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Former Iraqi Kurdish official says
political parties 'Failing' to work together
17.10.2007
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October
17, 2007
PRAGUE, -- Kamran Karadaghi, a former chief
of staff for Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, says
that Iraq's political climate will not improve until
the country's leaders find the political
determination to make "very hard decisions." He also
discussed the current tensions between Turkey and
Iraq's Kurds, as well as the issue of "normalizing"
the disputed region of Kirkuk.
Karadaghi, also a former editor in chief of RFE/RL's
Radio Free Iraq, talked to RFE/RL Iraq analyst
Kathleen Ridolfo at RFE/RL headquarters in Prague on
October 15.
RFE/RL: Many in
the West are concerned with the Iraqi parliament's
performance and its failure to pass outstanding
legislation. Can you talk about this failure and
whether the prospects for passing legislation are
good?
Kamran Karadaghi:
The problem with the parliament is the way the
parliament acts and the procedure of the parliament.
The parliament consists of representatives of
different political groups, who were elected not
individually by the electorate, but they were
elected as part of lists. In a way, there is really
no free member of the parliament. [Parliamentarians]
cannot really decide [anything] on their own, it's
all political maneuvering, it's all [based on the]
positions of their political groups. So, you can't
talk about the failure of the parliament, but you
have to talk about the failure of the political
groups who have representatives in the parliament.
RFE/RL: The
Shi'ite and Kurdish alliances in parliament formed
the "moderates' front" a couple of months ago, and
it seemed the idea was to join together and try to
constitute a majority so that legislation would be
pushed through. That didn't appear to play out the
way they had hoped.
Karadaghi: My opinion, my own observation in
Iraq...[is] this was not the only reason or the main
reason was not to establish a majority in parliament
to pass laws and things. But I think it was also
part of the political process in Iraq, part of the
struggle between the political groups...it was an
attempt to get out of the bottle by breaking the
existing status quo of the political alliances in
Iraq.
These parties, the two main Kurdish parties, the
Shi'a alliance, and Al-Da'wah Party -- and one
cannot say the entire Al-Da'wah Party, it was more
the Prime Minister [Nuri al-Maliki], who is the
official leader of the Al-Da'wah Party -- and the
Islamic Party.... There was an alliance between the
two main Kurdish parties [known as the Kurdistan
Coalition], SCIRI [a reference to the Shi'ite party
led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, now known as the
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, or SIIC] and the
Islamic Party. The hope was that the Islamic Party
would join, but they didn't.
This is the way now how the Iraqis work. They always
try to find something alternative or something
parallel [to keep their options open]. So, when this
didn't work and the Islamic Party didn't join this
new [moderates' front], they [instead] invented this
so-called three-plus-one, the three members of the
Presidency Council plus the prime minister....
So I don't think there was a direct attempt to try
and secure a majority in the parliament, because
they all know, the political parties, that there is
always [going to be] a shift in the political
groups. One day the political groups side with an
alliance, the next day they side with another party.
Some people think that the four parties which tried
to establish [the moderates' front, that this] was a
mistake because it alienated the Sunnis. Some think
that it was a good step and that the Sunnis failed
to join them. But this is all part of the failure of
the political leadership in Iraq.
RFE/RL: Since
the moderates' front was formed, Tariq al-Hashimi,
the Sunni Arab leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party and
Iraqi vice president, has since gone into talks with
other parties, such as the Shi'ite Al-Fadilah Party
and several other smaller parties. The idea was that
these groups together would try to form a
counteralliance in parliament. What are the
prospects that this will actually happen, given the
diverse positions of these parties?
Karadaghi: I don't think it will work.... All
the political parties and groups in Iraq have
different interests. It is very difficult for all of
them to agree on one target, [one issue] like for
example before the regime change in Iraq. There was
one purpose: to topple the regime. But now...they
are in power. So they have different [views,]
whether it is Al-Fadilah Party, or Sadrists, or
others, the Islamic Party....
