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Report: Turkey needs plan B to be ready
for division of Iraq
8.8.2006
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Ankara, August 8,
2006
Turkey should be prepared for a possible division of
Iraq and develop a plan B, said a recent report
published by a major Turkish think-tank. It urged
the Turkish government about the need for a new
approach towards the Iraqi Kurds and northern Iraq.
The Ankara-based International Strategic Research
Organization (ISRO), in a 33-page report on Iraq,
criticized Ankara's current policy and gave
recommendations on a new approach.
"The ideal choice for Turkey could well be a united
Iraq with a strong central government consolidating
its power in all parts of the country, including
northern Iraq. But developments show the contrary,"
the report said. "In these conditions Turkey needs
plan B."
Stressing that Turkey so far failed to adapt its
Iraq policy to the rapidly changing conditions in
Iraq and the region, the think-tank warned that
without a policy change in the short term Ankara
will face grave problems stemming from Kurdistan
(northern Iraq).
"An independent Iraqi Kurdistan is not necessarily a
threat to Turkey. On the contrary, it could be a
major advantage," the report claimed.
"The worst scenario for Turkey wouldn't be the
division of Iraq but chaos and civil war in northern
Iraq, the case now in the south. Should that happen
Turkey would then border a region where there's
civil war and the [terrorist Kurdistan Workers'
Party) PKK could also reap the benefits of that."
The think-tank proposed the Turkish government
take new measures to stop alienating the Iraqi Kurds
and win their confidence. It made the following 15
recommendations:
1) Turkey's wrong policies towards the region
are alienating it from the Iraqi Kurds, creating
permanent fear among them of Turkey and pushing them
to seek support from other countries. Ankara needs
to reverse this trend soon by taking
confidence-building measures.
2) The Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens' interests
don't necessarily contradict each other. It's in
Turkey's interests to bring the Iraqi Kurds and
Turkmens as close as possible. But in Turkey some
political groups are deliberately trying to portray
differences between the Turkmens and Kurds as being
greater than they really are for domestic
consumption. But in fact this not only undermines
Turkey's interests in Kurdistan (northern Iraq) but
also fuels a greater risk of polarization in Turkey
between ethnic Kurds and others.
3) Ankara needs to do immediate work for
greater economic integration between Turkey and
northern Iraq. This would give Turkey more leverage
in possible future scenarios in Iraq -- a united or
divided one.
4) It's not in Turkey's interests to let
other countries increase their domination in this
region. But today countries like the U.S., Israel,
Britain, Russia and Iran and many others are
undertaking extensive intelligence work in the
region and trying to influence the Iraqi Kurdish
regional government.
Added to which, in a large part of the region
neither the central Iraqi government nor the Kurdish
regional government have effective control. Turkey,
meanwhile, has got very behind in increasing its
influence in the region.
5) Northern Iraq has become an important
element which could influence the domestic balances
in Turkish politics. If Turkey doesn't draw up new
policies towards the region, the region's impact on
Turkey will be more dramatic.
6) Turkey should stop a small
security-oriented group from dominating the
development and implementation of policies on the
Turkmens and Kurds. Such policies have to date
failed to unite the Iraqi Turkmens and instead
caused further divisions among them.
7) Some Turkish groups and units sent to
northern Iraq have abused their financial and
political power for their individual interests or
ideological goals. It has become clear that northern
Iraq is consistently and increasingly becoming a
more prominent factor in new crime gangs in Turkey.
The weapons and money transfers involved all recent
political criminal activities in Turkey, from the
Atabeyler gang to the shooting of a Council of State
judge, were all from Kurdistan (northern Iraq).
8) Some groups in Turkey are carrying out
secret talks with foreign intelligence officials in
northern Iraq in their personal interests or to
achieve their ideological goals.
9) Turkey should introduce new mechanisms and
channels to its new approach towards the Iraqi
Kurds. These should include improving bilateral
contacts, increasing trade volume, offering
scholarships to Iraqi Kurdish students and starting
TV broadcasting in Kurdish and Arabic.
10) Turkey's new policy towards the Iraqi
Kurds should focus on two points. First of all,
Turkey has to show the Iraqi Kurds that it isn't
hostile towards them and that, on the contrary, it
will defend them. Secondly, Ankara has to show its
determination to combat the PKK. But Turkey is
currently giving counter messages. The majority of
Iraqi Kurds seem to perceive Turkey as their main
obstacle and, on the other hand, believe Ankara is
not strong or courageous enough to combat the PKK.
11) Iraqi Kurds, in the long term, can
contribute to Turkey's efforts to combating
separatist terrorism but for that there needs to be
official authority, the political will and security
forces ready to combat terrorism. If central
government cannot do so, it should be done by the
regional government. Turkey should not miss the
larger picture by focusing too much on and limiting
itself to the issue of Iraq's territorial integrity.
12) Since Turkey is unwilling to train Iraqi
Kurdish militias (peshmerga), this is being done by
the U.S. and Israel. But Turkey's military and
police are the most experienced in the field and are
currently training hundreds of foreign students.
13) Turkey should prioritize avoiding
terrorism and civil war spreading to northern Iraq.
It should also try to contribute to stopping
conflict among the Shiites and Sunnis. The civil war
in Iraq is pushing Iraqi Kurds to be more
independent of regional countries and more dependent
more on foreign powers like the U.S., Israel and
Britain.
14) Turkey should make itself and the
southeast more attractive to the Iraqi Kurds. Ankara
should draw up a plan on that.
15) The Iraqi Kurds shouldn't be perceived as
limited to two main groups under Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani and Iraqi Kurdistan region President
Massoud Barzani. Ankara should develop its relations
with other Iraqi Kurdish groups as well and support
plurality. Ankara also needs to find ways to talk
with the Iraqi Kurd public and not limit
communication to just with its leaders.
thenewanatolian.com
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