or develop an increased Kurdish
independence movement. Without the support of the
Kurdish population, especially their military, the
unity and stabilization of Iraq will be severely
inhibited, requiring either more U.S. military
forces to fill in the gaps left by the Kurdish
troops or instigating a civil war that could spread
throughout the region. The Kurdish population is one
of the only stable influences in Iraq and the loss
of their support would reverberate throughout Iraq,
Iran and Syria.
Turkey’s invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan would have
limited benefits for Turkey and disastrous
implications for Iraq. The violation of state
sovereignty that a Turkish incursion represents
would present the Iraqi government as ineffectual
and unable to protect its own borders. Jalal
Talabani, the president of Iraq, would be forced
into a difficult position, having to choose between
his ethnic group and his country. Turkey would gain
little more than a minor disruption of PKK activity
and would ultimately foster increased hostility from
the Kurdish community, including the possibility of
establishing an open policy of support for Kurdish
separatists in other countries.
The only foreseeable solution is for a joint
U.S.-Turkish-Kurdish agreement that focuses on
addressing the PKK elements and not Kurdistan as a
whole. Turkey will not likely be pacified by a
political agreement alone and will demand evidence
of action against the PKK locations. If the United
States does expect to stop an invasion, an agreement
with Turkey must be negotiated soon. While
cooperating with Turkey will be distasteful to many
Kurds, it will not be nearly as insulting as an
outright invasion. A Turkish invasion will force the
Kurds to choose between Kurdistan and Iraq. And in
this choice, Iraq will lose out.
Richard May served as an officer in the U.S.
Army’s 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan and
Iraq. He is currently the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace
Fellow at the World Security Institute’s Center for
Defense Information and a contributor to Foreign
Policy In Focus.
fpif org
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