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In a failed bid to
starve Iraqi Kurds into submission, Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi administration to
withdraw from the region. Kurdish parties filled the
vacuum, establishing an area of self-rule
approximately the size of Denmark. On May 19, 1992,
the Kurdish parties held elections resulting in a
coalition between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK). Their
alliance broke down in 1994 because of disputes
about property ownership and revenue embezzlement at
the lucrative Ibrahim Khalil-Habur customs post on
the Turkish border. The resulting civil war killed
or displaced thousands and caused a partition of
territory between the PUK and KDP.
There was renewed hope in the wake of Saddam's fall
that the bifurcated Kurdistan Regional Government
could fortify its democracy. Such hope was dashed.
On January 30, 2006, Kurdish authorities held new
elections—the two dominant parties ran on the same
list so as not to compete—and divided power
equitably according to their leaderships'
pre-election agreement. KDP leader Massoud Barzani
assumed the presidency of the Kurdistan region, and
his nephew Nechervan Barzani became prime minister,
overseeing a unified, albeit inactive, parliament.
They preside over more than forty ministers, all of
whom receive hefty salaries, perks, and pensions.
Because Iraqi Kurdistan lacks a constitution,
Barzani and other senior political leaders can
exercise unchecked, arbitrary power. The absence of
accountability and a free press has enabled
corruption, abuse, and mismanagement to increase.
Nepotism is widespread. Not only is the prime
minister the nephew of the president, but the
president's son, Masrour Barzani, a
scarcely-qualified 34-year-old, heads the local
intelligence service. Another Barzani son is the
commander of the Special Forces. And Masoud Barzani
installed his uncle, Hoshyar Zebari, as Iraq's
foreign minister when the political party heads were
distributing patronage. Other relatives hold key
positions in ministries or executive offices. PUK
leader Jalal Talabani has only one wife and two
children and so has less patronage to distribute.
Still, one son oversees PUK security and the other
is the Kurdistan Regional Government's
representative to the United States. When the major
Iraqi political parties divided up the ministry
portfolios in Baghdad, Talabani awarded the PUK's
slot to his brother-in-law.
Another brother-in-law is the Iraqi ambassador in
Beijing.
Other Barzani and Talabani relatives have
monopolized telecommunications, construction, and
trade. Those who have no relatives in power sit at
the bottom of every hierarchy. Merit is seldom a
factor in promotion. While it is possible for
non-family members to become ministers, they must
have a long record of submission to the Barzani or
Talabani families. Many Iraqi Kurds welcomed Iraq's
liberation, calculating that the presence of U.S.
forces would also help solidify democracy in the
Kurdistan region. They now question whether more
than 3,000 U.S. troops sacrificed their lives to
enable oligarchy.
Political Parties
Is Iraqi Kurdistan beyond reform? Not necessarily,
but the entrenched parties have created a system
which immunizes them from accountability and
competition. The two major parties are modeled in
both structure and role on Saddam's organization of
the Baath Party. A small coterie of decision-makers
presides over a large network of patronage and
intimidation. The analogy is not loose: Documents
recovered after Saddam's fall and published recently
by two independent Sulaimaniyah-based Kurdish
newspapers, Awene and Hawlati, show extensive ties
between leading figures in the Barzani family and
the Iraqi dictator.[2] There were relations, too,
between the PUK commanders and Saddam's security
services, although more subdued.[3] While some
contacts were understandable, for example, in order
to coordinate electricity distribution between areas
of Baathist and Iraqi Kurdish control,[4] documents
surfaced after Iraq's fall which showed extensive
intelligence sharing and business relationships
between Nechirvan Barzani, for example, and Saddam
Hussein's sons.
Just as under Saddam, in Iraqi Kurdistan today,
political party control extends down into the high
schools and universities. Student unions are
financed by political parties and act as their
extensions. The KDP and PUK student groups act as
eyes and ears for the security services of the two
parties. They observe students and professors and
submit reports of activities to their supervisors.
Membership is often a prerequisite for academic
degrees, foreign scholarships, employment, and
promotions. It is not uncommon for the student with
the highest grade point average to be passed over
for scholarships or even valedictorian status should
he or she not be a party member.
Smaller political parties have failed to act as a
check over the larger parties. Several are co-opted,
with their personnel given lucrative positions or
even ministerial portfolios in exchange for silence.
