The growing tensions over Iran are
beginning to have an immediate impact on the foreign political
stance of Turkey. On the one hand, the US is very much interested in
involving Turkey in its anti-Iranian coalition, on the other hand,
Turkey is very much interested in using this circumstance for
strengthening its foreign political positions. And so, they are
beginning a big haggle.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has got into the spotlight by
her visits to Greece, Turkey and Iraq on her way to Sofia for the
April 28-29 informal NATO FM summit. Turkish media called Rice’s
visit “a new page in the history of bilateral relations.” Turkish
officials said it was very fruitful. In fact, Rice’s 16-hour visit
was a good chance for Turkey to further improve its cooperation with
the US, particularly, over Iran and the Kurdish rebels.
When in March 2003 the Turkish parliament refused to provide US
troops a land corridor for attacking Iraq from the north, the
Americans grew colder to Turkey. They put all blames on Turkish
generals and said that, henceforth, they would cooperate with
politicians, namely, with the Party of Justice and Development (PJD),
an Islamist force who has been in power since 2002. This was in line
with the US’ Big Middle East project, where Turkey was to supposed
be the moderately Islamist leader.
But the crisis over Iran has made Turkey’s generals relevant again.
Since December 2005 the US military officials have been frequent
guests in Turkey, and the Turkish generals have gradually restored
their status in the country’s internal politics. Even though PJD
will be the only ruling party in Turkey, at least, till the autumn
2007 parliamentary elections, and the acting Prime Minister Recep
Erdogan has the best chances to win the spring 2007 presidential
race, the Bush administration is improving its relations exactly
with the Turkish military.
In March 2006 Chairman of the US Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace
visited Turkey and met with Chief of Turkey’s General Staff, General
Hilmi Ozkok and Prime Minister Recep Erdogan. The sides discussed
the problems of Iran, PKK, the internal political situation in Iraq,
the visit of a HAMAS delegation to Ankara.
This was exactly the agenda of Rice’s meetings with the Turkish top
officials. Rice met with President Ahmed Necet Sezer, Prime Minister
Recep Erdogan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. The sides agreed to
draft a Common Strategic Vision. In Ankara Rice said that Turkey is
the US’ key partner. The brief few-page Common Strategic Vision will
consist of three main chapters: (1) fight with terrorism, (2)
relations with the EU, (3) Big Middle East project and addenda
concerning Cyprus, PKK, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East peace process
and relations with Russia. To date, the US has a similar document
only with India.
The Turkish public had been well prepared for Rice’s visit. On the
eve of the visit, all Turkish media reported that in the last years
the US has provided the Turkish armed forces with information
support, particularly, through the Echelon global surveillance
system. Even though most of this information was about PKK (it was
due to this very source that the Turkish armed forces held a series
of successful operations in Turkey’s south-eastern regions in
March-April), Rice did not give a specific yes to Turkey’s request
to stifle PKK’s positions in Northern Iraq or to let it do it
itself. At the same time, she hinted that the US may close its eyes
on this, i.e. on a Turkish military operation in Northern Iraq. It’s
noteworthy that Turkey launched this operation while Rice was still
in its territory. So, we can say that the US has, in fact, given a
sanction to it.
One more interesting circumstance is that before coming to Ankara
Rice had signaled that she supports Turkey’s position on Cyprus,
thereby, paving the way for her talks in Ankara. Particularly, in
Athens she said that Turkey is already a European country and that
the Republic of Cyprus should do its best to make Turkey’s EU
membership a reality. Ankara made a response gesture: it turned down
Iran’s request for National Security Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit
to Turkey. The Turks advised Larijani to put off his visit for early
May, i.e. after Rice’s visit. They may well act as a go-between at
the talks with Larijani by telling him what the US has said. This is
quite typical of Ankara: to get most of the tensions between two
allies and to act as a negotiator between them.
Yet one more interesting circumstance is that Turkey had launched
its all-time big anti-Kurdish military campaign exactly by the time
of Rice’s Ankara visit. Fearing Europe’s anger, Turkey had, thereby,
tried to “legitimize” its action. Turkey’s goal is to curb the
activity of Kurds in its south-eastern regions, to provoke them into
counter-action and, allowed by the US, to track the fighters down to
Northern Iraq and to put things in order there. This is, in fact,
the repetition of the campaign it held in the Saddam times.
