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Divided We Stand
3.8.2006
By Pejman Yousefzadeh |
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The current
reconstruction effort in Iraq seeks to keep the
current boundaries of Iraq whole. But by keeping
Iraq whole, the United States may in fact be
hindering a successful reconstruction effort and
needlessly delaying the achievement of an honorable
peace and the successful withdrawal of American
troops.
It may be that Iraqis want to keep their country
whole. If so, that choice ought to be respected. But
in the event that keeping Iraq whole is not a sine
qua non of the reconstruction effort according to
the Iraqi people, the partition of Iraq into natural
boundaries is a way to bring the reconstruction to a
successful end while at the same time establishing
successor states to Iraq that may be more coherent
and easier to keep together than Iraq itself was.
The Original Creation of Iraq
Iraq was created through the Sykes-Picot Agreement
and its current boundaries are the construction of
Western powers. This has caused Shi'ites, Sunnis and
Kurds to be lumped together into a single state.
Because of the sectarian tensions that have existed
between these groups, their forced cohabitation into
a single state has always been a dicey affair.
Sectarian violence was kept at a minimum and
tensions were sublimated by the presence of an
autocratic Ba'athist regime -- led for most of its
existence by Saddam Hussein. But it is doubtful that
even Saddam's iron hand would have been successful
for long in keeping sectarian tensions hidden away.
Indeed, those tensions became strong enough even
during the presence of the Ba'athist regime that the
Shi'ites staged a rebellion in the immediate
aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and an
autonomous Kurdish entity organized itself in
northern Iraq. Even if the Ba'ath Party had remained
in power, the potent sectarian divisions would
likely have caused Iraq to be rent by internal
violence.
The long term prospects for a coherent and unified
Iraq were therefore never very good. Now, with the
removal of the Ba'athist regime, sectarian violence
has bubbled to the surface. This does not make the
removal of the former regime somehow wrong, but it
does mean that the sectarian divisions will have to
be dealt with as an obstacle to a successful
stabilization effort.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the Iraqi
people may be open to a partition plan. There remain
arguments against partition that should be addressed
and overcome.
Does partition constitute failure?
There is rhetorical value in saying that a
reconstruction effort has been able to keep Iraq
"whole" and "unified" instead of saying that at the
end of such an effort, Iraq was left "divided." We
generally operate under a psychological conceit that
says that dividing a country into separate entities
is a bad choice and denotes failure in dealing with
that country.
But why should this be so? The former Czechoslovakia
split apart into a Czech Republic and the country of
Slovakia. The partition was peaceful and has led to
the existence of friendly relations between both
countries. The former Soviet Union is a prime
example of a country with sectarian and
nationalistic divisions seething underneath the
surface. Its partition has significantly lessened
the chances of war and conflict between the
nationalities and sects that made up the former
Soviet Union.
Sometimes partition is preferable to keeping a
country together despite all of the internal
conditions that doom unity in the long run. In these
cases, partition serves as a recognition of and
response to the existence of long term instability
within a country. Iraq currently labors under its
internal divisions. Those divisions may not be
resolved in a way that will allow the current state
of Iraq to exist in the long term. A new path -- one
involving partition -- may have to be taken.
Will an independent Kurdistan poison relations
with Turkey?
An independent Kurdistan would likely be one of the
Iraqi successor states. Because of traditional
animosities between Kurds and Turks, there is the
question of what Turkish reaction will be to the
creation of a Kurdish state.
Many anticipate that the creation of an independent
Kurdistan won't be received well in Turkey. But
bringing the Turks around to the fact that there is
an independent Kurdish state is not impossible. For
one thing, the existing autonomous Kurdish entity is
in many ways a state in everything but name. For
another, making the existing entity into a homeland
for the Kurds might help remove pressure from Turkey
to cede any authority or territory for the creation
of a Kurdish state. The current Kurdish entity is
renowned for functioning effectively and within
present-day Iraq the Kurds clearly have the most
effective institutions of government running. This
autonomous entity is prepared to step into its role
as a nation-state if a partition takes place and if
an independent Kurdistan is recognized as a
sovereign country. Indeed, it is already currently
performing key nation-state-like functions.
