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Would the Breakup of Iraq Break Up Iran as
Well?
12.9.2006
By Mac Johnson
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Tuesday, September
12, 2006
One of the most critical factors in the 13 colonies’
defeat of Britain in the American Revolution was the
financial, political and military aid given to
America by France. The autocratic French king,
though, was not motivated in his support by a love
of the individual liberty and right to populist
revolution espoused in the Declaration of
Independence or the pamphlets and speeches of the
American rebels. He just wanted to badly wound
England and its king—his great rival for power.
In this endeavor, there can be little doubt that he
succeeded beyond his greatest expectation. However,
in retrospect, the example of overthrow of monarchy
set by the Revolution may not have been the wisest
ever supported by the French “sun kings.” Within 10
years of the American victory, a Revolution had
swept France, which was partially inspired by and
consciously emulative of the American Revolution. By
1793, the French king had been beheaded.
I do not believe that last part was what he had in
mind when he came to our aid in 1778. As my mother
used to tell me, “Be careful what you wish for.” |
Mr. Johnson, a writer and medical researcher in
Cambridge, MA.
Photo:macjohnson.com |
I bring all this up not only because I am getting
old, and old people are obliged to tell crotchety
old stories about things that are no longer taught
in school. But also, because we may be witnessing a
similar moment of poor judgment in Iraq.
No, I’m not referring to one of the United States’
alleged blunders, despite the fact that all American
coverage of the war is negative and totally self-centered.
I’m talking about a huge potential blunder being
committed by one of the other interventionist powers
in the war: Iran.
There is little doubt that Iran sees the American
intervention in Iraq as a godsend, a wonderful
opportunity to ensnare and exhaust the great Satan
while expanding its own sphere of influence into a
now Shia-dominated Iraq.
There is a constant stream of reports, many
credible, that Shiite Iran is not only arming,
funding and jockeying the more radical elements of
the Iraqi Shiite community, but is also giving
logistical and technical support to some factions
among the Sunni insurgency that is dedicated to
killing American soldiers at a slow, but steady
rate.
Such support makes sense if one’s primary goal is to
destroy America’s power in the region. But it makes
less sense when such insurgents also turn their
weapons on Iraqi Shiites. And it makes very little
sense if the instability grows into full fledged
civil war and results in a partition of Iraq into
multiple states.
Although the disintegration of Iraq into
ethno-religious mini-states (split between the
Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs) would certainly
be hailed as a defeat for the United States (and
what outcome couldn’t be hailed as a defeat by
opponents of the war), it would set a dangerous
precedent for Iran, which in some ways is even more
tribally divided than Iraq.
The dominant ethnic group in Iran, the Persians,
whom hold most political power and influence,
constitute only about half of the population of
Iran. The remainder of the population is composed of
several other groups, who are geographically
concentrated into different regions of Iran—a
classic formula for separatism.
Significantly, the extreme northwestern regions of
Iran are inhabited primarily by ethnic Kurds, who
compose about 8% of the total population of the
nation. Independent by nature, ethnically and
religiously distinct, and linguistically and
geographically isolated, the effect on Iranian Kurds
of suddenly sharing a border with an independent
Kurdistan where Northern Iraq once lay on the map
would be hard to overestimate. The region is already
heavily militarized by the Iranian Army, and has
seen outbreaks of rebellious unrest for decades.
An independent Kurdistan in Iraq could be expected
to fuel a new wave of nationalism among the Kurds of
Iran, Syria, and Turkey, and all three Kurdish
populations could, in the event of rebellion, count
on safe haven and support within Iraqi Kurdistan.
Already the de facto independence of Iraqi Kurdistan
begun under the northern no-fly zone after the first
Gulf War has inspired a revival of Kurdish culture,
language and political life. Turkey’s greatest
concern over the current war was the prospect of a
free Kurdistan rising from the ruins of a
destabilized Iraq, and fueling the violent
independence movements that Turkey faces in the
(currently) Turkish portions of Kurdistan.
In the southwestern province of Iran lies a
considerable population of Shia Arabs, who border
the Shia Arab heartland of Iraq. In a “rational” map
of the Middle East based on language, religion and
ethnicity, these people, who constitute about 3% of
Iran’s population would have been grouped with the
Iraqi Shia Arab community.
Indeed, Iraq has long claimed the territory and
population as its own. While the population is
small, the land does contain many of Iran’s richest
oil fields. Saddam Hussein was very conscious of
these facts when he invaded Iran in 1980. Annexing
this Arab portion of Iran would have brought great
wealth to Iraq, and it may yet.
The southeast of Iran is inhabited by a small
population of Balochs with an active armed
independence movement.
But the great wildcard in an ethnically destabilized
Persian Gulf might be the Azeris of Iran.
Constituting at least 25% of the population and
bordering the now independent nation of Azerbaijan
(composed of the Azeri population of the former
Soviet Union), the Iranian Azeri currently show few
signs of a desire for independence.
However, tensions with the majority Persians do
exist, as demonstrated by recent riots and arrests
in the Azeri region following an official (Persian)
Iranian newspaper publishing a cartoon in which
Azeris were portrayed as cockroaches. Whether such
tensions could find a new outlet in an Iran
suppressing independence movements in Kurdish, Arab
or other ethnic regions is an interesting question.
Already the strains of war have necessitated growing
official recognition of the independence of the
Kurds within Iraq. The weaker the central government
becomes due to insurgency, the more concessions it
will make to the Kurds to maintain their support. It
would take little provocation from the central
government to unleash outright Kurdish independence.
Within their region, the Kurds have their own
government, military, language, schools, media,
customs, trade, and peace and stability. They will
fight to maintain these, if threatened by the chaos
of the insurgency or the new power of a victorious
Shia government following the end of the insurgency.
The birth of a Kurdish nation could easily set of a
decades-long chain of events leading to a greater
Kurdistan and a much reduced Iraq, Iran, Syria and
Turkey.
Looked at this way, Iran is playing with fire in
Iraq, hoping to burn only America in the flame. And
it makes one wonder why partition of Iraq has been
so resisted by the U.S. coalition.
Mr. Johnson, a writer and medical researcher in
Cambridge, MA., Archives and additional material can
be found at
www.macjohnson.com .
humanevents com
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