Unusual political stability in Turkey
faces upheaval from Iraq's impending fracture along sectarian lines.
The birth of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq will end
Turkey's E.U. accession hopes. The collapse of the accession process
will strongly undermine the legitimacy of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (A.K.P.), making it increasingly vulnerable to
political attacks from Turkey's secular establishment. These attacks
could prompt the disintegration of the Erdogan government as soon as
the end of 2006.
Sectarianism Governs Iraq
Far from providing the long-awaited impetus for political and social
stability, the results of Iraq's December 2005 parliamentary
election were another step toward the division of the country along
sectarian lines. Secular candidates supported by the Bush
administration were trounced in the election, while the broad
victory of the Iran-backed Shi'a political parties undermined
Washington's influence in Iraq. [See: "Red Lines Crisscross Iraq's
Political Landscape"]
Thus far, it has been impossible for either Ibrahim al-Jaafari or
his successor as prime minister, Nouri Maliki, to form a government.
At the heart of Iraq's political impasse is the country's new
U.S.-drafted constitution, which incomprehensibly calls for the
division of political powers along sectarian lines.
The constitutionally-mandated division of political power in Iraq
was meant to ensure that Shi'a, Kurds and Sunnis would participate
equally in a government of "national unity." In practice, however,
it has proved impossible for these disparate ethnic groups to reach
a consensus for sharing cabinet positions.
Bush administration officials blame the escalation of sectarian
violence in Iraq on the inability of the country's political parties
to form a government. More likely, it is the other way around.
Iraq's descent into civil war, which began with the February 2006
bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, has made it impossible
for Shi'a and Sunni political parties to work together. Meanwhile,
sectarian violence has raged out of control. At least 3,000 Iraqis
have died in sectarian-related violence since February 2006.
Although Prime Minister Nouri Maliki is expected to soon fill his
cabinet positions, Iraq's escalating civil war will continue to
obstruct governance making it impossible for the country's new
government to function. This, combined with the planned withdrawal
in 2006 by most of Washington's coalition partners from Iraq, will
pressure the Bush administration to begin withdrawing U.S. troops. A
U.S. troop drawdown may be accelerated by electoral politics as the
U.S. mid-term elections approach. The withdrawal of U.S.-led forces
will fuel Iraq's civil war, speeding the country's fracture along
sectarian lines.
Like Iraq's government, Washington played a strong role in the
creation of the country's military, police and paramilitary
organizations. As a result, these security organizations are also
steeped in sectarianism, hence their role in enflaming Iraq's civil
war. As foreign forces are withdrawn, Iraq's security organizations
will devolve back into the Shi'a and Kurdish militias from which
they were derived. These militias will be used to protect Shi'a and
Kurdish territories, respectively. Compared to the Shi'a, the
Kurdish militia, or peshmerga, is much better organized and more
well-armed thanks to many years of U.S. support.
More than 90 percent of the Iraqi National Army troops stationed in
northern Iraq, or Iraqi Kurdistan, hail from the Kurdish peshmerga.
Rather than allegiance to a central military authority, these troops
are loyal to peshmerga leaders. The Kurds have also maintained their
peshmerga militia in northern Iraq. Combining these troops gives the
Kurds a formidable army with which to defend its territory.
Inevitably, Iraqi Kurds, who just anointed their own prime minister
and parliament creating the Kurdistan Regional Government, will
likely declare their independence from Iraq.
No E.U., No Erdogan
In the past six months, the Turkish military has amassed nearly
250,000 troops in southeastern Turkey and along the border between
Turkey and Iraq. This buildup has two aims: thwarting Turkey's own
Kurdish separatists operating in the region and protecting the
interests of the Turcoman population in Iraqi Kurdistan. The birth
of an independent Kurdistan could agitate Turkey's Kurdish
population, which has suffered decades of repression at the hands of
the Turkish military. It could also undermine the rights of the
Turcoman living in Kurdistan.
