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Tensions mount at Iraq-Turkey border
25.7.2006
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Turkish Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gul last week summoned the U.S. and Iraqi
ambassadors to warn them that his country would act
in self-defense if effective measures were not taken
to end the presence in northern Iraq of the PKK, or
Kurdistan Workers Party.
The party was responsible for the killing of 14
Turkish soldiers and policemen the previous weekend.
The basically cautious government of Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, leader of Turkey’s Justice and Development
Party (AKP), is making what may prove to be its last
attempt to make the U.S. administration live up to
its declaration that it opposes the PKK, as it does
any other terrorist organization.
The support given by the U.S. administration for
Israel’s massive assault on Lebanon — and the
understanding shown by the rest of the G-8 — has
compounded Erdogan’s difficulty in containing
domestic pressure to disregard U.S. and European
Union warnings against a cross-border operation to
root out PKK bases in northern Iraq.
Accused of indecision by the opposition and pressed
by his own supporters, Erdogan has to respond to the
demand for national self-assertion, in spite of the
misgivings expressed privately by some of his
ministers.
Upsetting the United States and world financial
institutions would be a more serious matter. The
publicity given to the message delivered to the U.S.
ambassador and to a “political directive” to the
general staff to set in hand preparations for an
assault on the PKK on both sides of the border is
for the moment a substitute for a major cross-border
incursion.
However, if the security situation does not improve
— and particularly if the PKK were to succeed in
mounting a spectacular attack in a metropolitan area
— military action could not be delayed indefinitely.
The three opposition parties represented in
parliament — the center-left Republican People’s
Party (CHP) and the center-right True Path (DYP) and
Motherland (ANAP) parties — have hastened to assure
Erdogan of their support for a cross-border
operation. Although more cautious voices are also
heard — from a small group of liberal columnists —
Erdogan and the AKP cannot disregard majority
opinion as they prepare for presidential elections
in May next year and then for legislative elections
the following November.
Effective action against the PKK is needed not only
to safeguard internal security but also to control
the political situation in Turkey’s southeastern
provinces inhabited by the Kurds. As long as local
people, and the politicians for whom they vote, fear
the PKK (often more than they fear the security
forces), the government will find it difficult to
rely on elected local authorities in its efforts to
end Kurdish disaffection through liberalization and
regional aid.
According to Turkish authorities, in the 18 months
to the end of June, PKK militants killed 148 members
of the armed forces, 17 policemen, 18 village guards
and 72 civilians. The number of injured exceeded
1,000. PKK losses amounted to 286 militants killed
and 15 captured.
Gul is reported to have presented the U.S.
ambassador with evidence of the presence in northern
Iraq of some 150 leading members of the PKK and of
the infiltration of men and military supplies into
Turkey.
The PKK relies largely on long-range rifles and
mines detonated from a distance for its hit-and-run
attacks. Most of these weapons are said to come from
former Iraqi army stocks.
Turkish patrols cross the Iraqi border frequently in
pursuit of the PKK and have observation posts in
Iraqi Kurdistan. However, a major operation would be
needed to strike at the PKK headquarters on Qandil
mountain (near the border with Iran) and Makhmur
camp nearer the Turkish border.
After his meeting with Gul, the ambassador said
that, rather than send troops into northern Iraq,
Turkey should rely on the “three-way mechanism” —
the process of consultation between Turkey, the
Iraqi government and U.S. authorities in Iraq — that
was established after earlier Turkish complaints.
However, after the last meeting of the three
parties, arrest warrants were issued against the PKK
leadership but no action was taken to implement
them. Turkish authorities realize that U.S. forces
are in no position to take action against the PKK in
northern Iraq and that the Kurdish regional
government will have to do so.
They also know that, contrary to conspiracy
theories, Washington would be happy to see the back
of the PKK but that the Iraqi Kurdish leaders may
see some use in the PKK in their conflict of
interest with Turkey, which opposes their demand for
quasi-independence and their claim to Kirkuk and its
oilfields. The Turks hope that the declaration of a
“shared vision,” issued after Gul’s recent visit to
Washington, means that they carry more weight in
U.S. calculations than the Iraqi Kurds, for all the
help that the latter gave (and the Turks refused) in
ousting Saddam Hussein.
The Erdogan government has to respond to domestic
demands for effective action to stop the PKK from
using northern Iraq as a sanctuary from which it can
attack targets inside Turkey. Although unwilling to
send a significant force into northern Iraq, it will
have to authorize a large-scale cross-border
operation (by land, air or both) if terrorist
incidents continue and Washington does not force the
Kurdish regional government to eject the PKK.
Oxford Analytica is an international consulting firm
providing strategic analysis on world events for
business and government leaders. See www.oxan.com
thehill com
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan (
Kurdistan-Turkey) wikipedia
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