Others are intimidated. On December 6, 2005, a KDP
mob stormed the office of the Kurdistan Islamic
Union in the Duhok governorate and shot and killed
its candidate. While new parties might form, the KDP
and PUK can control their licensing through the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Abuse of Power
Abuse of power is one of the main characteristics of
the Kurdistan Regional Government's administration.
Iraqi Kurds speak often of arbitrary arrest,
torture, and enforced disappearances. Awene, one of
the two independent newspapers in the region,
reported an incident in which a driver, who was
stopped for a routine traffic violation in Erbil,
seriously wounded the policeman. Other police
officers arrested the shooter and brought him to the
hospital with their wounded colleague. A short time
later, ten armed men in the uniform of the KDP's
Zervani peshmerga unit stormed the hospital to
remove the suspect, a member of their unit, in order
to prevent the judiciary from processing him on a
charge of attempted murder. In the process of their
raid, the KDP's peshmerga wounded a civilian but
suffered no consequences as this second victim was
not a party member.[5]
The legal system of the region is both chaotic and
compromised. There are five parallel judicial
systems in Iraqi Kurdistan: the regular courts,
state security courts to try political offences,
military courts with jurisdiction over peshmerga
forces, separate KDP and PUK party courts known as
Komalayati (social) courts, and special tribal
courts with jurisdiction only over the members of a
certain tribe. With the exception of the regular
courts that apply Iraqi laws, all the other courts
are, in fact, illegal. Their judgments are arbitrary
and often contradict the law. Komalayeti courts
insure impunity for their members. For example,
after a regular court sentenced PUK member Salih
Muzali to life in prison for the murder of two
sisters, PUK leader Jalal Talabani intervened to
transfer the case to the Komalayati court, which set
him free after the victims' families accepted a
payment of US$170,000 "blood money."[6] Human rights
organizations protested this intervention for his
release.[7] According to Awene, sixty-eight suspects
in crimes such as murder and robbery remain at large
and under the protection of the KDP, PUK, and
Socialist Party of Kurdistan.[8]
Politicians also intervene in judiciary staffing.
Judicial appointments require prior approval by the
leadership of the dominant parties. In an interview
on the fifth anniversary of 9-11, Rizgar Hama Ali,
the first judge to preside over the special Iraqi
tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and the current
member of the court of cassation in Iraqi Kurdistan,
expressed reservations about the independence of the
judicial system in Iraqi Kurdistan and suggested
political party interference in judicial affairs
"seriously endangers the integrity of courts."[9]
Rather than protect citizens, the courts have become
a tool for political parties to harass and oppress
them. I know. I suffered their arbitrary and
politically-motivated judgments firsthand. On
October 26, 2006, I was abducted by the KDP secret
service and detained for nearly six months for
publishing articles on corruption of the Barzani
family and the ties between the late Mulla Mustafa
Barzani—Massoud Barzani's father—and the Soviet
KGB.[10] The investigative judge acted as a
representative of the secret service and not of the
judiciary. When I refused to sign a confession
prepared by the KDP—nothing I had written was untrue
and so I saw no reason to repudiate it—a KDP
security official told me that the
investigative judge could order torture to gain
confessions from detainees. After two weeks, I did
sign the confession after being deprived of water
and food for several days. I was tried on December
19, 2006, before the state security court in Erbil.
I did not receive prior notification of the trial
which, at any rate, lasted less than fifteen
minutes. I had no access to a lawyer and was not
allowed to produce evidence. A security forces
officer entered the courtroom to give the chief
judge a letter. The judge sentenced me to thirty
years in prison for having published two articles on
the Internet. I was told later that the letter
contained instructions as to the verdict and
sentence.
Illegal treatment is, unfortunately, the rule rather
than the exception in the Iraqi Kurdistan region's
detention centers. Disappearances remain rife. The
parliament's human rights committee acknowledges at
least twenty-one disappearances since 2003.[11]
Western human rights experts say that hundreds
remain detained without trial in Kurdish
prisons.[12] Local papers have reported unlawful
detentions as recently as September 2006.[13]
Appeals to Talabani and Barzani by relatives of
persons detained by the political party militias,
and subsequently disappeared, remain unanswered.
Torture is common. Ali Bapir, the head of the
Islamic Group, told Hawlati, the region's other
independent newspaper, that Kurdish security forces
have crippled several dozen detainees in prison
during torture sessions.[14] These prisons are
funded indirectly by U.S. aid. One of my torturers
told me that he was trained by U.S. experts in
investigative techniques, but he seemed to prefer
his own methods saying, "U.S. investigative methods
cannot be effective in Iraqi Kurdistan."