The militarization of southeastern Turkey in response to Iraq's
fracturing and moves toward Kurdish independence has already
prompted new repression designed to foil any separatist designs by
Turkey's Kurds. This repression, combined with probable Turkish
military action against the new Kurdistan, will probably end
Turkey's hopes of eventual E.U. accession. Without E.U. accession as
an anchor, the Erdogan government will quickly lose its legitimacy.
In Turkey's November 2002 elections, the A.K.P. won a stunning 363
out of 550 parliamentary seats, allowing Prime Minister Erdogan to
form the country's first single party government in over ten years.
Turkey has a unique electoral system, which allows political parties
to gain parliamentary representation only after surpassing a ten
percent threshold in popular votes.
Heavy political fragmentation combined with growing disdain for
traditional political parties allowed the A.K.P. to control 66
percent of the seats in Turkey's parliament despite gaining only 34
percent of the popular vote. That a government with Islamist roots
came to power with such a weak popular mandate initially raised
serious legitimacy questions within Turkey's secular establishment,
which includes the business community, the judiciary and the
military.
The Erdogan government strengthened its legitimacy by immediately
and aggressively pursuing E.U. accession, an issue dear to Turkey's
secularists. These Herculean efforts seemingly paid off in December
2004, when Brussels formally accepted Turkey's E.U. accession
application. Accession negotiations subsequently commenced in
October 2005. Nearly simultaneously, Kurdish nationalists, based in
Iraq, began to launch increasingly bold attacks in Turkey, including
military ambushes and civilian bombings.
Turkey's military leaders have been almost powerless to pursue
Kurdish nationalists of Turkish origin in Iraq due to Washington's
restraining hand. The Bush administration does not want to undermine
its Kurdish partners in Iraq by allowing Turkish military operations
in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is most likely because many in the Pentagon
believe that Iraq's fracture along sectarian lines is unavoidable.
With no leverage over Iraq's Shi'a or Sunnis, Washington's only hope
for maintaining military basing rights in Iraq is by cementing its
relations with the Kurds. In addition, Turkey's military leadership,
headed by General Hilmi Ozkok, has taken a pragmatic approach toward
developments in Iraq and the broader implications of these
developments for Turkey's E.U. membership. Nonetheless, a red line
undoubtedly still exists for the Turkish military in Iraq. This red
line is Kurdish independence.
In August 2006, General Ozkok will retire in favor of Turkish Ground
Forces Commander General Yasar Buyukanit. General Buyukanit appears
to have much more hawkish views toward the birth of an independent
Kurdistan and Turkey's Kurds than General Ozkok. Buyukanit raised
many eyebrows at home and abroad after stating that he would
personally lead the Turkish military into northern Iraq should Iraqi
Kurds establish an independent state.
In order to launch a military action against Iraq's Kurds and to
contain the threat of secessionist activity by Turkish Kurds, the
Turkish military has already begun to militarize southeastern
Turkey. With Europeans focusing heavily on Turkey's ability to
improve its human rights record, military action against Kurds in
Iraq, military action against an independent Kurdistan and renewed
oppression of Turkey's own Kurds will bring Istanbul's E.U.
accession process to a screeching halt.
Conclusion
The collapse of Turkey's E.U. accession bid can be expected to raise
significantly the political heat on the Erdogan government from
Turkey's secular establishment. This heat will be amplified as the
May 2007 presidential succession approaches. Turkey current
president Ahmet Necdet Sezer has acted as a secular bulwark against
the Erdogan government, using his power to veto A.K.P.-sponsored
legislation and to reject many government appointments made by
Erdogan.
Since Turkey's president is appointed by the country's parliament,
the political party controlling parliament will decide who replaces
Sezer. Barring early elections, this party will be the A.K.P.
Turkey's secular establishment is unlikely to accept an A.K.P.-appointed
Islamist as the country's next president. The Turkish military may
find it quite convenient to intervene politically to prevent this.
Intervention could provoke the collapse of the Erdogan government by
late 2006 or early 2007.
Report Drafted By: Jephraim P. Gundzik
Pinr.com
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent
organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
conflict analysis services in the context of international
relations. Top |
® 