The fact that a de facto Kurdish homeland exists for
all practical purposes should help Turkey acclimate
itself to the creation of a de jure Kurdish
homeland. There may continue to be issues that need
to be worked out between the Kurds and the Turks,
but the current autonomous Kurdish entity provides
us with a valuable template to fashion a peaceful
and workable coexistence between an independent and
sovereign Kurdistan and its neighbors.
Will the creation of a Shi'ite successor state
lead to Iranian influence?
Along with an independent Kurdistan, two other
successor states will likely be the result of any
partition. One will be a Sunni successor state.
Another will be a Shi'ite state.
The mere mention of the creation of a Shi'ite
successor state will likely cause alarm bells to go
off in the minds of American policymakers. The
concern, naturally, will be that a Shi'ite successor
state will become an Iranian satellite, given that
Iran is overwhelmingly a Shi'ite country.
This conclusion is premature. The mere existence of
two Shi'ite states side by side does not necessarily
entail the subjugation of one as a satellite to the
other. Nation-states have interests that they pursue
rationally (if not always correctly) and these
interests -- maintaining a balance of power,
balancing against certain threats, bandwagoning with
potential allies in favor of a particular policy
goal -- play a powerful role in determining national
policy and statecraft. Statecraft is not determined
merely by the nature of domestic regimes or
similarities and/or differences between the
populations of various nation-states. Thus, despite
the fact that they were both Communist regimes, the
Soviet Union maintained a long rivalry with the
People's Republic of China. Ditto for the
relationship between the USSR and Tito's Yugoslavia.
Will a Shi'ite successor state to Iraq have friendly
relations with Iran? Possibly. But that won't
necessarily make that state a puppet or satellite of
Iran. And we cannot automatically assume that a
Shi'ite state will be friendly with Iran. A Shi'ite
state will have its own security interests and
foreign policy goals to follow. Iran will similarly
calculate its own goals and interests and, given the
existence of conflicting interests between Iran and
Iraq (conflicting interests which led to the
outbreak of an eight-year long war between the two
countries), it is likely that there will also be
conflicts between the interests of Iran and a
Shi'ite successor state as well. These conflicting
interests -- along with an overall Persian/Arab
ethnic division -- will significantly lessen the
chances that a Shi'ite state will become an Iranian
vassal. To the extent that the nature of populations
have any bearing on this issue, the existence of
centuries-old tensions and rivalries between Arabs
and Persians and the differences between the Iranian
theological stance of direct clerical involvement in
politics and the Iraqi Shi'ite belief in clerical "quietism"
or political non-involvement serve to reduce
concerns that a Shi'ite successor state will be in
thrall to Iran.
None of this means that we should wholly discount
the possibility that Iran may exercise an outsized
degree of influence on a Shi'ite successor state.
Indeed, any partition process must include strict
warnings to Iran stating that attempts unduly to
influence the affairs of a Shi'ite successor state
will not be tolerated. But we should not believe
that it is a foregone conclusion that such a state
will become an Iranian puppet, and there are a whole
host of disincentives for a Shi'ite successor state
to allow itself to be sublimated to Iran. Moreover,
if it is a foregone conclusion that a Shi'ite
successor state will become an Iranian satellite,
that may make the case for partition all the more
compelling. Given the majority Shi'ite presence in
present-day Iraq, leaving Iraq whole and unified may
allow Iran to exercise influence throughout the
country if we believe that Shi'ite political
ascendancy will allow for the spread of Iranian
influence into Iraq. In a worst case scenario, it is
best to contain such influence by limiting it to a
Shi'ite successor state rather than allowing Iranian
geopolitical ambitions to also influence the fate of
the Sunnis and Kurds in the context of an Iraq with
present-day boundaries.
To arguing on behalf of partition is a difficult.
But the amount of sectarian divisions in Iraq may be
impossible to overcome while at the same time
keeping the current boundaries of the country
intact. Partition should be a last resort but it may
prove to be an effective way to successfully
reconstruct the region and institute a lasting and
honorable peace. It deserves consideration as a
serious policy option. And if the Iraqi people are
open to the partition of their country, we should be
as well.
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