The Islamic Party, maybe they have an interest
[shared position] with Al-Fadilah on one issue, but
they cannot afford to lose the Kurds as allies on
other issues. So, it is really very difficult [to
move forward] unless all the main political
leaderships of different parties find the
determination within themselves...to take very hard
decisions, nothing will work.
Shi'ite Parties' Agreement
Fragile
RFE/RL: There
was an agreement forged last week between Shi'ite
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the SIIC. It was
described in the press as an agreement that will
bring peace to the southern region. Again, given the
diverse positions of the two groups, what is the
likelihood that that would happen, and if you know,
what is the real motivation for this agreement being
forged?
Karadaghi: Of course [SIIC] and the Sadrists
have a history of rivalry, especially between the
two clans of al-Hakim and al -Sadr. And it still
exists. But, there were some reasons for this
[agreement].
First, now you have Ammar al-Hakim [son of ailing
leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim,] who is in charge of [SIIC].
He is young, he is energetic, and he has some ideas
and he wanted to show leadership. And the same thing
with Muqtada. But we should not forget also that
Iran played a major role in this. The Iranians have
an interest to keep the Shi'a together and these two
groups are powerful among the Shi'a. So, there are
some domestic and some outside reasons for this
alliance.
And I would say also the marja'a, [Shi'ite clerical
leadership, headed by Grand Ayatollah Ali] al-Sistani
and others, feel the rivalry and the differences
between the Shi'a groups have gone too far, and they
want to keep it under control.
Maybe it will work for awhile but I don't think this
will [have] a real significant development in the
future.
RFE/RL: Ammar
al-Hakim came out in favor of the establishment of
federal regions over the weekend and al-Sadr's
office reacted very strongly against al-Hakim's
statement.
Karadaghi: So, here you are, yes. This is
also a problem within the Shi'a alliance, the
approach to the position regarding federalism. [SIIC]
is for, Ammar al-Hakim especially...even more than
his father, I would say. And we all know that for
the Kurds this is essential. But other groups,
Fadilah are against it, the Sadrists are against it.
These will always be reasons to weaken any new
alliance of the kind between Ammar al-Hakim [and al-Sadr]....
It's not an alliance really. They made an agreement
[and] I think it will have an effect for the short
term but not for the long term.
Kirkuk Referendum To Be
Delayed
RFE/RL: Kirkuk
is a big topic right now because of the upcoming
planned resolution. From Kurdish officials we hear
that plans for a December referendum to determine
whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdistan region is
still on target, but we hear from other sources that
it has already been agreed that the referendum will
be delayed due to the tension the issue is causing
between the Kurds and Arab parties in Iraq.
Karadaghi: From the beginning it was obvious
that it was very difficult to keep within the
timetable [outlined in the constitution] for
practical reasons at least. You cannot have a
referendum without solving several other issues.
Article 140 [of the constitution, which applies to
Kirkuk] says there must be a process of
normalization. Normalization is different than
referendum. Normalization means first you have to
solve the problem of the deportees, and of the
settlers, the Arab settlers.
Second, you have to solve the problem of the borders
between provinces -- the administrative issues --
because the Kurds have claims on some territories
they say were part of the Kurdish autonomous region
but under Saddam Hussein they deliberately took
these territories and attached them to [other
governorates like] Tikrit, Diyala, and others.
So, you have to solve all these problems. The
problem of the Arab settlers is also not that easy
[to solve]. Even within [Article] 140, the Kurds
themselves have always said there is a difference
between the Arabs who originally lived in Kirkuk and
the Arabs who were brought by Saddam Hussein for the
reason of ethnic cleansing and to change the
demography of Kurdistan. The process now [has]
started to give compensation. There are Arabs who
signed petitions that they want to leave. But it's
not an easy process, it's difficult. For practical
reasons, it will not happen by the end of this year.
