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The real issue for Turkey is not 3,000 rebels, but 15 million
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The real issue for Turkey is not 3,000
rebels, but 15 million Kurds
25.10.2007
By Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel
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Struggling against the changing times: the real
Issue for Turkey is not 3,000 rebels, but 15 million
Kurds.
October
25, 2007
Fighting the branches of your problem is fruitless,
without addressing its root.
Authorization of military
action
On October 17, the Turkish Parliament passed a
controversial motion that effectively allowed the
Turkish military a year's pass to launch incursions
into northern Iraq as it sees fit, under the pretext
of preserving national security and eradicating the
long-standing PKK threat emanating from the Qandil
Mountains of the Kurdistan region. Despite strong
objections from Iraq, the U.S. administration, NATO,
the EU, and a plethora of major States, Turkey
approved the bill in defiance. With a huge
occupation force in the shape of the U.S. Army still
on the ground, this hardly gives a positive image of
Iraqi sovereignty and may well set a benchmark for
future invasions by neighbors. Turkey's battle with
the PKK is not new. In fact, Turkey has been waging
war on the PKK for 28 years in the impoverished and
largely neglected lands of southeastern Turkey. This
war reached a peak in the mid-1990s, culminating in
a series of large cross-border campaigns by the
Turkish military to oust rebel bases across the
porous borders. Clearly, these campaigns did no
significant damage to the PKK nor did they eradicate
the threat, even as those campaigns
were supported by some Iraqi Kurdish parties at the
time. However, although five years of unilateral
truce by the PKK on the back of the arrest of their
leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resulted in some peace and
a motion to readdress its adverse international
image, the PKK made very little political gains with
the Turkish government persistent in its refusal to
negotiate with their 'terrorist' arch-nemesis or
issue amnesty. Feeling lost and weary on the back of
the dramatic arrest and trial of their revered
leader, the influence and power of the PKK steadily
dropped. However, clearly the onset of the Iraqi
liberation in 2003 and the newfound prominence and
political stature of the Iraqi Kurds served to
embolden PKK desire and reignited their passion for
making another stand against the Turkish regime.
Clearly, this time the PKK has more political
coverage than ever before along with broader media
attention. The status of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) is now enshrined in the Iraqi
Constitution and widely recognized by major global
powers. Arguably, the long-standing rivalry with the
PKK became second nature to a Turkish state that
long-denied its substantial Kurdish population
cultural and linguistic rights and before that
systematic denial altogether, but now to its horror
was witnessing a strong Kurdish national renaissance
a stone's throw across the border.
Iraqi Kurds-the real
Turkish danger
It is likely that with parliamentary approval of
military incursions valid for one year, this will
give the Turkish state time to maneuver and watch
the KRG closely with an upcoming decisive year that
will determine the future of Iraq. The ideal
scenario for Turkey would be to maintain a long-term
foothold and influence over northern Iraq, rather
than attack at will. Under a period of self-rule,
the Iraqi Kurds have grown from strength to
strength, witnessing an economic boom, status as key
strategic allies to the U.S. administration and
widely acknowledged as the only island of peace and
prosperity in the mess that is Iraq. Whilst Kurdish
confidence has reached alarming new heights for the
Turkish state, which as of today still refuses to
recognize the Kurdish administration or negotiate
with them on an official level, many of the red
lines set by the Turkish government have long passed
with the Iraqi Kurds hungry and determined to
bolster their status and political gains further. In
the year officially set for a referendum on the
status of oil-rich Kirkuk, frequent Turkish calls
for the abandonment of such a momentous milestone
have gone unheard. Turkey has lobbied with the Iraqi
government extensively to dismiss the referendum
out-of-hand or at least delay it indefinitely citing
various concerns. In contrast this has only
increased Kurdish determination and desire and with
the knowledge that they are almost certain victors
in any vote they have pressed on without fear.
Undoubtedly, Turkey and the surrounding neighbors
fear that if Kurdish aspirations are unchecked, this
may well create an unstoppable ripple affect for the
millions of Kurds inhabiting those countries.
Although, the PKK issue has acted as the focal point
in channeling Turkish fears, the presence of an
estimated 3,000 rebels in the rugged mountains of
Iraqi Kurdistan is clearly a side issue to the
greater concerns of the ramifications of the
potential destabilization affect of 15 million
Turkish Kurds.
Prospects of a full-scale
invasion
Clearly, launching any military incursion into Iraq
may well backfire. The PKK rebels will disperse into
Kurdish towns and villages and even major air raids
may lack the effectiveness of getting the job done.
