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A third option in Iraq - The Kurds
21.1.2007
By Michalis Firillas |
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January 21, 2007
There's panic in Washington. Even George Bush is
preparing to leave Iraq, and he has set in motion a
plan for his alibi: He described the "surge" as the
final chance Americans are giving the Iraqi
government to fix the mess caused by the 2003
invasion. Anyone with rudimentary skills in the
arithmetic of American politics can calculate that
the pullout will start sometime by the second half
of 2008. And since American politicians are not
known for their propensity to think laterally about
international relations, it will be an absolute
withdrawal - which will prove to be a bigger mistake
than the invasion itself.
In cosmic terms, Iraq is a black hole. What is
keeping the hole from sucking in the entire Middle
East is the American presence there. If the U.S.
pulls out completely from Iraq, as many wish it to
do, the ensuing disintegration of Iraq and the
impact on the region will give rise to challenges on
a global level that will be extremely difficult to
manage. This is a dilemma that American strategists
have surely wrestled with for some time.
There is, however, an option that offers many
advantages, minimizes costs in American lives and
assets and can potentially be used to effect greater
stability in the region. The United States should
not withdraw from Iraq - not entirely. Instead, the
U.S. should establish a bolstered, semi-permanent
presence in the most stable part of Iraq, the
Kurdish-controlled north. A division -sized mix of
Special Forces and other specialists, backed with
air power dispersed in nearby allied countries,
should be sufficient. The number of American
casualties will diminish drastically, even though
attacks are not likely to end completely. The
unbridled draining of American assets will also be
checked.
The transformation of the current American presence
in Iraq from that of an occupier to a "guardian"
will not end the bloodshed. That kind of peace can
only come about if the historic conflict between
Sunnis and Shi'ite, which reemerged in the modern
Middle East when Khomeinism rose to challenge Sunni
hegemony three decades ago, is resolved. That can
occur if the "moderate" neighboring Sunni states and
Iran forge a pragmatic solution to the conflict.
Continued American presence in the Kurdish north,
however, can contribute to encouraging a process in
which a new format, perhaps a federal system, can be
created to accommodate the strains inherent in Iraq.
More importantly, a complete American pullout from
Iraq will cause irreparable damage to U.S. prestige.
There need not be a Saigon redux; what is needed is
a demonstration of flexibility and innovation, a
willingness to step back onto more solid ground and
influence by containing, from the sidelines, the
civil war unleashed by the U.S. invasion. It is also
of utmost importance for Arab allies in the region -
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, countries
with their own fears of militant Islam - to know
that America is not throwing in the towel.
Paradoxically, Syria and Iran are also terribly
concerned by the regional vacuum that will follow an
outright American pullout, and they would welcome a
more limited U.S. presence, especially one that is
accompanied by dialogue.
An alliance with the Kurds in the north is both
feasible and essential. It is feasible because the
Kurds offer the one critical variable that is sorely
missing in the Iraqi equation - a sense of nation,
however frail and affected by other elements of
identity so familiar to the Middle East. As such,
unlike the impossible U.S. trapeze act with Sunni
and Shi'ite Arabs in Iraq, the Kurds offer
Washington something tangible with which to work.
But the American presence in the north is essential
because there is real potential for regional
conflagration if the Kurds are not protected, from
themselves and others. The American presence will
guarantee that the Kurds will not seek independence.
That is important because it will keep Turkey and
Iran at bay. The former has all too often been
tempted into adventures in northern Iraq. Not only
will this not be tolerated by the Kurds, but Iran
has already said that it will also not remain idle.
While Tehran is unlikely to overtly or unilaterally
enter Iraq in the south - not wishing to antagonize
the Arab world - it will not hesitate to become
directly involved in the north. A Turkish-Iranian
clash in northern Iraq, which has been avoided in
recent memory by a delicate balancing act of shared
interests, restraint, and the presence of the Iraqi
state, is likely to occur if the area is abandoned
during an American withdrawal.
The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 undermined two
structures: it toppled the nervous Sunni-Shi'ite
balance; and pulled a supporting column out of the
tightly packed state system of the Middle East. The
U.S. can do very little about the first, and it
should take its troops out of the eye of the storm.
But in the case of the second, it is essential that
the U.S. continue to serve as a support beam by
ensuring that the chaos of Iraq does not result in a
broader, regional implosion.
haaretz com
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