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Iran: A Country Divided
21.1.2007
by Sami Shorosh
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January 21, 2007
London,- Iran constitutes one of the most
diverse countries in the Middle East in terms of
ethnic and religious composition. This state, which
has preserved its geographical and historical
structure, in addition to its borders – at least
since the 19th Century without any significant
change by virtue of not participating in the two
world wars – has a widely diverse internal fabric of
races, religions and creeds. For this reason, it
becomes difficult to understand the fundamental
equations that construct the make-up of this
country, which is spread on a wide range and which
has a population of approximately 70 million,
without a clear and accurate understanding of the
constituents and details of this fabric.
At a first glance, present-day Iranian society
ostensibly appears to be homogenous and harmonious
in its ethnic and religious build-up, but in reality
it is but a misleading image of the Iranian arena.
The internal diversity of this Middle Eastern state
that spreads from central Asia to the Persian Gulf
is distinguished by historical and geographical
factors and the absence of ‘openness’ and economic
interaction – in addition to an intense suppression.
The Khomeini Revolution in 1978 contributed to the
religious ideology of the Iranian authority and what
ensued of disastrous political, cultural, economic
and military attempts that affected the Iranian
formations, particularities and human aspirations,
fueling further the internal fires.
In the book ‘The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics’,
British researcher, Fred Halliday sees that the
Iranian constitution, as opposed to the secular
Turkish one, recognizes the ethnic and cultural
pluralism of Iran, however in his view, the problem
lies in the notion that the plurality in the
constitution is limited to language, culture and
tradition only. Iranian academic and Professor of
Sociology, Dr Abbas Wali explains that the Iranian
(Islamic) constitution acknowledges the cultural
diversities in identities in the national formations
in Iran but disregards the political content of
these identities, furthermore forbidding any
national activity that deviates from the ideology of
the prevalent political system, considering any
national differences to be inconsistent with the
prevailing religious rule. Therefore, it would be
correct to say that this diversity in population led
to the enrichment of the linguistic, cultural,
literary and spiritual life in Iran but it also took
its toll on the country in terms of its internal
political reality and its conflict and struggles
externally, which has led to a substantial amount of
tension and problems.
Political observers do not rule out the possibility
of countries, such as the US, playing the minority
card to exert pressure on Iran’s current stands –
especially its nuclear development program and its
support of organizations that Washington describes
as ‘terrorist’, in addition to Iran’s opposition to
the peace process between Israel and Palestine and
its interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Without
a doubt, the populational and cultural diversity in
Iran cannot act as a source of imminent threat to
stable or democratic societies, or those not
involved in external conflicts, but the situation is
different in Iran. The escalating tensions that the
country faces with the United States and the
international community, coupled with internal
problems on all levels; political, economic and
cultural herald a turn for the worse – add to that
the increasing unemployment amongst youth and the
continuous subtle hints that point towards the
imposition of international sanctions upon it.
Iran’s internal fabric is comprised of the
following ethnic groups:
1-Persians, who largely dominate the country’s
political institution, in addition to its culture,
literature and official language.
2-Azeris, (Azerbaijani) who share the same faith of
the current regime and who have noticeable control
of the trade markets
(bazaars) in Tehran and other major cities.
3-Kurds, who are mainly spread in northwestern Iran,
or what the Kurds refer to as Eastern Kurdistan, the
most prominent cities
of which are Mehebad (Mahabad), Sine (Saqqez),
Karmanshah and Sardasht.
4-Arabs, who live in Khuzestan, or what is referred
to by Arab Iranians as ‘Arabistan’. The most
renowned cities of which are
Ahvaz (Ahwaz) and Khorramshahr, and some parts in
the eastern coast of the Gulf.
5-Turkmen, who are spread out in southern
Turkmenistan.
6-Baloch, who live in the areas of Kerman and
Zahedan.
Additionally, there exist independent tribal groups
whose allegiances are divided between the Farsi,
Azerbaijani and Kurdish nationalities such as the
Bakhtiari and the Lur. The truth is no census exists
with an accurate record of the existing ethnicities
in Iran – especially since the governmental
institution has long since avoided compiling
statistics. Moreover, the dominance of the Persian
language, literature and culture among Iranians over
the past few centuries – especially since the
decades that preceded the rise of the Islamic
republic in Iran – makes it more difficult to view
the existing ethnical differences. The closest known
estimates are: 40-45 percent Persian; 30-35 percent
Azeris; 9 percent Kurds; 4 percent Arabs; 3 percent
Baloch; 2 percent Turkmen; Armenians and Assyrians
combined constitute 2 percent; and a further 2
percent are independent tribal groups.