Unfortunately, those techniques that Kurdish
interrogators prefer sometimes culminate in murder.
Since the establishment of Kurdish administration in
1991, there have been hundreds of unsolved political
killings.
Disappearances peaked during the 1994-97 Kurdish
civil war.[15] The major political officials have
refused calls to account for many of these summary
executions or to return the bodies. Rather, summary
detention and extrajudicial execution have
continued, albeit with less frequency. In April
2002, for example, PUK security forces abducted
Muhammad Ahmed al-Zahawi, a former member of the
Kurdistan Human Rights Organization in Kalar.[16]
The Kurdistan Human Rights Organization had become a
thorn in the government's side for its frequent
abuse-of-power law suits against government
officials.
He is not alone. Lawyers and judges who try to
defend the victims of human rights violations or
prosecute perpetrators in the region sometimes
themselves become targets. Assailants have gunned
down several judges who have investigated financial
crimes and the drug trade.[17] More recently, after
an Erbil lawyer, Razwan Osman Ceco, successfully
prosecuted a civil suit against a KDP military
commander accused of forcibly seizing private
property, the KDP militia twice attacked him,
leaving him with severe injuries.[18] In another
case, PUK security forces arrested
lawyer Bakhtyar Hama Sa‘id in Sulaimaniyah on August
13, 2006, as he prepared the defense for arrested
demonstrators. The PUK only released Sa‘id a week
later after the lawyers' union staged a strike.[19]
Civil Society
While the judicial system may be broken, the problem
runs deeper. Often, outside groups can provide a
check upon abuse of power. This is what the
Kurdistan Human Rights Organization tried to do. But
independent civil society organizations are few and
far between. Most organizations remain under the
yoke of the two major political parties; they are
often run by senior party members and serve as
extensions of the political parties.[20] Would it be
possible to establish a truly nongovernmental
organization (NGO) in Duhok, Erbil, Sulaimaniyah or,
for that matter, Kirkuk? Probably not. The PUK and
KDP use legal and financial means to control civil
organizations. In many cases, they control
licensing. In other cases, they dominate ostensibly
independent organizations with personnel
appointments. Union leaders, for example, are often
senior party members.[21] Independent NGO
personnel—including those run by Europeans—say local
administrations seek to force them to hire party
members.
Nor is the press able to act as a check on political
abuse. While there are now two nominally independent
papers, their financial situation is shaky. There is
no guarantee that they will continue to publish. The
parties often seek to co-opt critical journalists
with bribes or positions at higher paying party
organs. While journalists may in theory be able to
publish a wide range of opinion, in practice, party
officials harass them with often arbitrary lawsuits.
If they anger party officials and, for example,
write about corruption within the Barzani family as
I did, they may face criminal prosecution. Iraqi
Kurdish law still employs the former Baath regime's
criminal code. Article 433 equates almost any
criticism with defamation. The PUK targeted editors
at Hawlati after it accused PUK prime minister Omar
Fattah of abuse of power.[22] Security forces have
assaulted other journalists. On March 12, 2006, PUK
security beat Rahman Garibi, correspondent for Radio
Azadi, as he covered anti-corruption demonstrations
erupting in Halabja. In another case, the KDP's
security service beat Al-Jazeera's Erbil
correspondent.[23] While independent Kurdish
Internet sites such as Kurdishmedia.com, Kurdistan-Post.com,
Dengekan.com and eKurd.net provide a vibrant outlet
for independent commentary, their reach in Iraqi
Kurdistan is limited so long as electricity is
spotty. Many poorer residents in Iraqi Kurdistan
cannot afford private generators and, at any rate,
such generators cannot run continuously.
Corruption
Corruption is endemic. Especially since Iraq's
liberation, the region has been awash in foreign
money and aid projects.
There have been hundreds of construction projects
since 2003, and two international airports in Erbil
and Sulaimaniyah have opened.[24]
Nevertheless, the economic growth has been hampered
by the ruling families' stranglehold over the
economy. They treat the treasury, built with customs
and tax revenues, as personal slush funds. There is
little transparency to differentiate between public,
political party, and private family property.
