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Intelligence Brief: The Risk of Turkish
Intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan Region
17.5.2007 |
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May
17, 2007
Since the start of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq
in 2003, one of the primary goals of the United
States has been to prevent Turkey from intervening
militarily in Kurdistan (northern Iraq). For the
United States, maintaining the support of northern
Iraq's Kurdish population has been critical
throughout its intervention since it has faced
instability in the central Sunni and southern Shi'a
regions. While Turkey shares the U.S. objective of
creating a united, stable Iraq, Ankara differs from
Washington over the level of autonomy that should be
granted to the Kurdistan Regional Government (K.R.G.)
in northern Iraq.
The reason for this difference in policies is that
the United States does not share Turkey's critical
interests in Kurdistan (northern Iraq), which
include preventing the loss of territorial integrity
and preventing an increase in domestic instability.
Since 1984, Turkey has faced a domestic security
threat due to the agenda of the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (P.K.K.), a Kurdish separatist group that has
rebelled against what it perceives as Ankara's
mistreatment of the Kurds, who comprise an estimated
20 percent of Turkey's population. Turkey cracked
down on the group, causing the P.K.K. to base some
of its resources and manpower in Kurdistan region
(northern Iraq), a region that is also predominately
Kurdish and, after the 1991 Gulf War, was protected
from the Iraqi government in Baghdad due to a no-fly
zone enforced by the United States, the United
Kingdom and France.
Turkey's main interest has been to prevent the P.K.K.
and other separatist Kurdish groups from using
Kurdistan (northern Iraq) as a rear-base for attacks
in Turkey and, in a worst case scenario, from
attempting to cede off parts of southeastern Turkey
into a greater state of Kurdistan.
Therefore, while the United States considers
supporting the Kurds a key interest in maintaining
Iraq's stability, Turkey sees supporting the Kurds
as providing assistance to a potential enemy who
will only use its bolstered power to weaken Turkey's
control of its territory in the southeast.
Although the K.R.G. is more interested in
strengthening its control over Kurdistan region
(northern Iraq) than in destabilizing southeastern
Turkey, it has not taken effective measures to
restrain more radical Kurdish elements engaged in
cross-border attacks in Turkey, or of pursuing P.K.K.-affiliated
fighters who are involved in planning future
operations from the safety of Iraq.
As a result, Turkey does not see the current actions
of the K.R.G. as synonymous with its interests. In
response, Turkey has threatened to intervene in
Kurdistan region (northern Iraq) militarily, a
threat that it has leveled frequently since the
start of the U.S.-led intervention and one that it
has not yet carried out on a significant scale.
One of the key factors behind Ankara's lack of
military involvement in Kurdistan region (northern
Iraq) is the E.U. and, more significantly, U.S.
resistance to such a development. Brussels has been
critical of Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish
population, and this has been a factor in Turkey's
difficulty in joining the European Union as a
member-state. Washington sees a Turkish intervention
in Iraq as a potential catalyst for the
destabilization of the north, as the Kurds'
well-trained and well- equipped peshmerga forces
would possibly engage the Turkish military. This
would sandwich U.S.-led forces in between two
allies, the Turks and the Kurds. Of course, if
Turkey would pursue such a course of action, it is
likely that it would do so in a surgical manner to
reduce the chances of all the Kurdish factions
uniting against it, and to prevent its forces from
ending up in a protracted guerrilla conflict.
Whether or not Turkey will intervene militarily in
Kurdistan region (northern Iraq) is based on many
factors. As long as U.S. forces are heavily deployed
in Iraq, however, it does not appear likely that
Turkey would risk its relations with the United
States by launching a large-scale intervention,
unless it receives Washington's prior approval.
However, it is not likely that Washington would
offer such approval since Turkish troops in
Kurdistan region (northern Iraq) would risk
destabilizing the area. Yet, if the United States
were to begin a limited troop withdrawal, the
possibility of a Turkish intervention in northern
Iraq would increase as Ankara might move to fill the
power vacuum.
Another factor that could spur Turkish intervention
is the status of Kirkuk. As part of Iraq's
constitution, residents in Kirkuk are supposed to
hold a referendum before the end of the year on
whether the city should join the autonomous
Kurdistan region run by the K.R.G. It is expected
that upon such a vote, the population would vote to
join the K.R.G. due to the predominance of Kurds in
the city. Turkey, however, fears that if the K.R.G.
were able to incorporate the oil-rich city of Kirkuk
under its control, it would be in a good position to
declare independence in the future and thus bolster
Kurdish aspirations in Turkey. If Turkey decides to
take military action to thwart the referendum, it
would claim publicly that it was moving to protect
the Turkmen of Kirkuk, a Turkish-speaking minority
with ethnic ties to Turkey.
In the end, the best-case scenario for Turkey and
the United States would be if the K.R.G. were to
crack down on P.K.K. and anti-Turkish elements
sheltered in Kurdistan region (northern Iraq), and
cease actions geared toward achieving a future
independent state.
Cracking down on radical Kurdish elements, however,
would be difficult for the K.R.G. to pursue since it
is far from a unified governing force. The K.R.G.
itself is divided between the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (P.U.K.) and the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (K.D.P.), with each group commanding its own
separate peshmerga forces. If the K.R.G. were to
attempt to move against its own, it could result in
the fracture of the Kurdish movement and the return
to the violent infighting that has characterized
recent Kurdish history in northern Iraq.
In addition, it is unlikely to expect the Kurds of
northern Iraq to end their ambitions for a future
independent state, which is really Turkey's core
concern, as long as the rest of Iraq remains
unstable and in the throes of violence.
pinr com
** The use of the term "Kurdistan" is vigorously
rejected due to its alleged political implications
by the Republic of Turkey, which does not recognize
the existence of a "Turkish Kurdistan" Southeast
Turkey.
Others estimate over 40 million Kurds live in
Big Kurdistan (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia),
which covers an area as big as France, about half of
all Kurds which estimate to 20 million live in
Turkey.
Turkey is home to over 25 million ethnic Kurds, some
of whom openly sympathise with the Kurdish PKK for a
Kurdish homeland in the country's mainly Kurdish
southeast of Turkey.
Before August 2002, the Turkish government placed
severe restrictions on the use of Kurdish language,
prohibiting the language in education and broadcast
media.
The Kurdish alphabet is still not recognized
in Turkey, and use of the Kurdish letters X, W, Q
which do not exist in the Turkish
alphabet has led to judicial persecution in 2000 and
2003
The Kurdish flag flown officially in Iraqi Kurdistan
but unofficially flown by Kurds in Armenia. The flag
is banned in Iran, Syria, and Turkey where flying it
is a criminal offence"
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan ( Kurdistan-Turkey)
wikipedia
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