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Iraq and the Kurds: The brewing battle
over Kirkuk 1.8.2006
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Crisis Group Report
As all eyes are turned toward efforts to stabilise
Iraq, the conflict that has been percolating in
Kirkuk remains dangerous and dangerously neglected.
That struggle is equal parts street brawl over oil
riches, ethnic competition over identity between
Kurdish, Turkoman, Arab and Assyrian-Chaldean
communities, and titanic clash between two nations,
Arab and Kurd.
Given the high stakes, the international community
cannot afford to stand by, allowing the situation to
slip into chaos by default. It needs to step in and
propose a solution that addresses all sides’ core
concerns without crossing their existential red
lines. The most viable negotiated outcome, which a
special UN envoy should mediate between leaders of
Kirkuk’s communities as well as representatives of
the federal government and the Kurdish federal
region, would rest on the following provisions:
postponing the constitutionally-mandated referendum
on Kirkuk’s status which, in today’s environment,
would only exacerbate tensions; designating Kirkuk
governorate as a stand-alone federal region falling
neither under the Kurdish federal region nor
directly under the federal government for an interim
period; equitable power-sharing arrangements between
Kirkuk’s four principal communities; and continued
reversal of past abuses, including managed return of
those who were forcibly displaced by previous
regimes; facilities and compensation for those
brought by previous regimes (including their
offspring) who agree to leave voluntarily;
resolution of property disputes via the established
mechanism; and a process by which former Kirkuk
districts can either be restored to Kirkuk
governorate or remain where they are.
To the Kurds, Kirkuk was always a Kurdish-majority
region – shared, they readily admit, with other
communities – over which they fought and suffered,
from Arabisation to forced depopulation to genocide.
In their view, the Baathist regime’s removal created
an opportunity to restore Kirkuk to its rightful
owners. They have done much in the past three years
to encourage the displaced to return, persuade Arab
newcomers to depart and seize control of political
and military levers of power. Their ultimate
objective is to incorporate Kirkuk governorate into
the Kurdish federal region and make Kirkuk town its
capital.
To the other communities, the Kurdish claim is
counterfeit, inspired primarily by a greedy appetite
for oil revenue, and they view the progressive
Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk as an outrage. To the
Turkomans, in particular, the growing Kurdish
presence has caused deep resentment, as they
consider Kirkuk town historically Turkoman (while
conceding that the Kurds are a significant urban
minority, as well as an outright majority in the
surrounding countryside).
The Kurds’ rising power has allowed them to create
institutional faits accomplis that now threaten to
bring the Kirkuk conflict to a vigorous boil. Their
prominent role in drafting the constitution in 2005
enabled them to insert a paragraph that ordains a
government-led de-Arabisation program in Kirkuk, to
be followed by a census and local referendum by the
end of 2007. However, while the constitution puts
them formally in the right, neither any of Kirkuk’s
other communities, significant parts of the central
government nor any neighbouring state supports these
procedures. Turkey, in particular, has indicated it
will not tolerate Kirkuk’s formal absorption into
the Kurdish region, and it has various means of
coercive diplomacy at its disposal, including
last-resort military intervention, to block the
Kurds’ ambitions.
Within a year, therefore, Kurds will face a basic
choice: to press ahead with the constitutional
mechanisms over everyone’s resistance and risk
violent conflict, or take a step back and seek a
negotiated solution.
Passions may be too high to permit the latter course
but, on the basis of two years of conversations with
representatives of all Kirkuk’s communities, as well
as of the governments of Iraq, Turkey, the U.S. and
the Kurdish federal region, Crisis Group believes a
compromise arrangement that meets all sides’ vital
interests is attainable.
Failure by the international community to act early
and decisively could well lead to a rapid
deterioration as the December 2007 deadline
approaches. The result would be violent communal
conflict, spreading civil war and, possibly, outside
military intervention. It is doubtful that an Iraq
so profoundly unsettled by sectarian rifts and
insurgent violence would survive another major body
blow in an area where the largest of the country’s
diverse communities are represented.
Recommendations To the Government of Iraq:
1. Invite the UN Security Council to appoint a
special envoy charged with:
(a) facilitating a negotiated solution to the status
of Kirkuk as well as other Kurdish-claimed areas;
(b) raising donor funds for Kirkuk’s rehabilitation
and ensuring their use on the basis of need, not
ethnicity;
(c) monitoring the parties’ compliance with any
agreements reached; and
(d) reporting regularly to the Security Council.
2. Intensify the process of reversing past abuses in
Kirkuk, including:
(a) the managed return of people forcibly displaced
by previous regimes;
(b) facilities and compensation for people brought
in by past regimes (including their offspring) who
agree to leave voluntarily;
(c) resolution of property disputes via the
established mechanism; and
(d) a process by which former Kirkuk districts can
either be restored to Kirkuk governorate or remain
where they are.
To the Government of Iraq, the Council of
Representatives, Representatives
of Kirkuk’s Communities and the Kurdistan Regional
Government:
3. Indicate the intention to resolve the status of
Kirkuk and other disputed territories through
peaceful negotiations and commit to moderating
rhetoric on this matter.
4. Negotiate with the help of the UN special envoy
an interim solution for a defined period, perhaps
ten years, along the following lines:
(a) broaden the negotiations over Kirkuk to include
other Iraqi stakeholders, specifically
representatives of civil society, including unions,
non-profits and women’s organisations;
(b) during the scheduled constitutional review
process, the council of representatives would set
aside the idea of a referendum for Kirkuk and
instead draft a charter dealing specifically with
that governorate;
(c) the charter would grant Kirkuk governorate the
status of federal region for a defined period of
time; and
(d) Kirkuk’s four communities would agree on
equitable power-sharing arrangements.
To the Kurdistan Regional Government:
5. Prepare the Kurdish public for necessary
compromises on Kirkuk and Kurdish national
aspirations, including acceptance of Kirkuk
governorate as a stand-alone federal region for an
interim period.
6. Relinquish directorates in the Kirkuk governorate
over which the Kurdish parties took control in April
2003 and cooperate with the UN special envoy in
redistributing senior posts in the governorate on an
equitable basis.
To the Government of Turkey:
7. Commit to the peaceful resolution of the Kirkuk
question and lower rhetoric on this issue.
8. Facilitate trade, especially in fuel products,
between Turkey and northern Iraq, for example by
opening a second border crossing in addition to the
one at Khabur, and promote investment with the Iraqi
Kurdistan region.
9. Commit not to send military forces into Iraq or
to undertake measures of coercive diplomacy, such as
shutting down the Khabur border crossing or the
Baji-Ceyhan pipeline.
To the Government of the United States:
10. Lend full diplomatic and financial support to
peaceful resolution of the status of Kirkuk and
other disputed territories, make this one of its
diplomatic priorities in Iraq, and persuade all
Iraqi political actors of the need to pursue a
negotiated solution to the Kirkuk question.
(a) Encourage Iraqi political leaders to promote
more inclusive and transparent decision-making
around the future of Kirkuk by including a broader
group of actors in the negotiations.
To the United Nations Security Council:
11. Act on an Iraqi request to appoint a special
envoy for Kirkuk, supported by a Security Council
resolution outlining the envoy’s powers in
accordance with proposals in this report.
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