In the 16th century, Iran under Safavid
rule and Turkey under the Ottomans were rising rival empires in a
difficult neighborhood. Their conflicts and rivalry revolved mainly
around Iraq and the Caucasus. Today, after a long pause, the
situation is not altogether different.
After World War I, the territories that caused the friction and
conflict between Turkey and Iran were totally lost by the two
states, and the geopolitics of the region changed. Relations between
Iran, Turkey, and Iraq were shaped by three realities: Pro-Western
governments ruled the three countries, the Soviet Union presented a
common external threat (in 1955, the three joined the Baghdad Pact
under the umbrella of the United States and the United Kingdom), and
Kurdish insurgencies and armed political movements presented a
common potential internal or trans-regional threat.
Indeed, the "Kurdish question" has dominated the foreign policies of
Iran, Iraq and Turkey since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
It was a potential source of conflict between Turkey and Iran during
the 1920s, when the Turkish Army crushed the Kurdish revolts in
Turkey and resurgent Kurds fled into Iran. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and
Afghanistan (the latter the only state that does not have a
significant Kurdish population) established the Sadabad Pact in 1937
in order to secure their borders and prevent subversive (read
Kurdish) activities within their territories.
Iran, Iraq and Turkey generally adhered to the Sadabad Pact for a
long time. They resisted the temptation to use the "Kurdish card"
against one another's interests. However, following the 1958
military coup in Iraq, Iran confronted a state capable of
challenging its ambitions to wield hegemonic power in the Gulf after
the British withdrawal. The Iranian-Iraqi geostrategic rivalry was
accompanied by a nationalist and ideological clash and long-term
border demarcation disputes.
The Kurdish card became an attractive political and military weapon
for Iran in its conflicts with Iraq. Turkey apprehensively watched
as Iran and Iraq exploited the Kurds for political leverage against
each other. Ankara was concerned about a possible refugee flow due
to the Iraqi regime's harsh response against the Iraqi Kurds and the
establishment of an independent Kurdish entity next to its borders.
The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 fundamentally reversed Iran's
policy orientation, as revolutionary ideology began to shape its
politics. Pursuing an independent foreign policy that included
"anti-imperialist" discourse meant that one of the pillars of the
Iran-Turkey relationship (pro-Western policies) was terminated.
Still, Turkey quickly recognized the revolutionary regime in Iran
because it was worried about the consequences of a possible breakup
of the country and its falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.
The outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran in September 1980
helped Turkey in two ways. First, it prevented a political
confrontation with Iran; second, both Iraq and Iran provided Turkey
with profitable markets by acquiring vital goods there. Indeed, in
the mid-1980s Turkey's trade volume with Iran and Iraq exceeded $2
billion dollars annually. Nevertheless, a power vacuum emerged in
the north of Iraq after the mid-1980s, as Iraq lost its authority in
Kurdistan due to the ongoing war and the Kurdish uprising. Turkey,
concerned about a possible attack on Kirkuk by Kurdish groups
supported by Iran, announced that it would view any attack on the
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline as being directed against Turkish
interests.
Another Turkish concern was that a possible Iranian victory would
cause the disintegration of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish
state in northern Iraq. On the other hand, Turkish military
incursions into northern Iraq in late 1986 to destroy the Kurdistan
Workers' Party, or the PKK, camps there upset Tehran. Iranian
leaders were concerned lest Ankara alter the regional power balance
to their detriment if Turkey controlled northern Iraq and the oil
region of Mosul-Kirkuk.
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