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My starting point is that Turkey is one of the
slowest countries, especially compared to EU
members, to transform from an authoritarian and
dictatorial political system to a liberal democracy,
though it formally abolished its single-party system
before any former communist country that is now a
member of the EU, and even before reforms in Greece,
Spain and Portugal were introduced. The main reasons
are, and will remain for years, its Kemalist
ideology, institutions and political practices.
Kemalism, as a basic idea on which the Turkish state
is built, was a top-down and internally aggressive
modernizing nationalism. It denied the complexity
and diversity of the population of the remaining
Ottoman Empire. In sharp contrast to India after
independence, Kemal Ataturk and his followers
embarked on state-building that strongly emphasized
the transformation of society by creating a new one
in the image of an abstract idea rather than by
negotiating a state and a society that would reflect
the reality on which they were based. Its driving
impulse was to eliminate differences within the new
state through denial, assimilation, repression and
strong centralization instead of managing the
country's diversity, which would have allowed for
the plurality of ideas, identities and possible
solutions.
Ironically, several decades of denial of Islamic
identity ended up with an Islamist government
eagerly negotiating with the EU, through which it
hopes to create elements of freedom of religion in
Turkey. Several decades of aggressive denial of
plurality of identities, brutal repression and
assimilationist policies drove the country toward
militarization, military coups and several years of
military confrontation with the Kurds.
Most Kurds hope that, within the EU accession
negotiation process, imposed elements of liberal
democracy will provide grounds to find new solutions
for the Turkish (not Kurdish) problem in Turkey.
However, in the coming decade or so, Turkish
difficulties in adjusting to new conditions might,
and probably will, lead to tensions and
confrontations inside the country and with EU
negotiators, because many within the military, the
bureaucracy and the media are powerful enough to
protect and preserve the illiberal or anti-liberal
elements of Turkish nationalism.
Mensur Akgun:
Thank you very much for taking the lead in
initiating this discussion. I found some of your
comments and analysis agreeable and some
disagreeable. But since our intention in this
discussion is not "academic", I will not go into the
details of your comments and analysis. I don't think
we can reach a totally converging interpretation of
history.
What I would suggest is to emancipate ourselves from
the nationalist discourse of both the Kurdish and
Turkish kind. Let us take current conditions as
given and discuss ways to improve them. We shouldn't
lose time in instrumentalizing history for our
"nationalist" agendas. There seem to be
misunderstandings on both sides of the border. Let's
talk about them. We are destined to live together
and next to each other.
Moreover, considering the problems prevailing in
Iraq and the democracy deficit in the Kurdish part
of it, I would not bother myself so much with the
problems of democratization in Turkey. Please don't
get me wrong, but the current state of affairs is
not as gloomy as you portray it. There are, of
course, illiberal elements in this country, however
their impact is rather modest. If you follow the
results of the current debate between TUSIAD
(Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's
Association) and the prime minister, I am sure you
can give some credit to my progressive
interpretation.
For a better understanding of the democratization
attempts in Turkey, I would recommend that you check
the regular reports of the EU Commission. They are
rather impartial and summarize both progress and
setbacks.
However, just for the record, as a political
scientist I wouldn't compare Turkey with India or
with any failed state. I don't know what you mean by
functioning electoral democracy, either. But I
haven't seen any criticism directed toward the
electoral system in Turkey for quite some time,
though I may have to check the OSCE reports. If you
have any vindication of your passing reference, I
would be happy to know it.
On the other hand, you may be right with respect to
Kemalist ideology. Kemalism may have embarked on
state-building (and also nation-building) by
creating a new state in the image of an abstract
idea rather than negotiating a state and society
that would reflect the reality on which they were
based. But who didn't do the same while creating a
nation?
As I said, we can debate history forever and we can
try to support and base our positions with selective
information. But this doesn't lead us anywhere.
Let's be more concrete and exchange ideas on the
solution of the problems, most of which emanate from
misunderstanding.
Khaled Salih: I would like to pick up two
points in your response. My comparison with India is
based on the conspicuous contrast between India and
Turkey in terms of official ideology and "national
identity". While modern India is based on acceptance
and recognition of societal diversity, Turkey is
based on denial and suppression of differences.
Given the complexity of the Indian state and its
population, this huge country has been remarkable in
managing linguistic, religious, caste, ethnic,
national and regional differences.
