The White House is right to insist that
our postwar goal is a unified Iraq, as opposed to one divided along
ethno-religious lines. So why is the administration taking so many
actions that make holding the country together virtually impossible?
In January, President Bush diverted nearly half the money allocated
to reconstruction in Iraq to other needs, including security. Given
that our current strategy is nicknamed "Clear-Hold-Build," where
does that leave us? Clear-Hold-Hope? Mr. Bush's decision sent a
terrible signal to the Iraqis about our resolve. It is even less
understandable since the expense of the critical reconstruction
program is a small fraction of our annual cost in Iraq.
Next, the administration deeply cut financing for democratization
efforts, many of them undertaken by nongovernmental groups. The
proposed budget for fiscal 2007 asks for a paltry $63 million. This
token sum — in a war that costs some $200 million a day — may simply
reflect a belief that the security situation prevents such efforts
from being effective. But democratization has always been one of the
administration's cherished goals, and cutting spending there sends
the wrong message.
The latest administration budget also recommends cutting overall
Army and Marine troop strength. If Mr. Bush and his advisers are
really committed to sustained support for the "long war" in Iraq,
how do they reconcile that with cutting the budgets for the most
engaged forces?
President Bush and his aides have also repeatedly hinted at
significant troop reductions in Iraq this year — perhaps to as low
as 100,000 from the current 130,000. This is despite the growing
violence in Baghdad and the fact that our military leaders in Iraq
have consistently said that we can withdraw troops safely only if
conditions improve. The administration may simply be talking fewer
troops to reassure the electorate before midterms. Unfortunately,
American voters are not the only audience. What do the Iraqis think?
The administration has long stated that the so-called Provincial
Reconstruction Teams — groups of 100 or so political, economic,
legal and civil-military relations specialists who help distribute
aid and advise regional Iraqi officials, which have had success in
Afghanistan — are critical to our strategy in Iraq. Yet The
Washington Post reported in mid-April that only 4 of the proposed 16
teams had even been inaugurated.
In addition, the Army staffs and units in Iraq, even those training
Iraqi security forces, continue to be undermanned. Meanwhile, former
colleagues outside the war zone — in the Joint Forces Command, the
European Command and the Pacific Command — tell me their commands
remain at full strength. It seems the Pentagon does not consider the
Iraq war important enough to shift from its peacetime manning
models.
Last, the administration has repeatedly said efficient and
law-abiding Iraqi security forces are central to our strategy, yet
has failed to provide them with more than minimal equipment. Three
years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, most Iraq troops are still
using open-backed trucks and unarmored S.U.V.'s.
Let's face it: this laundry list of inaction on the part of the Bush
administration leaves a prudent Iraqi with no practical choice but
to prepare for a United States withdrawal long before the Iraqi
central government and security forces are capable of running the
nation. For most Iraqis — Arab or Kurd, Sunni or Shiite — this will
mean looking to religious and ethnic militias, criminal gangs and
Islamist insurgents for protection. This, in turn, greatly increases
the chance of civil war.
The militias are already looking ahead: some are carving out safe
areas they will use as bases in the coming war by driving Iraqis of
other ethnic and religious groups out of mixed neighborhoods and
villages. Iraqi government officials estimated that more than
100,000 families have already fled their homes. This falling back on
militias and preparing for internecine conflict is not a new
phenomenon. It is exactly what we saw in Afghanistan nearly two
decades ago. Once the Afghans believed the Soviet troops were
finally pulling out, the various insurgent groups stopped fighting
the invaders and began positioning for a multisided civil war. That
conflict, of course, lasted until the United States invaded
Afghanistan in 2001.
The Bush administration, despite all its missteps since the fall of
the Baathists, has clung to one correct idea: that an intact Iraq is
a better outcome than a splintered one. To keep it unified, however,
the White House must commit to long timelines and to providing the
money necessary for both the military and reconstruction efforts.
The alternative is for Mr. Bush to change his mind and tell the
American and Iraqi people that we must start planning for a peaceful
division.
In any case, the uncertainty resulting from trying to have it both
ways will result in the worst possible outcome: open civil war.
Thomas X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel, is the author of "The
Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century."
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