WASHINGTON, DC, United States
(UPI) -- Consider the latest controversy to divide Iraq; the current
impasse afflicting the new Iraqi government over appointing new
defense and interior ministers that are acceptable to the main
Shiite, Kurdish, and Sunni parliamentary blocks.
In a micro sense it serves as an example of why a certain U.S.
politician recently called for doing things differently. When it
comes to Iraq, Sen. Joe Biden`s, D-Del., approach is a metaphor for
the Holy Trinity -- it carves the country into three different parts
or, as he puts it, into 'three largely autonomous regions.' Although
Biden says his plan is not a call for 'partition,' it is hard to see
what else it could be called.
Partitioning Iraq isn`t a new idea. Leslie Gelb, formerly an
assistant secretary in President Jimmy Carter`s State Department and
currently president emeritus of the Council for Foreign Relations,
has advocated this idea for years -- before all the present troubles
in Iraq had emerged and well before there had been a single Iraqi
election.
Together, Biden and Gelb spelled out their ideas in a New York Times
op-ed entitled 'Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq' and in a speech by
Sen. Biden before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia.
In fairness, Gelb and Biden, aren`t the only ones who support
partition. There are others who think it inevitable. See, for
example, the article 'Divide and Heal' by Gareth Stanfield of the
University of Exeter in the British Prospect magazine, who wrote
'partitioning 'should not necessarily be seen as a problem .' It is
worth noting that thus far all the people calling for partition are
from Western countries; not a single Iraqi of any group has endorsed
it.
To their credit, Gelb and Biden do identify real problems in
partitioning Iraq. For example, they recognize the danger of ethnic
cleansing and potential genocide if the ongoing violence in Iraq
becomes uncontrollable; the problem of disputed cities like Kirkuk
and Baghdad itself; the uneven distribution of oil resources; the
difficulty of protecting rights of women and minorities; the
dangerous role of militias that represent various ethnic or
sectarian groups; and the danger that a civil war could draw Iraq`s
neighbors into a regional war in defense of particular groups or
strategic territory. And, as Biden pointed out, it is true that the
new Iraqi constitution already provides for a loose federal system.
Despite recognition of these problems, the Biden-Gelb partition plan
is a flawed solution, according to many regional and country
experts.
One such flaw is the weak central government key to the Biden-Gelb
plan. To prevent the civil war they fear from happening - some would
say it is already happening -- blame is placed on the failure of
present policies rather than the central government. The implication
is that there is nothing to lose by trying something different.
For example, if you accept that the militias will remain and will
provide 'security' and that there will be no serious national army
or security service, then enforcement of any change is a challenge.
Their proposal suggests 'bribing' the Sunnis with promises of a
substantial percentage of oil revenues, but how a feeble government
in Baghdad, presumably still dominated numerically by Shiites and
Kurds, can bring this about and enforce it is unknown.
Their plan also proposes that U.S. aid be increased on the
understanding that it will be withdrawn unless the rights of women
and minorities are respected. At the moment, the United States is
spending some $10 billion per month with very limited effect. That
is the equivalent, in current dollars, of a Marshall Plan every 13
months. While protecting women and minority rights is important, the
effectiveness of this money is questionable. For example, it is
unlikely that any dollar amount will really convince Shia
authorities to change their culture.
Another problem of the Biden-Gelb plan is the call to keep about
20,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, presumably in adjacent
states, for post-withdrawal intervention against insurgents inside
Iraq. However, a warm welcome to a substantial new or additional
U.S. military footprint, especially ground forces, for what could be
a very long time seems unlikely from Iraq`s neighbors. Such an
action also sets a bad precedent for the United States.
For example, in June 1996, terrorists exploded a fuel truck in a
housing complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. servicemen and
one Saudi and left 372 wounded. As a result of that and other
attacks, U.S. forces are no longer stationed in Saudi Arabia. This
policy shows that U.S. government officials understand that any
American military presence in Saudi Arabia is an invitation to
trouble and an excellent recruiting tool for al-Qaida. Hopefully,
this policy disfavoring military presence will be extended to other
Arab countries.
Finally, this proposal presents itself as a virtue of necessity: if
things are inevitably headed toward civil war and separation then
let`s adopt that as our policy by simply mapping out three
autonomous regions in Iraq. For now, this is superficially
appealing, but in the end, the United States can not deny its
responsibility. By creating three separate political entities the
United States would be taking on the additional responsibility of
overseeing three governments, rather than one, and each would have
its own interests, vulnerabilities, and ambitions.
Instead of creating three governments, the United States should
accept some responsibility for equitable distribution of oil
revenues, for preventing ethnic cleansing in the highly mixed Iraqi
population, and for maintaining minority rights -- we 'earned' this
responsibility the minute we entered Iraq.
In the end, the Biden-Gelb plan seems reminiscent of the British
mandate or Ottoman times, and we know by virtue of hindsight how
well that worked out. Those historic proposals and this one calling
for Iraqi 'partitions' are reminiscent of a line spoken by famed
writer H.L. Mencken: 'For every problem, there is a solution that is
simple, neat, and wrong.'
(David Isenberg is a senior research analyst at the British American
Security Information Council, a member of the Coalition for a
Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser to the Straus Military
Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information. The views
expressed are his own.)
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