The United States will leave Iraq
someday. All parties here agree to that, at least publicly; all
parties there insist on it, increasingly so. Looking ahead to
postwar relations between the US and Iraq, a cautious observer might
wonder if present policies will produce practical working relations
when the US does leave. Events of the last three years hardly
inspire confidence in the administration’s judgment. However, a
shift in our efforts toward working mainly with the Kurds and Shi’as
might enable us to salvage our endeavors in the country, establish a
measure of good relations with the majority of the Iraqi people, and
perhaps even lay the foundations for an honorable exit.
- Our present efforts to build a unitary state acceptable to all
three main groups are at an impasse. The construction of a central
government is blocked by the majority’s unwillingness to cede
disproportionate power and revenue to the Sunnis, who have misruled
the country, often brutally, since its inception, and by a vicious
insurgency, waged mainly by these same Sunnis, which is increasingly
taking on ominous sectarian tones that threaten to devolve into
civil war. Our policies are antagonizing the majority of Iraqis,
which hardly augurs well for postwar relations.
Demographic, political, economic, and military realities argue for a
change in policy. They are clear and beyond dispute. Shi’as and
Kurds constitute almost eighty percent of the population; their
various parties won commensurate representation in recent elections;
the nation’s oil reserves lie mainly in their realms; and they
currently have a preponderance of organized military might, not only
in the army, but perhaps more importantly in militias and security
forces. Maintaining a policy seeking to augment the power of less
than twenty percent of the population is unrealistic and unwise.
Continuing it to the detriment of relations with the overwhelming
majority is foolhardy and potentially disastrous.
Three policies can help bring about better relations with the Iraqi
majority. First, we must forego the idea of fostering a stable
central state amenable to all three groups. Instead, we should
recognize existing political dynamics, work with them, and support a
confederation of three relatively independent states. Second, we
should allocate proportionately more funds for reconstruction,
development and the militaries to the Shia’s and Kurds. Third, limit
pressures on Iran over its nuclear program to diplomatic ones.
Military action against Iran would further antagonize the Shi’ite
population in Iraq, seriously damage our relations with them, and
likely lead to greater Iranian support for the insurgency.
Numerous advantages would follow from these policies. The US would
gain working relations with a large portion of the population. The
neo-conservative vision of transforming the Middle East into a
western-style democracy is a hopeless delusion, but a measure of
influence in postwar Iraq could be salvaged. Second, the oil wealth
of the country would be in the hands of groups less hostile to the
US than were previous power holders and strongmen, thereby
facilitating the free flow of oil to the West. Third, the US would
be in a better position to slow ties between Iran and its
coreligionists in southern Iraq. Fourth, stability in the North and
South would enable us to withdraw large numbers of troops from an
already lengthy occupation plagued by an insurgency that cannot be
quashed by military means. This would enable us to reconstitute our
weakened army and reserves, which many analysts see close to
breaking.
There will no doubt be serious problems attendant to favoring the
Kurds and Shi’as at the expense of the Sunnis. Sectarian strife
could escalate as Sunnis see themselves increasingly marginalized in
national affairs. This strife would not be confined to the Sunni
Center. Under Saddam, hundreds of thousands of Sunnis settled in the
oil-rich regions in the North, where they are now vulnerable to
Kurdish attempts to drive them out. As grave as these likely
consequences are, it is important to note that there are clear
trends in those directions today with our present policies. The
palatability of these problems should be judged by reference to the
grimness of the present state of affairs in Iraq as well as the
prospect of those problems reaching critical mass with US troops in
the middle of a vicious and likely interminable civil war.
Our choice today is not between a postwar democracy and dictatorship
or between victory and defeat. It is between a postwar Iraq with
almost universal hostility to us and one with a modicum of
cordiality toward us in the North and South. It is between a foreign
policy based on ideology and one based on practicality.
Brian M. Downing is the author of several works of political and
military history, including The Paths of Glory: War and Social
Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.
Brian Downing May 2, 2006
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