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The conventional wisdom holds that Iraq’s break-up
would be destabilising and should be avoided at all
costs. Looking at Iraq’s dismal history since
Britain cobbled it together from three Ottoman
provinces at the end of the first world war, it
should be apparent that it is the effort to hold
Iraq together that has been destabilising.
Pursuit of a coerced unity under Sunni-Arab
domination — from the first British-installed king
to the end of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in
2003 — has led to endless violence, repression and
genocide.
I do not believe it is possible in the long run to
force people living in a geographically defined area
to remain part of a state against their will.
Certainly Iraq’s Kurds will never reconcile
themselves to being part of Iraq. Under these
circumstances I believe that a managed amicable
divorce is in the best interests of the peoples of
Iraq and will hasten American and British
withdrawal.
At the beginning of this year the Bush
administration invested heavily in diplomatic
efforts aimed at forming a national unity government
that included the Shi’ites, Kurds, Sunni Arabs and
secularists. It took until late April to agree on a
prime minister, president, two vice-presidents and
the speaker of the parliament. Because of its
internal tensions, the government is not likely to
function very well. Even if it does, what will it
govern?
Not Kurdistan: the regional government insists on
its constitutional authority to run its region.
Baghdad ministries are not allowed to open offices
there.
Not the Shi’ite south: it is run by a patchwork of
municipal and governorate officials who front for
the clerics, religious parties and militias that are
the real power in the region.
Not the Sunni-Arab heartland: it is a battleground.
The American military, assisted by Shi’ite troops,
are at war with insurgents and foreign terrorists.
Many Sunni Arabs despise both sides of this battle,
but it does not mean that they will accept the
authority of a Shi’ite-led national government which
they see as installed by the Americans and aligned
with Iran.
Not Baghdad, at least outside the green zone: Iraq’s
capital is a city of armed camps. Wealthy Iraqis
maintain private armies for security. Although most
of Iraq’s ministries are outside the green zone,
many ministers live inside it. Most rarely go to
their offices and spend their days visiting
colleagues in the zone. There is much talk at the
highest levels of Iraq’s government — but little
government.
The situation should be blindingly obvious to the
top US officials who visit. After three years of
occupation they cannot leave the green zone or even
move within the zone without a security detail the
size of a small army.
Even when America and Britain had full legal
authority in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, they did nothing
to arrest the break-up of the country.
In the south they allowed the Shi’ite clergy and
religious parties to take power and to build their
Islamic states. While saying that Kurdistan should
rejoin Iraq, America did nothing to reduce any part
of Kurdistan’s autonomy. While outlawing armed
forces that were not part of the Iraqi army, the
coalition allowed militias to proliferate.
If the coalition could not prevent Iraq’s
unravelling when it was fully in charge of the
country, it is illogical now to put all the emphasis
on building strong national institutions, such as a
single Iraqi army and powerful central government,
when American influence is much diminished.
How could a divorce be carried through? Arab Iraqi
leaders have told me privately that they accept
Kurdistan’s right to self-determination. Some seem
to prefer that Kurdistan should leave, having grown
weary of its refusal to make any concessions to a
shared state. With settled borders, the split
between Kurdistan and Arab Iraq could be more like
Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce than Yugoslavia’s
wars.
Turkey — with many Kurds living within its borders —
has long been considered the chief obstacle to
Kurdish dreams for an independent state. Turkish
attitudes have evolved significantly, however. Some
Turkish strategic thinkers, including those within
the so-called “deep state” comprising the military
and intelligence establishments, see a secular,
pro-western and non-Arab Kurdistan as a buffer to an
Islamic Arab state to the south.
If the Shi’ite south forms a region, it can set up a
theocratic government and establish a regional
guard. Iran will be the dominant power and the Bush
administration has no ability, and no intention, of
countering Iran’s position there.
These are not welcome developments but they need not
be catastrophic. For the United States and the
world’s Shi’ites (including the Iranians) have a
common interest in defeating Al-Qaeda and its
kindred Sunni fundamentalist movements.
Certainly Iraq’s Shi’ites would line up against the
United States in the event of an American
confrontation with Iran. But America could have good
relations with a southern Iraqi Shi’ite theocracy
that did not share the tortured US relationship with
Iran but came to power through a democratic process
that coalition troops made possible. And an elected
regional government — with a regional guard
responsible to it — would certainly be preferable to
the current ad hoc system of informal Islamic rule
enforced by sometimes competing militias.
Even a theocratic government can provide the
political and economic stability needed to permit
new investment in the south’s vast oil reserves. By
providing technical assistance to a southern
government, America and its coalition partners may
have some influence on internal developments.
The continued presence of American and British
military forces in Iraq’s south can only aggravate
relations with the Shi’ite authorities without any
corresponding gain in what is a relatively secure
part of Iraq. Last year British troops clashed on
several occasions with local police and militias.
One incident — where British forces attacked a
police station to rescue two British special forces
troops who had been arrested while working
undercover — nearly escalated out of control.
As long as the coalition remains in the south there
is a risk of more incidents. Troops should be
withdrawn in a rapid but orderly fashion.
What about the Sunni-Arab heartland? Here America
faces a dilemma. The US military presence among
hostile Sunni Arabs seems to generate an endless
supply of new suicide bombers and insurgent
fighters. If America withdraws from the Sunni
heartland, even more territory may fall into the
hands of insurgents and terrorists.
The pogroms after the destruction of the Askariya
shrine served as a wake-up call to many Sunni Arabs.
In a Sunni-Shi’ite civil war, Sunni Arabs realise
they will lose. They may come to see the formation
of a region as essential for self-protection and
therefore be less worried that federalism will lead
to the dissolution of Iraq.
If the Sunnis establish a regional guard, it could
take over security responsibilities from the
Americans and the Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi army.
America could withdraw, making it clear that US
forces would return only if the regional authorities
allowed Al-Qaeda and other anti-western terrorists
to operate freely from the region.
It will need to keep a force nearby, ready to
intervene. Kurdistan is the ideal location. It is
close, the local population are friendly and it is
at present still in Iraq.
Even if the Sunni Arabs do not form a region, the
United States should still withdraw and leave
security duties to the Iraqi army, which would
presumably continue to use Shi’ite forces there.
In sum: partition works as a political solution for
Kurdistan, the Shi’ite south and the Sunni Arab
centre because it formalises what has already taken
place. By contrast, the American effort to build a
unified state with a non-sectarian, non-ethnic
police and army has not produced that result nor
made much progress towards it.
There is one remaining problem. Partition is a way
to get most coalition forces out of Iraq quickly. It
does not solve the problem of Baghdad, however.
Theoretically, the United States has the power to
provide some level of security in Baghdad. This
would require many more troops and result in many
more casualties. And it might not work. It is hard
to imagine that there is any support for this role
in America.
The alternative is to recognise that there is not
much that America is able and willing to do to stop
the bloodshed in Baghdad. Once they get started,
modern civil wars develop a momentum of their own.
In Baghdad and other mixed Sunni-Shi’ite areas,
America cannot contribute to the solution because
there is no solution, at least not in the
foreseeable future.
It is a tragedy and it is unsatisfying to admit that
there is little that can be done about it. But it is
so. No purpose is served by a prolonged American
presence anywhere in Arab Iraq.
© Peter W Galbraith 2006
Extracted from The End of Iraq by Peter W Galbraith,
published by Simon & Schuster tomorrow at £17.99.
Copies can be ordered for £16.19 including postage
from The Sunday Times BooksFirst on 0870 165 8585.
Peter Galbraith is a former US ambassador with a
long involvement in policy on Iraq
timesonline co.uk
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