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The Return of Turkey's Kurdish Problem
30.7.2006
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The U.S. might still be able to head off a
Turkish attack on Iraqi's Kurds.
By Henri J.
Barkey, HENRI J. BARKEY, chairman of the
International Relations Department at Lehigh
University, is a former member of the State
Department's policy planning staff.
July 30, 2006
If Iran's nuclear ambitions, Iraq's low-level civil
war and the Israeli-Hezbollah war were not enough,
President Bush may face a new dilemma. The Turkish
government has ordered its military to prepare for
an attack on 3,000 Kurdistan Workers Party
insurgents living in Kurdish-dominated northern
Iraq. Although the incursion by Turkey, a U.S. ally
of 50 years, would be mostly for show, it would
severely embarrass the Bush administration. No
wonder the president twice talked to Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan last week.
But Erdogan's moderately Islamist government is
cornered. This month, two insurgent attacks inside
Turkey killed 15 Turkish soldiers, and the prime
minister vowed to fight back. Meanwhile, the war in
Iraq has intensified Ankara's biggest problem: the
country's restless minority Kurds.
Throughout its modern existence, Turkey has battled
Kurdish political activism — sometimes violently.
After defeating the 15-year insurgency led by the
Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, in 1999, the
government failed to come up with a political
solution to the social divisions and dismal living
conditions of Turkey's Kurds in the southeast. The
insurgents recently abandoned their unilateral
cease-fire and resumed their fight for independence.
The success of Iraqi Kurds in setting up a thriving
autonomous state in northern Iraq has exacerbated
matters. That example only emboldens Turkey's Kurds
to strike out on their own. Even worse for Ankara is
the possibility that an independent Kurdish state
will emerge in northern Iraq as the rest of Iraq
descends into civil war.
Turkey has focused its frustrations on Washington.
It blames the Iraq war for rekindling Kurdish
aspirations throughout the region. It is embittered
by the refusal of the U.S. to take on the PKK
insurgents in Iraq despite Washington's persistent
declarations that their party is a terrorist
organization. Many Turks believe that such hypocrisy
can mean one of two things, equally nefarious:
either that Washington is punishing Ankara for
refusing to allow the U.S. to open a second front at
the beginning of the Iraq war or that it is
nurturing a pan-Kurdish state to be its proxy in the
Middle East.
Turkey's internal politics also have put Erdogan on
the defensive. His government's primary goal of
deepening the country's ties to the European Union
is in danger of hitting a brick wall of European
opposition because of Cyprus. Defying an agreement
with the EU, Turkey has refused to open up its ports
to Greek Cypriot shipping because its Turkish
Cypriot brethren are barred from trading with Europe
and the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, relations between Turkey's civil and
military authorities are at their lowest point since
Erdogan became prime minister in late 2002.
Suspicious that Erdogan has a hidden Islamist
agenda, the generals have been exploring means by
which to weaken him, if not force him out. They
worry that either the prime minister or someone from
his conservative religious entourage will ascend to
the presidency — parliament, which elects the
president, is controlled by Erdogan's party — one of
the most important and last bastions of secularism
in Turkey. Erdogan also has been the target of a
nationalist backlash — not a majority movement yet —
that accuses him of being too soft on Europe,
Cyprus, the U.S., the PKK and Iraqi Kurds.
Yet, Iraq is Erdogan's Achilles' heel. He can bat
away most criticisms, but when it comes to the PKK
insurgents taking refuge in northern Iraq, he's
trapped by his promise to retaliate for the deaths
of the Turkish solders. The timing could not be
worse. Israel's retaliation against Hezbollah in
Lebanon, a move profoundly unpopular in Turkey, has
raised the ante for Erdogan. If Israel can unleash a
punishing attack on terrorists, how can he do any
less?
It would be a win-win proposition for the Turkish
prime minister, although inaction could bring down
his government. By delivering on his promise of
retaliation and standing up to the Americans,
Erdogan would burnish his nationalist credentials.
He also would inoculate himself against the
meddlesome generals, who are eager to counter
Kurdish gains in northern Iraq.
Although a Turkish cross-border military move would
embarrass the Bush administration, the U.S. may be
able to tolerate it, especially if it took the form
of just artillery attacks or airstrikes. But an
operation involving large numbers of ground troops
backed by tanks could cause mayhem in northern Iraq.
It would inevitably clash with Iraqi Kurds,
destabilizing the only relatively quiet sector in
Iraq.
None of this should be happening. But Ankara has
treated Iraqi Kurds with disdain while making no
attempt to improve the domestic conditions of
Turkey's Kurds. The U.S., especially the Central
Command, has shown little understanding of the
political costs to Turks of the PKK's presence in
Iraq. And the Iraqi Kurds have refused to cut off
supplies to the insurgents because they regard the
PKK as a Turkish problem. The most consequential
misstep came last fall, when the Turkish
intelligence chief, Emre Taner, began talking with
Iraqi Kurds on how to dispose of the PKK. The Iraqi
Kurds were genuinely interested in doing a deal. But
neither the Turkish government nor its military was
willing to take the chance, and Washington,
distracted by its multitude of problems, did not use
its considerable influence with Iraq's Kurds to push
the negotiations forward.
The talks could be resuscitated if the U.S. gave
them high-level attention. Bush has talked to
Erdogan, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has
talked to her counterpart in the Turkish government.
There may still be enough time to avert a crisis.
Latimes com
The Kurdish conflict has claimed more than 37,000
lives since 1984 when the PKK took up arms for
self-rule in the southeast of Turkey
(Kurdistan-Turkey)
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan (
Kurdistan-Turkey) wikipedia
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