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Turkey in the New Iraqi Stage
12.7.2006
By Sami Shorosh - Opinion - A writer and former
government minister in Iraqi Kurdistan |
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Turkey's share in Iraqi politics and its economy may
be greater than that of any other country in the
region. The two states have long joint borders
extending for more than 310km. Turkey is Iraq's
shortest land route to Europe, whereas Iraq is the
shortest and lowest-cost route for Turkey's
commercial and economic activities with the Gulf
States. Moreover, the pipeline, through which the
crude oil of Kirkuk reaches the Turkish Ceyhan
seaport, has remained for the two past decades the
most important trade artery for the two countries.
In addition, many people expect that the economic,
political and military partnership between the two
countries in the future will pave the way for the
emergence of a strong strategic base in the Middle
East against terrorism.
To say nothing of Turkey's major participation in
the reconstruction of Iraq. But the main stumbling
block is that Turkey is slow to act in the direction
of Iraq and has shown an unjustified sensitivity
toward the country and the Middle East, compared to
its fast steps in the direction of Europe and the EU.
In Iraq's case, it has made the implicit condition
that it should play a political role in the country
before there can be any economic, trade and
diplomatic co-operation. It has also made a
stipulation concerning its vague concept of the
integrity of the Iraqi state. Turkey repeated its
calls on the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqis and the
Americans to co-operate to eliminate the remnants
affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on
its borders with Iran. But it forgets that this step
requires first and foremost a complete suspension of
Turkey's military incursions in Iraq's Kurdistan and
that it should refrain from shelling the Kurdish
villages located close to its borders in the Zakhu
area.
Above all, the matter requires the complete
political and economic normalization of relations
with the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey is making a mistake if
it thinks that normalizing relations with the Kurds
will be at the expense of Baghdad. The Kurds are no
longer represented in Iraq as an abstract case of
nationality. Throughout the last three years, they
have asserted that they are the strongest and most
crucial guarantee for the preservation of Iraq's
integrity and for bringing together the viewpoints
of its different ethnic formations.
The most glaring evidence of this was the efforts of
the Kurdish leaders, particularly the president of
the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barazani, to bring the
viewpoints of the Iraqi ethnic formations closer
together and stop the wave of violence in Iraq.
On the other hand, Ankara stresses the issue of the
Turkmen minority in Iraq, and signaled that Kirkuk
should remain outside a Kurdish federation.
Notwithstanding, it seems that Ankara did not learn
from its bitter experience in Cyprus, when it
intervened to uphold the interests of the Turkish
minority. It harmed this minority instead of
benefiting it. In this light, Turkey has the right
to stress the importance of preserving the rights of
minorities in Iraq, including those of the Turkmen.
Turkey should know that the Turkmen problem,
assuming that it exists, is an Iraqi problem through
and through, and any talk about the status of the
Turkmen in Iraq may lead to a rejoinder from Baghdad
and Irbil about the conditions of the Turkmen,
Arabs, Alawites and Armenians in Turkey. Ankara must
also give up the idea of searching for solutions for
the future of the oil-rich Kirkuk, since the
permanent Iraqi constitution approved by the people
late last year stipulates that an Iraqi solution
should be reached on the subject.
Weeks ago, the government of Nouri al-Malki decided
to activate the committee, which has not more than a
year to normalize the situation within the
government. Any Turkish, Iranian or American
intervention in this regard will be detrimental to
the Iraqis' decision to solve their problems on the
basis of the law and the constitution.
On the other hand, it may be said that the Turks no
longer have reservations about a Kurdish Federation
in Iraq. But, surely, they still have reservations
in principle about a federal Iraq, in the belief
that if a centralized government loses its grip, the
disintegration of the Iraqi state will follow, and
this could open the way for Iranian and Syrian
intervention.
Furthermore, in this regard, Ankara ignores a basic
fact: Turkey itself may have to opt for federalism,
especially if its negotiations with Brussels lead to
its accession to the EU, which stresses on
decentralizing the political, economic and cultural
life of the member states.
Likewise, Ankara continues to cling to the erroneous
belief that the PKK problem is not purely Turkish,
but a result of the complications of the political
situation in the neighboring countries, especially
Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.
What aggravates the problem is that this mistake
leads to others in Turkish influential circles, such
as the army. Among these mistakes is the belief that
the solution to the PKK problem does not lie with
Turkey, but inside Iraq; and that the solution is
not to achieve the pacifist and cultural demands of
Turkey's Kurds, but to force Iraqi Kurds to fight
the PKK.
In the same context, over the past three years, and
especially after the demise of the former Iraqi
regime, Turkey has formed another wrong idea. It has
been trying to persuade the US to co-operate with it
to launch joint military operations against the PKK
fighters inside Iraqi Kurdish territories.
What has led Ankara to this belief is that
Washington has put the party's name on the list of
terrorist organizations. But Ankara did not take
into consideration the fact that the party has been
always looking forward to normalizing relations with
the US. The Americans, for their part, did not
hesitate to contact some PKK officials to encourage
them to renounce violence and pursue peaceful
methods. The Kurds know that Washington enlisted the
party's name as the result of growing Turkish
insistence.
The Americans do not want to open a new front, this
time with the PKK in the North, when their forces
are facing prickly military problems in central and
southern Iraq. The US is unlikely to encourage the
Iraqi federal government and the Kurdish regional
government to extend the clashes to the stable
Kurdish areas. However, if the aim is to stop
infiltration across the border, the Americans are
well aware that the infiltration does not occur
through Iraqi territories, but through the borders
of neighboring states, such as Turkey. The acts of
terrorism, violence and extremism that Turkish
cities are experiencing are not the result of
infiltrations. They are the result of the obvious
presence of PKK fighters in Turkey. If we suppose
that the pockets of PKK fighters have a logistic
role in this violence, the solution surely will not
be to trigger new fighting across the border. The
solution is to implement a political program that
includes pardoning these fighters and eliminating
poverty in Turkish Kurdistan. It should also include
satisfying the cultural and political demands of the
Kurds in eastern Turkey.
Meanwhile, the US, which was greatly disappointed by
Ankara's decision not to take part in the Iraq war
in 2003, may face difficulties in convincing the
American people of the feasibility of siding with
Turkey in an unjust war against an unarmed people.
The Americans will definitely respond to any Turkish
official request of assistance in the war against
Kurdish terrorism by saying that the real and
serious terrorism lies in Iraq. They will try to
convince the Turkish officials that they must help
the Iraqis face this terrorism, which may spread in
the region if it meets with success.
Ankara needs to normalize its relations with Iraq.
This will happen by the exchange of high-level
political visits. Turkey should also stop
interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq. It
should accept the fact that Iraqi Kurdistan is not a
thorn in the side of Iraq. Rather, it is the real
commercial, economic and political gateway to the
new Iraq. Many questions may be asked in this
connection: will Turkey be able to begin a new stage
of strategic relations with Iraq? Will this new
stage begin with a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gul to Erbil, the capital city of Iraqi
Kurdistan, and then to Baghdad, the federal capital
of Iraq? Let us wait and see.
*A writer and former government minister in Iraqi
Kurdistan
daralhayat com
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan (
Kurdistan-Turkey) wikipedia
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