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But over and over again
Iraq's insurgents have shown the willingness to bide
their time during major US operations only to
resurface when the American troop presence
inevitably declines. So the real (and more
difficult) question is not what the operation
accomplishes in the short-term, but whether there is
any genuine hope of stemming insurgent violence and
sectarian strife in the long-term.
That's where the politics come in. "We are hoping to
see what the prime minister announces," Babakir
said, referring to long-discussed plans for national
reconciliation, which aims to disband Shi'ite
militias and bring some Sunni insurgents into the
political fold with a promise of amnesty. "This will
support us, and enable us to deal with the situation
a lot better than we have done in the past."
Babakir's careful reply actually says quite a lot
about the complex challenges he and his country
face. After all, relying on Iraq's politicians to
cement the tactical gains made by the American and
Iraqi militaries is more a prayer than a strategy.
Though the rail-thin officer downplayed the danger
of militias affiliated with members of the
government, like the Badr Organization and the Mahdi
Army, many of the political opportunities cited by
Babakir could just as easily be called part of the
problem.
Politicians doubling as militia chieftains seem to
be driving the violence, or at the very least
contributing to the proliferation of armed groups in
Baghdad. Abdel Aziz al Hakim, whose Shi'ite
coalition holds the most seats in Iraq's parliament,
has called on Shi'ites to create armed neighborhood
watches to defend themselves against terrorists.
Meanwhile Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army operates from a
sanctuary in Sadr City.
General Babakir and the US military have been a bit
more aggressive on that front than the government of
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki would prefer. Earlier
this month a joint US-Iraqi raid into Sadr City
freed prisoners, at least some of the Sunnis, being
held by what Babakir called an "assassination cell."
Maliki denounced the raid and promised nothing like
it would happen again. Gen. Babakir, though,
defended the operation, saying his soldiers do not
launch raids in Sadr City — or anywhere else —
without specific intelligence.
But Babakir was also careful not to link the targets
of the raid directly to Moqtada Sadr or his militia,
saying violence attributed to the militia was
actually the work of renegades.
"Those are the dangerous people," he said, "because
they don't take orders from the leadership of the
Mehdi Army." By contrast, he stressed, "the majority
of [politicians affiliated with militias] are
actually involved in the parliament; they have a
great role to play in the parliament," Babakir said.
"And they're all agreed on the national unity
[plan]. And all their efforts are out there trying
to calm the situation."
American officers and diplomats — to say nothing of
the Iraqi government — join Babakir in his refusal
to name an enemy or tie "insurgents and death
squads" to larger political movements. Col. Michael
Shields' Stryker Brigade, which spent a year in
Mosul, had its mission extended by four months and
is now working with the Iraqi Army to cordon off and
search west Baghdad's most violent neighborhoods.
"We're not targeting organizations," said Col.
Michael Shields. "We're targeting the threats to the
security of the people."
After three years of counter-insurgency warfare
American commanders are well aware of what they can
and cannot accomplish through force of arms. Shields
said that the ultimate success of the new security
push is out of the military's hands. "It's going to
take the will of the people," Shields said. "It's
going to take governance and economic development as
well."
But while American power cannot solve Iraq's
problems it may also be too late, after three years
of war, to rely on Iraqi institutions to do the job.
Gen.
Babakir emphatically declared that no one with
sectarian loyalties had a place in the Iraqi armed
forces. Yet beyond the high walls and earthen
barriers that make Iraqi officers and politicians
prisoners in their own country, many militiamen
operate — sometimes openly — within the Iraqi
security forces. And in neighborhoods like Sadr City
militias, and not the government, command the
support of the people.
Babakir, like some other American and Iraqi
officials, alludes to these complexities even if
political realities constrain what he can say — and
what he can do. He cited efforts to bring the Mahdi
Army under control through the political process,
and said he did not anticipate a military push into
Sadr City. "We don't want to create more problems,"
he said. "It's a very delicate situation." Spoken
like a true politician, albeit one with a military
background, who knows that the wrong choice of words
can cause as much damage as a poorly executed battle
plan.
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