The events of the last week have confirmed this conclusion. Turkey
was holding its campaign while Rice was talking with Turkish leaders
in Ankara and had crossed the Iraqi border when Rice was still in
the Turkish capital. Apr 26-27 night, after being informed that
fighters from the PKK training camps in Khaftanin and Metina
(Northern Iraq) were planning to infiltrate into the Turkish
territory, the Turkish army launched a preventive attack, threw back
the enemy and pursued it into the Northern Iraqi territory. Armed
with night vision cameras, the Turkish soldiers liquidated the
covers of the Kurds.
The chief of Turkey’s general staff, Gen. Hilmi Ozkok refused to
answer any questions. Instead, Ms Rice “calmed down” the Iraqi
authorities by saying that Turkey was not going to cause damage to
Iraq but was only trying to destroy PKK bases. US Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld said the same. This means that when in
Ankara Rice gave consent to Turkey’s operation in Northern Iraq. We
can’t yet give all the reasons of this consent but, undoubtedly, it
was the result of a trade.
The next day Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul confirmed that
Turkish troops had violated the Turkish-Iraqi border but said that
the Iraqi authorities protested in vain (the note of protest handed
by Iraqi Ambassador to Turkey Umran Sabah) as “the destruction of
PKK fighters in the territory of Northern Iraq is good for Baghdad
too.” “For as long as Iraq is unable to guard its own borders, we’ll
do it ourselves,” Gul said. This statement shows how confident
Turkey is in this matter. It undertakes to protect the border of a
neighbor country without its consent and, in the meantime occupies,
part of its territory. Obviously, Washington has not only agreed to
but also guaranteed Turkey’s actions.
In his turn, the leader of the Iraqi Democratic Party of Kurdistan
Masud Barzani refuted the fact of Turkish invasion into Iraq. This
shows that, sacrificed by the US once again, the leaders of Iraqi
Kurdistan are trying to save their faces. Meanwhile, the Turkish
troops are reported to have gained control over 20-km area in
Northern Iraq and to be holding a large-scale operation to destroy
PKK fighters. They have already destroyed the Zap training camp near
Ahmediye – 30 km deep into Iraq. During the operations Turkish
planes heavily bombed the PKK bases. Availing itself of the
opportunity, Turkey’s general staff has hurried to deploy a
110,000-strong corps on the border with Iran and to say that this
border is fully controlled. This may be part of Turkey’s
preparations for the anti-Iranian campaign.
Summing up the results of Rice’s visit to Ankara, we can say that
the US is pressing hard on Turkey so as to prevent the recurrence of
the Mar 2003 events, but, at the same time, it is catering for some
of Ankara’s major interests. According to confidential information,
Rice has demanded a straightforward answer from Turkey – “who is it
with: with the US or Iran?” The Turkish officials are pretending
they have given no specific promises to Washington yet and will act
in line with the UN Security Council’s resolution. But there are
facts that prove that during its secret talks with the DS and
Pentagon and earlier this year with Tel Aviv, Turkey showed that it
might well join the US and Israel.
Turkey’s key argument is the fear of its generals that a nuclear
bomb in the hands of Iran may break the balance of forces between
Ankara and Tehran. Turkish military analysts say that the
decades-long peace between Turkey and Iran is fragile and is based
on the parity of their armed forces. At the same time, the political
rulers of Turkey, namely, the pro-Islamist PJD, fear that strong
Iran may be a strong enemy in the struggle for sway in the Muslim
world and want to weaken it.
But given the growing anti-American moods and coming up elections in
the country, PJD would still like to get the UN SC’s sanctions for
the military campaign against Iran: PJD is careful in its policies
and is not going to say yes to whatever the US wants. Meanwhile,
Turkey’s General Staff, on the contrary, hopes that joint actions
with the US will help it to strengthen its position in own country
and to curb the further rise of Islamism there, particularly, to
prevent PJD leader Erdogan from becoming president.
This is proved by the following circumstances: (1) a number of
scandalous differences between PJD and US officials, particularly,
the premier’s advisor Zapsu’s appeal to Washington not to give up
PJD and Erdogan; and (2) the frequent visits of US representatives
to Turkey. So, we can assume that Rice’s promise of a new strategic
partnership treaty soon may well come from an agreement between
Pentagon and Turkey’s General Staff. And so, we can accept the view
of Turkish analysts about “a new stage” in Turkish-American
relations with one proviso: just like several years ago, the US and
Turkey will build their relations on the basis of military
cooperation. Ankara has two problems the US can help it to solve:
Cyprus and PKK. Rice’s Athens statement that Cyprus should do its
best for Turkey to become an EU member, the entry of Turkish troops
in Northern Iraq (something Ankara has been demanding for three
years already) and the US’ connivance in the matter show that Ankara
and Washington have, in principle, agreed on their cooperation over
several important directions, including over Iran.