Maybe some Kurds also were not very careful [in
making] these statements insisting either by the end
of the year or it will be doomsday.... They should
be more practical about these issues. But, I don't
think the tensions or the opposition from Arabs
against Article 140 will change the view of the
Kurds. The Kurds are committed to implementing, they
want Article 140 to be implemented, but they will
also show some flexibility on the process of
implementing 140, and they will [allow] some time
for it to happen.
Turkey, Iraq, Kurds Must
Communicate
RFE/RL: We have
to ask you about Turkey. The Turkish government is
seeking permission from parliament to possibly
launch a large-scale incursion into Iraq. What do
you think the ramifications of such an incursion
will be? We saw statements from Jabar Yawar, the
Kurdish regional minister for peshmerga affairs,
saying that peshmerga militia forces will be ready
to respond to any incursion. Will peshmerga who have
joined the army and are based south of the Kurdistan
region be called back to the region, and what would
be the ramifications of such a move?
Karadaghi: First of all, the Turkish
government say that getting a permission from
parliament does not mean automatically that they
will go inside [Iraq]. They want to secure the
permission, especially with the military, to have a
free hand to do whatever, whenever they decide to do
something.
At the same time, some people who know the situation
well think maybe the Turks won't launch a wide-scale
[incursion] into Iraq. [Rather], this is part of
putting a strong pressure on the Kurds, really, not
on the Iraqi government. Ankara knows the Iraqi
government does not have the means of doing anything
militarily in Kurdistan. It's the Kurdish peshmerga.
If you follow the Turkish press, commentators, you
feel [that] the Turkish government and the military
think they will have this experience like they had
with Syria. They put a lot of pressure on Syria,
they employed their army on a huge scale along
Syria's borders, and Syria caved in [and] kicked
[Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah]
Ocalan [out] from Syria....
The Kurds of course, are also obliged to make these
kinds of statements, to be on the alert. There are
Kurdish peshmerga who are part of the Iraqi Army,
but the main [peshmerga] forces are still in the
Kurdistan area. There are some units outside
Kurdistan, but in territories and provinces attached
to Kurdistan -- in Diyala, they don't have a lot now
in Baghdad -- they were there for a while in Baghdad
and now they've [left]. But, now what they are doing
outside the Kurdish provinces is to secure roads,
secure oil pipelines, and these kinds of things.
I am sure that, God forbid it comes to a
confrontation, they will of course abide by the
Kurdish leadership, by the leadership of the
Kurdistan administration. But, as I said, there are
a lot of political activities [talks] still going
on. The Kurds sometimes don't show flexibility
regarding their relationship with Ankara.
It's true, the Turks are very difficult to deal
with. Since the regime change in Iraq, and
especially after the constitution [was approved],
and the fact that now you have a legal
administration in Iraqi Kurdistan which is
recognized by the Iraqi Constitution, to pretend now
that [Kurds] don't exist is wrong. But this is now
how Ankara is behaving.
And I think Baghdad also has very limited options.
The fact that they signed a [security] agreement
with Turkey recently has two sides. One, Baghdad
knows that they can't do anything in Kurdistan. On
the other hand, this agreement can also put Ankara
in an embarrassing position because if they go into
Iraq, according to the agreement, they cannot go
into Iraq without permission from Baghdad. And
Baghdad is not ready to give such a permission.
So, things are still balanced. But if there will be
a large-scale interference, it will have very bad
consequences for the Kurds, first, and also for
relations between Ankara and Baghdad, the United
States, Europe...it's very unpredictable. There can
be [many] different complications.
RFE/RL: If the
Kurdish peshmerga serving in the national army are
called back to Kurdistan, how will it impact the
security situation south of the region, because now
they are helping secure areas where Al-Qaeda is
active in Iraq. Will it have a huge impact on the
security situation?
Karadaghi: No, I don't think it will have a
huge impact on the security situation in Arab areas.
Because [participation] is still limited in some
areas. They are securing roads...even if these units
stay where they are, it will not have a big effect
on the capability of the Kurdish forces. Because the
Kurds have now really a huge army of fighters.
rferl org
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