The Azeris speak a dialect of the Turkish language
and they are spread in the northwestern region of
Iran of which Tabriz is the capital. Although they
follow the Islamic Shia creed, their nationalistic
inclinations are affiliated to their ethnical
Turkish origins, according to numerous Azerbaijani
researchers. Despite sharing the same religious
creed, Shiism, the Azeris are distinguished by their
nationalistic spirit, which is why they declared
they were supported by the former United Soviet
Socialist Republic (USSR), in the northwestern
region of the country during the period that
followed World War II. It is true that the Iranian
forces succeeded in quashing the republic less than
a year after it was formed, and yet the Azeri
nationalistic movement continued to regard the
Persian role with suspicion and mistrust based on
the former’s belief that they are the true
fundamental basis of the Iranian state, achieved at
the hands of their historic leader Ismail Safavi who
was the one to announce Shiism as the official
doctrine of the Savafid (Safavi) Iranian Empire in
the 13th Century. According to the nationalistic
among the Azerbaijanis, the loss of their right to
rule Iran is a result of the Persian cultural and
literary hegemony practiced in the country. Despite
that, the Azeris still continue to be at the helm of
trade activities and the economy in Iran yet still
felt alienated and ignored in politics and culture,
which is what led to a number of demonstrations in a
number of Azeri provinces last year, protesting
against the Iranian government’s disregard of their
language. In turn, the Iranian security forces
arrested a number of Azerbaijani political activists
on charges of illicit dealings with Turkey.
Despite the 25 percent of the Kurdish population
that follows the Shia doctrine, the majority of whom
are spread throughout the provinces of Kermanshah
and Ilam, we find that historically the relationship
between the two parties remains ‘unnatural’. The
Kurds have often taken up arms in the face of the
Iranian governments and empires as a result of
feeling that the central authorities rejected their
local peculiarities. This is what is declared as the
reason that drove the Kurds to declare an
independent republic, with Mahabad as its capital in
1946. However the Kurdish Republic, like its Azeri
counterpart lasted no longer than 11 months after
the Iranian forces crushed it weeks after
vanquishing the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Presently, the Iranian government allows for the
publication of a number of cultural Kurdish
magazines and other publications in the Kurdish
language, as there are active Kurdish cultural
centers in Tehran. A Kurdish literary union was
established in Saqqez, in addition to a number of
orchestras and arts groups, which have been allowed
to practice their activities. But political activity
was prohibited. In this domain, last year saw a
number of bloody demonstrations in the Kurdish areas
demanding political rights. It should be noted that
the Kurds accuse the Iranian security forces of
being responsible for the assassination of the
Iranian Kurdish leader, Dr Ebdulrehman Qasimlo in
the Austrian capital, Vienna, in 1989, and Dr Sadegh
Sharafkandi in Berlin in 1992.
Iran’s Arabs inhabit the oil-rich Khuzestan and
although the majority follows Islam (Shia), the
Sunni followers form a force to be reckoned with
among them. A few months ago, according to human
rights findings conducted by the United Nations
(UN), it was noted that the Iranian government was
unjustifiably harshly treating the Iranian Arabs and
was limiting job opportunities for them, in addition
to tampering with their topographical composition in
the region by sending Arab families to faraway
cities and bringing families of other nationalities
to live in their place. In this same report,
international supervisors from the UN demanded that
the Iranian government not execute capital
punishment on three activist Arab politicians. As
such, the Arab areas, Ahwaz province in particular,
constitutes a hub for political oppositional
activities led by clandestine (Arab) organizations,
many of whom Iranian officials accuse the US and
Britain of supporting and encouraging. Arab sources
who believe that that the Iranian government is
attempting to displace Arabs by tampering with their
topographical makeup in Khuzestan, which is
considered one of the world’s richest areas by
virtue of its oil, believe that the main aim is to
reduce the Arab presence in the province from 70
percent to 30 percent.
