There has been a sequence of events and
public statements this week involving the Kurds that, on the whole,
tend to argue against the popular opinion that their eventual goal
is to secede from Iraq and form an independent state.
First, Kurdish deputies in the Iraq parliament spoke out about
territorial incursions by Iranian forces, who have recently struck
out at the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northwestern
Iraq. Parliament speaker Mahmud Mashhadani has called on the Defense
and Foreign Affairs Ministries to investigate the reported Iranian
raids.
Second, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), said Baghdad is using diplomacy in efforts
to stop the Iranian shelling of Kurdish rebel positions in the
north, and that the government does not expect an incursion by
ground forces. “The Iraqi government is making necessary contacts
with the countries concerned and with international sides,” he said.
“There were some violations, but we do not think that there is a
present threat or possibility of major incursion.” Zebari added
that, despite some “sticky issues and problems,” the cross-border
attacks “should be handled through diplomatic means.”
Finally, the PKK warned that it would retaliate against any attacks
authorized by Turkey or Iran against its bases in northern Iraq.
Senior commander Murat Karayilan said at a press conference in the
northern Iraqi town of Raniyah that if Tehran and Ankara continued
to strike at PKK bases or those of other Kurdish factions, his group
would launch a guerrilla war in Turkey. Karayilan said the PKK,
which is based in Turkey, is not active in Iran, but that its
Iranian counterpart has bases along the Iraq-Iran border.
What is interesting about these three events is that, when laid side
by side, it appears the Iraqi Kurds are willing to use their ethnic
brethren residing in Turkey and Iran (and even Syria) as a
bargaining chip, seeking to improve their own standing within Iraq —
but that they are not willing to antagonize Ankara, Tehran or
Damascus by joining forces with the other Kurds in the region in a
push for an independent Kurdistan.
There are several explanations for this position.
First, and fairly obvious, is the fact that even if the Kurds of
Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran pooled their resources, they would be
no match for the military forces of even one of those states, let
alone all three combined.
Second, the Iraqi Kurds are sufficiently factionalized in and of
themselves that only chaos could be expected if other groups were
thrown into the fray. There is a well-known love-hate dynamic
between the KDP — led by Masoud Barzani, head of the regional
Kurdistani government in northern Iraq — and Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The two parties have
a decent working relationship, but it is clouded by uncertainty:
Both have been shaped by their respective leaders, and there are
questions as to what would happen if either man was no longer at the
helm. Nor can it be forgotten that besides these two groups, there
is the Islamic Union of Kurdistan — which bagged five seats in
parliament — the largest for any of the smaller groups following the
four principal political blocs. That it was able to do so on a
proportional representation system underscores that it wields
considerable influence in the northern region; the Kurdistani
Gathering bloc, led by the KDP and PUK, is the dominant Kurdish
group, with 53 seats in the legislature.
A third consideration is that the Iraqi Kurds wield more internal
political power than any other Kurdish communities in the region. On
the surface, it would appear that they would, therefore, be the best
candidates to launch a bid for independence. But it is their very
political strength within Iraq that, paradoxically, prevents them
from doing so. The Kurds control the presidency, foreign ministry,
deputy premiership, and other key portfolios in Baghdad, not to
mention having an autonomous Kurdistan region in the north, and a
decent shot at controlling significant Iraqi oil revenues.
Stated differently, the Kurds of Iraq likely will find it in their
interest to pursue their political fortunes within the existing
state rather than attempt to create a new one of their own.
Therefore, when the Kurds talk of federalism in Iraq, it is not with
an eye toward laying a foundation for secession, but an end in
itself. Proactively aiming for anything beyond a federalist
structure would jeopardize the gains they have made since the fall
of Saddam Hussein. Within Iraq, the Kurds have power and leverage;
outside of Iraq, there is real danger of losing political power and
perhaps even of physical destruction by the states that view them as
a threat.
It is little wonder, then, that both Talabani and Barzani are
emerging as advocates of Iraq’s territorial integrity. They have
established ties to Iran and Syria, and they have exhibited an
unwillingness to antagonize Turkey — despite Ankara’s long
suppression of Kurdish political aspirations. The Iraqi Kurds are
fully aware that, should they make any moves toward independence
from Baghdad’s rule, the Kurds of neighboring states naturally would
follow suit — and the safety of the entire community, let alone
their own interests and standing, would be at risk.
A viable secession bid from any given state would require support
from a third party — in all likelihood, a neighboring state or a
strong regional player. In the case of Iraqi Kurds, all such
potential allies see the breakup of Iraq as detrimental to their own
interests, and Washington has no interest in supporting an
independent Kurdistan. That essentially rules out the breakup of
Iraq by secession. It does not, of course, rule out the possibility
of failure stemming from the Sunni-Shiite split or other factors. If
such forces led to the collapse of the Iraqi state, the situation
would be altogether different, and the Kurds would be forced to
change their calculus. But under any circumstances that can be
envisioned, an independent Kurdistan rising from the ashes of Iraq
quickly would become a major battleground for the region.
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the Kurds of Iraq
should prefer their current position — limited but real power within
an existing state — to unity with their ethnic brethren and the very
real possibility of wielding no power at all.
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