A highly unpopular Turkish invasion will only
encourage support and sympathy for the PKK amongst
Iraqi Kurds. Any major incursion deep into KRG
territory may well induce direct confrontation with
the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which is likely to
only deepen the issue and increase the risk of an
all-out Turkish-Kurdish war. As a result of these
factors, a full-scale invasion in reality is
unlikely and much more costly than the limited gains
it may provide. Alienating Kurdish populations on
either side of the border who heavily rely on one
another for billion of dollars in trade is political
and economical suicide. This motion, for the time
being, at least, is more sabre-rattling and show of
power and intent. It is designed to further
pressurize the U.S. and Iraqi governments into
action and warn the Iraqi Kurds of the
dangers of defiance, harboring the PKK, or
continuing separatist ambitions.
Changing political climate
Turkey has long accused the U.S. administration of
not doing enough to tackle the PKK issue and has
called on the Iraqi government to take action.
However, the key problem with any U.S. action to
deal with the PKK is the potential to undermine
their strong relationship with the Iraqi Kurds and
destabilize the only stable part of Iraq.
Noticeably, for a Turkey suffering from a dramatic
decline of their traditional closeness with the
U.S., this is seen as preferential treatment of the
Kurds and double standards in the fight against
terrorism. The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan by
U.S. forces and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last
year set a dangerous precedent for superpowers
combating terrorism and threats against national
security. Turkey feels it is no exception to the
rule and only wider strategic and political
implications stopped it from invading in 2003 to
dispel Kurdish drive toward power and the expansion
of their region. However, events in the last year
and more recently have irked Turkey beyond care of
the repercussions of their actions. First, Turkey
introduced mild reforms and introduced more cultural
tolerance of their Kurdish minority under EU
accession talks. However, despite what it perceived
as more than a gesture of goodwill, the reforms on
the back of EU pressure did not continue apace.
Talks have all but stalled and the divide has only
deepened with major reservations from key European
nations over the potential influx of millions of
largely impoverished Muslims into their Christian
super club. Turkey, in its gradual changing
political stance and its fast emerging ties with the
controversial governments in Syria and Iran, has
seemingly all but given up on the idea of an
imminent entry into the European Union and turned
its attention to its more immediate concerns.
Turkish public opinion has hardly helped, as a
strong sense of nationalism has kicked in over the
Iraqi Kurdish calls of defiance, frequent PKK
attacks, and the fast-declining popularity of the
U.S. in the country.
Turkish-U.S. ties under
strain
Whilst the frequently failed promises by the U.S.
administration to deal with the PKK hardly helped,
two events that arguably swayed Turkish political
opinion and deep-rooted anxiety into overdrive was
their disappointment over a U.S. Senate motion,
referred to as the Biden-Brownback amendment, to
push through the break-up of Iraq into three federal
entities; then, there was their downright anger over
the passing of a non-binding resolution by the U.S.
House Foreign Affairs Committee to officially
recognize the Armenian massacre between 1915-1923
under Ottoman rule as genocide. This created uproar
in public, political, and military circles alike,
with Turkey swiftly condemning the resolution and
warning President Bush of the massive ramifications
that this would have in their relationship and their
logistical support of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the
resolution was formally passed. Similar moves by
France caused similar rage and ended military ties
between both nations. Turkey is moving through a
time of great sensitivity and fears that perhaps
they can only rely on themselves in the present era.
The changing face of the political and strategic
makeup of the Middle East and international focus
has rocked Turkey's once unbreakable alliance with
the U.S., reaching a peak at the time of the Cold
War. However, the U.S. has greater priorities than
ever before and faces its gravest danger in the form
of terrorism. The global aspects and wider
implications of their foreign policies are more
important than any relationship with a single
country.
Iraqi Kurds bypassed
The region and the international community are now
watching closely at Turkey's next steps. What is
clear, however, is that Turkey's next steps must be
taken cautiously and wisely. Any hasty or
controversial adventure that goes beyond the remit
of a limited incursion may well result in a major
backlash. The Iraqi Kurds, keen as ever to strike
friendly and productive terms, fully appreciate that
for their long-term prosperity and survival they
must cooperate very closely with Turkey. However,
even they are feeling increasingly undermined by the
actions of regional powers and the insistence of
Turkey in bypassing them in negotiations with the
Iraqi government. A recently signed security deal
between Iraq and Turkey bypassed the Iraqi Kurds
directly with the Baghdad government insistent that
all elements of national foreign policy must be
channeled through them. However, evidently the
region at the focus of the debate is the Kurdish
administration. Turkey will be effectively invading
the autonomous KRG region and as such violating
their rights and sovereignty directly. It is ironic
that a nation that refuses to recognize a political
entity would directly invade their area of
jurisdiction and expect to bypass them as any matter
of importance. Despite the rhetoric of Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Turkey's ignorance,
there is nothing that Baghdad can do in the Kurdish
region. There is no Iraqi Army in Iraqi Kurdistan
and no sense of bending backwards to fight their
ethnic brethren to satisfy the vain nationalist
desires of a neighboring country who even refuses to
acknowledge them as a credible entity.