Outside a narrow circle of family members, there is
no knowledge of how the budget is spent. On June 23,
2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority
transferred to Iraqi Kurdistan $1.4 billion dollars
remaining from its allotment of the oil-for-food
program. Much of the money has, apparently,
disappeared.[25] While the Iraqi Kurdish government
may have spent some on public projects, much more
appears to have vanished into individual bank
accounts. The ruling families further involve
themselves in major businesses. Family members or
proxies act as silent partners in
telecommunications, construction, and import-export
businesses. Through arbitrary privatization
conducted by government decree, they appropriate
public property and valuable real estate. Talabani's
oldest son Bafil, for example, now runs the
Sulaimaniyah tobacco factory. Few if any large
businesses can operate in the region without taking
the political leaders' family members as ghost
partners. Since returning to Iraqi Kurdistan in
1991, the Barzani family has amassed a fortune
estimated at over $2 billion.[26]
Land speculation has exacerbated the situation. The
post-liberation construction boom has led land
prices to skyrocket.
The cost of housing in Sulaimaniyah is not
dissimilar to that in Washington, D.C. Political
party members have granted prime real estate to
their supporters and family members for free or at
below-market prices. Real estate development—
construction of hotels or apartment buildings, for
example—can provide the recipient of the land grant
with a multimillion dollar profit. On December 7,
2005, the PUK-led government in Sulaimaniyah
transferred a large property belonging to the
municipality of Sulaimaniyah to the PUK-owned Nizar
construction and trade company by simple decree.[27]
In another case, the KDP-led government transferred
the ownership of nine publicly-owned parcels of real
estate and buildings in the Erbil governorate by
decree to the KDP politburo for a nominal price.[28]
All of this makes everyday life unaffordable for
ordinary residents. Because of inflation, it is not
uncommon, for example, to see families living in
incomplete houses. Others are forced to squat in
corrugated tin structures.
Corruption and mismanagement has undermined
stability. During commemorations on March 16, 2006,
marking the eighteenth anniversary of Saddam's
chemical weapons bombardment of Halabja, protests
erupted against corruption and deteriorating basic
services. The PUK security forces killed one
demonstrator, injured six others, and arrested
forty- two, half of whom appear to have been
tortured while in custody.[29] PUK security forces
later attacked demonstrators in Chamchamal, Kifri,
Shoresh, and Darbandikhan.[30]
Security
Security remains a major problem in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Although Islamist groups have existed in Iraqi
Kurdistan since the 1950s, apparent Iranian backing
enhanced their threat after 1991.[31] While their
first targets were leftist activists and secular
intellectuals, by 2001, they had begun to establish
permanent bases. On February 18, 2001, Islamists
assassinated Fransu Hariri, the speaker of the KDP's
parliament and the highest-ranking Christian in the
government, and on April 2, 2002, they tried to
assassinate PUK prime minister Barham Salih.
Islamists in the Kurdish parliament have called for
Kurdish authorities to adopt Shari‘a (Islamic law)
and abandon secularism.[32]
Penetration by foreign intelligence services,
especially the Iranian VEVAK and the Qods Force,
might also undercut local security. Chako Rahimi, a
senior member of the Iranian Kurdistan Democratic
Party and the head of the party's security
department, told Awene in an interview that the
Iranian secret service, Ettela'at, had assassinated
more than 204 members of his group in Iraqi
Kurdistan since 1991 and that the Iranian secret
service maintains more than fifty safe houses in
Sulaimaniyah, a city controlled by the PUK which is
headed by the current Iraqi president Jalal Talabani.[33]
The latest victims of Iranian terrorism in Iraqi
Kurdistan were two members of the Kurdistan
Revolutionary Union-Iran (KRU-I), who were shot in
the PUK-controlled border town of Penjwen in June
2006. KRU-I speaker Shwane Mahmudi blamed Iranian
intelligence.[34] It is doubtful such assassinations
could occur without at least tacit PUK permission.
While the security threat is real, both political
parties amplify it to silence opponents, simply by
accusing them of being Islamist activists.
Conclusions
During my trips in Iraqi Kurdistan, I see how
grateful ordinary Kurdish citizens are to the U.S.
government and American people for the establishment
of the safe haven in 1991, the no-fly zone, and
Iraq's liberation. But the mood is changing. Today,
the Kurdish parties misuse U.S. assistance and
taxpayers' money. Rather than support democracy, the
Kurdish party leaders use their funding and their
militia's operational training to curtail civil
liberties. What angers Kurds is the squandered
leverage. Instead of demanding rule-of-law, the
White House has subordinated democracy to stability
not only in Baghdad and Basra, but in Iraqi
Kurdistan as well. Rather than create a model
democracy, the Iraqi Kurds have replicated the
governing systems of Egypt, Tunisia or, perhaps even
Syria.