UN special rapporteur, Miloon Kothari, who visited
Iran in 2005, accused the Iranian government of
attempting to change the Arab and Kurdish
demographic makeup, in addition to restricting job
opportunities and exercising sectarian pressure on
them. It should be pointed out that Khuzestan, which
has a number of active political parties and
organizations, including the Popular Democratic
Front of Ahwazi Arabs has witnessed a number of
terrorist operations over the past two years. Only
last month, Iran’s Supreme Judicial Council declared
the Arab Lejnat al-Wefaq party (Committee of
Reconciliation), which is active in Ahwaz, illegal
on the grounds that it was flouting the Islamic
regime. Previously the Iranian security forces
killed three Arab youth during a demonstration in
Ahwaz, in addition to arresting 250 people.
Other nationalistic formations include the Turkmen,
who are spread over areas that overlook the Caspian
Sea in the northeastern tip of the country and the
Baluch who live on the border areas adjacent to
Afghanistan and Pakistan – most of whom are Sunni,
in addition to the Uzbek minority who are spread in
the northeastern region of the country. What is
striking about these nationalities is that they form
extensions of the larger ethnical groups who have
their own independent states neighboring or close to
Iran. Since Tehran is not concerned with local
peculiarities and economic development, the majority
of the youth is attracted to these states and is
inspired by their nationalistic spirit and values
and cling to their ethnical origins. Recently, the
Iranian government has deployed forces from the
police and the Iranian Guard in the Baluch region,
particularly in Kerman and Zahedan and the areas
that surround them under the pretext of combating
the cross-border smuggling trade.
But ethnic diversity does not constitute the sole
feature in the mosaic Iranian society; religion and
sectarianism also play a large role. The following
are the approximations of Iran’s population:
1-Shia: 70 percent
2-Sunni: 20-25 percent
3-Other religions (Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians,
Baha’is, and Zaydis): 5 percent.
Followers of other religions are spread throughout
the major cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz,
Hamedan, while Sunnis are concentrated in Kerman,
Zahedan, Kurdistan and the areas inhabited by
Turkmen, in addition to pockets in the coastal areas
of the gulf of Khuzestan (Arabistan). The reality is
that the Iranian government has displayed remarkable
attention towards caring for the peculiarities of
these religious groups and did not hesitate in
allocating a parliamentary seat to each of the
groups, save the Sunnis who have more than one seat.
And yet in the end, the government did not succeed
in establishing good relations with these religious
groups. In Kerman and Zahedan sectarian groups
actively oppose the government; however Tehran
ignores their political and cultural demands and
instead focuses its attention on the illegal
involvements with neighboring Pakistan. Likewise,
the Christians are persecuted under the accusation
of their involvement with foreign countries such as
the US, Britain and Germany. The western region in
Iran has a large number of tribal formations with
their own linguistic and social peculiarities,
distinguished by their mountainous cultures and
their unique economic life. What is remarkable is
that none of these aforementioned groups consider
themselves to be Persian nationals, such as the
Bakhiaris who claim that they are descendents of the
Lurs, the Lurs in turn believe that they have
descended from the Kurds, among other examples. Most
Orientalists and specialists in Iranian civilization
will agree that over half the Iranian population is
affiliated to non-Persian ethnic groups.
The period that followed the rise of the Khomeini
revolution in 1978, a year later, saw the
significant flourishing of Iran’s ethnical groups.
Less than a year later, April 1979, the government
embarked on bloody campaigns against the various
ethnicities – particularly in Kurdistan and
Arabistan and against the Turkmen of Iran. The
religious regime left no room for cultural liberties
in its constitution, especially article 19. This
resulted in the establishment of a number radio and
television channels and a large number of
publications in languages other than Persian, which
reflects the buzz of cultural activity, but still,
more rights are being demanded. Amnesty
International issued a report last February
condemning the practices of the Iranian government
against ethnic and religious groups and sects,
especially related to the acquisition of lands and
displacement, standard of living and the harsh
economic conditions for these groups unto the
sentences issued by the judiciary against political
activists.
In a situation like this, the burning question
remains: What if the UN Security Council imposes
international sanctions on Iran?
Or what if the current tensions between Iran and the
international community were to lead to a military
war?
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