PKK-a terrorist issue or a
Kurdish problem
It is more ironic that Turkey sees the PKK as a
terrorist threat and not as a Kurdish problem.
Violence is not a solution and never an adequate
substitute for diplomacy; however, Turkey has a much
bigger problem than a few thousand rebels. It may be
painful to concede, but Turkey has a huge restive
Kurdish population and if Turkey does not tender its
next steps correctly and advocate a greater solution
to its long-standing Kurdish headache, this will
only exasperate tensions beyond what it currently
perceives as a problem. The PKK is simply the fruit
from the seeds of problems that were sewn decades
previously in the aftermath of World War I. Unless
the root of these problems are addressed, the
branches may be cut under all the pretexts that one
can imagine; however, they will only grow back at a
more vicious rate. If the PKK as an organization is
hypothetically eradicated all together, there is no
guarantee that another Kurdish offshoot will not
arise by next year. It is time for the Turkish
regime to stop an impractical game of incongruous
politics and recognize the existence of the Iraqi
Kurdish administration. They cannot preserve their
stability without the help of the Iraqi Kurds and
the Iraqi Kurds are unable to survive without
Turkish help. Turkey will never solve the PKK
dilemma through ignorance or arrogance. Although
rebel actions and their presence in northern Iraq
create leverage for negotiations on either side,
ultimately PKK violence and insurgency will never
benefit the greater Turkish Kurdish population. In
the great global battle against terrorism, such
actions in the present era will hardly strike the
right sentiments of international opinion that is
vital in winning concessions and achieving success.
The need for a reality
check
Turkey must finally open its eyes and realize that
after decades of fighting the ghosts of its past
legacies and outdated ideals, it will never win this
battle against Kurdish nationalism until it takes a
firm reality check. The recent majority Kurdish vote
for Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Party of Justice and
Development is proof that Turkey Kurds can be swayed
into playing a supportive and productive role in a
new Turkey, and they must be embraced with open arms
into forging new brotherly ties for the benefit of
the greater Turkish state, whilst accepting the
emergence of a Kurdish entity in Iraq, not as a
choice but as a natural eventuality that cannot be
stopped no matter how much they delay its end. This
is simply the wrongs of the past correcting
themselves-it was always inevitable that all the
explosive seeds that were planted by the artificial
creation of the Middle East could never remain
underground forever. Unfortunately for the Middle
East, the wave of change is not over and will
continue. There are far too many volcanoes waiting
to erupt from Iran to Lebanon and possibly beyond.
As for Turkey, it is like fighting a tidal wave that
you know will sweep you ashore, but rather than
fight a storm that will eventually prove costly and
counterproductive, you must use the tides of the
stream to ensure maximum gains and benefit and the
least painful of landings.
kurdishglobe net
**
Kurds are not recognized as an official minority in
Turkey and are denied rights granted to other
minority groups. Under EU pressure, Turkey recently
granted Kurds limited rights for broadcasts and
education in the Kurdish language, but critics say
the measures do not go far enough.
The use of the term "Kurdistan" is vigorously
rejected due to its alleged political implications
by the Republic of Turkey, which does not recognize
the existence of a "Turkish Kurdistan" Southeast
Turkey.
Others estimate over 40 million Kurds live in
Big Kurdistan (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia),
which covers an area as big as France, about half of
all Kurds which estimate to 20 million live in
Turkey.
Turkey is home to over 25 million ethnic Kurds, some
of whom openly sympathise with the Kurdish PKK for a
Kurdish homeland in the country's mainly Kurdish
southeast of Turkey.
Before August 2002, the Turkish government placed
severe restrictions on the use of Kurdish language,
prohibiting the language in education and broadcast
media.
The Kurdish alphabet is still not recognized
in Turkey, and use of the Kurdish letters X, W, Q
which do not exist in the Turkish
alphabet has led to judicial persecution in 2000 and
2003
The Kurdish flag flown officially in Iraqi Kurdistan
but unofficially flown by Kurds in Armenia. The flag
is banned in Iran, Syria, and Turkey where flying it
is a criminal offence"
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan (
Kurdistan-Turkey)
wikipedia
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