It is true that such abuse of power is not rare in
the Middle East, but Iraqi Kurds want more. They
have listened to the rhetoric of the White House but
see corruption in the Kurdistan region enabled, at
least indirectly, by the United States. On Kurdish
party-controlled television, they watch U.S.
diplomats dining with KDP and PUK leaders at their
palaces and private resorts. When Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice or other senior U.S. diplomats
visit, they do not challenge the Kurdish leadership
on human rights abuses. Kurds wanted real democracy,
like that in the U.S. and other Western democracies
and not Potemkin democracy. Ultimately, Washington
may pay a price for not holding Iraqi Kurds to a
higher standard. While Erbil and Washington enjoy an
alliance of convenience today, interests change.
Undemocratic regimes in the Middle East are, at
best, inconsistent allies.
Kamal Said Qadir is an Iraqi Kurdish writer based in
Vienna, Austria. He was detained by KDP security
forces on October 26, 2005, for criticizing
corruption within the KDP but was released following
an international campaign.
[1] For example, see Sverker Oredsson and Olle
Schmidt, "Kurdistan—A Democratic Beacon in the
Middle East,"
Kurdistan Development Corporation, Dec. 2004.
[2] Hawlati (Sulaimanya), Oct. 11, 2006.
[3] Awene (Sulaimanya), Sept. 12, 2006.
[4] "Jalal Talabani: ‘No Grounds for a Relationship
with Baghdad,'" Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2002,
pp. 19-23.
[5] Awene, June 27, 2006.
[6] Salih Muzali interview, Awene, July 25, 2006.
[7] Rebwar Fatah, "Kurdish Women's Blood for Cash
Affair: Mahabad's Ordeal," KurdishMedia, July 10,
2006.
[8] Awene, June 20, 2006.
[9] Rizgar Hama Ali interview,
iraqikurdistan.blogspot, Sept. 11, 2006.
[10] "Walamek bo barez Masoud Barzani," The
Kurdistan Post, Oct. 2, 2005; Kamal Berzenji, "Our
Last Stake: The Post
U.S.-Controlled Iraq and the Kurds," KurdishMedia,
Apr. 21, 2003; Kamal Said Qadir, "The Barzani
Chameleon," Middle
East Quarterly, Spring 2007, pp. 87-8.
[11] Awene, Oct. 31, 2006.
[12] The New York Times, Dec. 26, 2006.
[13] Hawlati, Sept. 13, 2006.
[14] Hawlati, June 14, 2006.
[15] "Iraq, Regional Country Index, Middle East and
North Africa," Amnesty International Annual Report,
1998, accessed
Feb. 14, 2007.
[16] "Iraq," Amnesty International Annual Report,
2003, accessed Feb. 14, 2007.
[17] "Iraq: Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan
since 1991," Amnesty International Special Report,
AI Index: MDE
14/01/95, pp. 91-4.
[18] Hawlati, June 21, 2006.
[19] Hawlati, Aug. 23, 2006.
[20] Kamal Mirawdali, "Civil Society and the State:
The Case of British Voluntary Sector," KurdishMedia,
May 28, 2006.
[21] Kyle Madigan, "Iraq: Corruption Restricts
Development in Iraqi Kurdistan," Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Apr. 29,
2005.
[22] "Iraq: Journalists from Kurdish Weekly Face
Arrest, Trial," news alert, Committee to Protect
Journalists, May 2,
2006.
[23] Awene, Mar. 21, May 30, 2006.
[24] The Kurdish Globe (Erbil), Aug. 8, 2006.
[25] Los Angeles Times, Nov. 22, 2005.
[26] The Daily Star (Beirut), Nov. 18, 2005.
[27] Awene, Nov. 21, 2006.
[28] Hawlati, Sept. 6, 2006.
[29] Awene, Mar. 21, 28, 2006.
[30] Awene, Aug. 8, 2006.
[31] Awene, Oct. 25, 2006.
[32] Awene, Nov. 14, 2006.
[33] Chako Rahimi interview, Awene, Oct. 17, 2006.
[34] Awene, July 11, 2006.
Dr Kamal Said Qadir, Austrian citizen, an
international legal expert, writer and human rights
activist. You may reach the author via email at:
drkamalsaidqadir (at) gmx.at
Source: meforum org
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