The approval of Turkey’s entry into Iraq may also imply that the
sides have agreed on Kirkuk. Particularly, the Turkish prime
minister and foreign minister told Rice that this town is very
important in both internal political and regional terms and one
can’t leave it under the control of one ethnic group. By “ethnic
group” they obviously meant the Kurds.
There is a strong possibility that Washington is playing a
situational game with several players at once. Getting strong
support in Iraq in 2003, the US realized once again how important it
is to cooperate with the Kurdish Peshmarga. But, obviously,
Washington is not hurrying to give the Kurds official independence
so as to have something to offer the next time the Kurds may get
handy. In case of a campaign in Iran, the US will need not only
Turkey, but also Kurds: who will help it to keep up stability in
Iraq and to break stability in Iran through local Kurds. There is a
strong possibility that Kurds may be used by Iran. And so, by
letting Turkey into Northern Iraq, i.e. Kurdistan, Washington has,
on the one hand, dealt a card to Ankara but, on the other, secured a
card for itself – for promising at later meetings with Kurds that it
will urge Turkey to withdraw from Kurdistan if they promise to
cooperate over Iran. Ankara perfectly knows that the US’ approval of
its campaign in Northern Iraq does not yet mean approval of its
deployment in that territory.
So, obviously, in the next 10-15 the US’ foreign policy will be
focused on Middle East, Caspian Basin, Caucasus, Central Asia,
South-Eastern Asia. Apparently, the US still needs Turkey as a
military and political partner. Besides, Turkey is still the only
partner of Israel despite the recent tensions over the PJD’s
Islamist policies.
Turkey also needs the US. If Iran gets stronger, and the balance of
forces in the region is changed, Turkey will hardly be able to keep
its positions alone. Turkey is obviously conceding in its relations
with the US so as not to face Islamism tête-à-tête. Today it wants
Washington just to curb Iran but not to war with it. If a war starts
Turkey will hardly avoid being involved. But for the time being, it
is just trying to capitalize on the regional crisis.
At its regular monthly conference on April 27, Turkey’s National
Security Council focused on Turkey’s military campaign against PKK,
Rice’s contacts in Ankara and the new government and nuclear program
crises in Iraq and Iran, respectively. Particularly discussed was
the strategy of Turkish military operations on the other side of the
border. It’s noteworthy that after the 5.5-hour conference the
Turkish premier had a tête-à-tête meeting with Transport Minister
Yildirim, who had just come back from Iran. The council also
discussed internal political problems, particularly, the
strengthening of the Islamist policy.
Naturally, for us the dynamics of Turkish-American relations are
interesting mostly in terms of Turkey’s relations with Russia and
its role in the Caucasus. Having decisive rapprochement plans with
Turkey, the US, at the same time, demands that Ankara stop its big
plans with Moscow. Particularly, when in Ankara, Rice demanded that
Gazprom be removed from the 600 mln EUR project to connect the gas
networks of Turkey and Greece. She had earlier demanded the same in
Athens. Some sources say that Rice proposed replacing the Russian
gas by the Azeri one to be imported to Turkey via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
pipeline. This demand has upset Turkey’s plans to become a mediator
between Russia and Europe and to, thereby, show its importance for
the EU. But Turkey’s tighter relations with the US may lead to its
stronger positions in the Caucasus, particularly, in the South
Caucasus.
So, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, to
be launched in 2007, will link Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey even
tighter. In Ankara the US and Turkey might also discuss the building
of a railroad Kars (Turkey)-Tbilisi-Baku, particularly, the
possibility of US support in the project. If we add to this the talk
that Turkey may be given supervision over the South Caucasus, we may
well assume that very soon the Russian military bases in Georgia
will be replaced by Turkish troops under the NATO aegis. Then, by
forcing Georgia to populate the Turkish-Georgian borderline regions
with ethnic Turks (Meskhetins), the EU and the US will chain it up
to the West, with Ankara gaining bigger influence over Tbilisi’s
policy.
Ankara has repeatedly said that it is ready to become a mediator in
the Karabakh peace process. This would give Turkey the authority of
big regional force. Despite Armenia’s resistance, the US may well
involve Turkey in the process, though, initially, just as an
observer. As a resume, we should note that the unpredictability of
the developments over Iran and the further deepening of
Turkish-American relations are very negative factors for Russia’s
positions in the South Caucasus.
Prepared by experts of Caucasus Analytical Center
Regnum ru Top |
® 