In contrast, Turkey's strategy to eliminate Kurdish
nationalism, religious identity of various groups
and regional differences is a failure. Instead of
"unity through diversity" (India), Kemalists have
imposed unity through the elimination of differences
(a strategy adopted by authoritarian state-builders
in Europe between the 1920s and 1940s, as well as
communist regimes). Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and
post-Franco Spain are examples worth serious
consideration by Turkish politicians, activists and
academics in helping Turkey to become a liberal
democracy.
The second point is that I do not believe Turkey's
problems "emanate from misunderstanding". They are
the result of a specific ideology, as well as
specific institutional designs, policies and
political practices.
However, I do agree with you that Turkey needs to
solve these problems quickly and effectively. It is
in the interests of Europe and the peoples of
Turkey, as well as democracy, peace and stability.
The Turkish political system has witnessed a wide
range of changes in the past few years, which is
good but not enough. Turkey needs fundamental
transformation of its political system, a
transformation similar to the European Union's new
members and post-Apartheid South Africa, but not
post-communist Russia, meaning a constitutional,
institutional and mental revolution (or dramatic
evolution). The EU's accession negotiations provide
a golden opportunity for Turkey's urgently needed
transformation.
In relation to the Turkish problem with the Kurds,
Turkey should deepen and broaden its democratization
process to include the Kurds. A decentralized Turkey
does not mean weakness; as in Greece and Spain,
genuinely democratized systems that are linked to
the EU mechanisms of regional cooperation can in
fact strengthen the country. Group recognition can
be seen as a sign of strength. It is easier to
mobilize loyalty to a liberal democratic state based
on democratic citizenship, shared interests and
values, than to a system characterized by fear of
suppression and assimilation. Arrangements in the UK
to meet the demands of Scottish, Welsh and Irish
national aspirations should inspire the current
transformation in Turkey. Or, why not transform
Turkey of the post-Helsinki era into a multinational
and multilingual state (as in post-Franco Spain)
based on the right to autonomy of nationalities and
regions? Wouldn't that help Turkey create a society
of pluralism, tolerance, justice! , solidarity, and
non-discrimination, as expressed in the draft of the
EU's constitution?
Mensur Akgun: I
am afraid I wasn't able to convey my message to you
correctly. I didn't mean to criticize your
interpretation of history. You may be right in
comparing Turkey with India. Social sciences present
us with enormous possibilities when it comes to
choosing criteria for classification and clustering.
One can always find an excuse for comparison to
vindicate one's own view. Our literature is full of
selective political interpretations that don't lead
anywhere and merely solidify the usual nationalist
discourse.
As I suggested before, let's go beyond history and
talk about the current problems. Although I am not
as liberal as you are, I agree with you that Turkey
should change. Without doubt, Turkey's democracy
offers cause for much criticism. But stimulating
such a change will also require some sacrifices from
the Kurdish side. Kurdish intellectuals, including
yourself, should be ready to accept democratic
self-determination within the existing borders of
the countries they are living in. They should be
ready to condemn every form of terrorism and refrain
from extending support to organizations like the PKK.
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Accepting democratic self-determination doesn't
necessarily mean unconditional support for the
territorial integrity of Iraq. Other factors, such
as an untimely withdrawal of American troops, may
lead to a total collapse in Iraq or even to a civil
war, and the Kurds may have no option but to
establish their own independent state. If this
happens, the Kurdish state, for its own security and
economic prosperity, should find ways to reconcile
its differences with Turkey. Kurds in northern Iraq
can have no better friends in the region than their
northern neighbors.
Turkey with its large Kurdish population,
functioning democracy, secular tradition, EU
prospects, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe membership
and its political influence both in the region and
elsewhere can be the best country to rely on. Even
in a territorially intact Iraq, Kurds have a lot to
gain from Turkey's friendship. Needless to say, the
same is valid for Turkey too. Therefore for our next
round I suggest to focus on bridging the
differences, rather than on the differences
themselves, and definitely not on the interpretation
of history solidifying these differences.
Khaled Salih: I am not trying to find an
excuse for comparison to vindicate and solidify my
nationalist discourse. As a student of comparative
politics, I'm puzzled why India did not take a path
similar to Kemalism and why Turkey did not produce
ideas resembling Nelson Mandela's. These are
legitimate academic and intellectual points from
which one can learn a great deal.
I welcome democratic self-determination for the
Kurds within the existing borders of the Middle
East. None of my earlier suggestions addressed
border issues. I am concerned with internal
political systems and orders. A liberal democratic
political order in Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria will
much more easily deal with sensitive issues such as
language, nationality, multiple identities,
self-government, land rights, recognition of and
compensation for past injustice, "national"
security, shared sovereignty and issues of violence.
It is not difficult to agree with you that a Turkey
tied to EU processes is the best option for
Kurdistan in Iraq. In order to build trust among
Kurdish leaders, Turkey's politicians and military
bureaucracy should abandon the dual strategy of
threatening the entity while offering themselves as
its only viable ally. A secular and democratic
Kurdistan will be an asset to Turkey because it can
function as a buffer-zone against Islamic radicalism
in the Arab part of Iraq. Such an entity would
certainly contribute to strengthening the democratic
trend in the region. If Turkish politicians publicly
accept Kurdistan as a divided territory, acknowledge
the trans-state character of Kurdish
self-determination, provide a democratic space for
Kurds to express themselves freely, and relinquish
discussing Kurdishness and Kurdistan as acts of
treason, then Kurdish moderate and democratic
parties and organizations would help to marginalize
radical groups, as we have seen among the Basques.
There is momentum for a dramatic move now. How about
Turkey's prime minister announcing (paraphrasing the
Turkish foreign minister's recent move on the issue
of Cyprus): "There are only two options on
Kurdistan. We can either leave the problem frozen as
it is, which benefits nobody, or we can move
forward. The Kurds are not doing anything to find a
solution, so we have come forward with an idea that
responds to the expectations of the EU and the UN.
Representatives of Kurdish organizations in all
parts of Kurdistan and concerned governments in the
region are invited to a conference in Ankara, under
the auspices of the EU and UN. I'm sure we will find
an inclusive, peaceful and democratic mechanism
sooner than we anticipate."
Mensur Akgun: I
think we are approaching a common understanding. I
am glad to see you are talking and writing on
democratic self determination where each and every
individual can decide on his or her own political
fate at the ballot box, within the existing borders
of the countries of the region. I also believe that
you renounced violence, although not unconditionally
as one might expect from a liberal democrat.
I hope I am wrong, but it seems to me that the only
remaining difference between us is in the
instrumentality of the ballot box. I tend to believe
that elections and democracy are not a means to an
end but, when implemented properly, an end in
themselves. As far as I read your comments, you seem
to see them in your case as a means to national
ends. Your emphasis on the trans-border character of
Kurdish self-determination reminds me of a
pan-Kurdish nationalist ideology. I am ready to
support every right envisaged in the treaties and
constitutions, but my support will stop at any type
of nationalist ideology, including Turkish.
It is indeed true that we have to have liberal
democracies in all these countries you named.
However, as you will see through your own experience
in Iraq, if not in northern Iraq, wishing to have a
liberal democracy is not the same as actually having
it. Conducting fair elections does not necessarily
mean liberal democracy. Even if you sign all the
international treaties protecting liberties and
become a member of all the possible international
organizations, internalizing the norms of liberal
democracy may take time.
I agree with your comment that Turkey's politicians
and military bureaucracy should take further steps
toward the Kurds in Iraq (indeed, I have written
extensively on this very issue in the Turkish
press). Governments can take bold decisions, but
public resistance should also be taken into account.
In democratic societies one should always consider
the opposition. I also agree with the essence of
your suggested announcement. But no prime minister,
including Erdogan, can be expected to commit
domestic political suicide. The Cyprus and Kurdish
issues are both major issues in Turkey now, but they
are fundamentally quite different.
As I previously indicated, change will come
incrementally though mutual understanding and
confidence building. May I once more suggest that
for our next round of correspondence, you write
about any indicator or development that might boost
confidence on this side?
Khaled Salih: My sense is that you are
retreating from your initiative for
self-determination because you avoid considering a
rearrangement of the political order even within the
existing borders by confining the concept to
individual rights. You know very well that Kurds in
Turkey are denied basic rights because they are
Kurds, otherwise how can you explain that the
Kurdish language, names and even letters, such as in
Newroz (officially only allowed as Nevroz), have
been forbidden for so many decades despite reform
attempts in Turkey? A Turkish woman can be called
Turkan, but a Kurdish woman named Kurdistan is still
denied the right to travel with Turkish Airlines,
let alone to enter Turkey or register with that
name.
You label my note on the trans-state character of
Kurdish self-determination as a pan-Kurdish
ideology, but seem to suggest that idolatry of
artificial borders is a neutral proposition. People
are free to worship whatever they prefer, but
remember that at the beginning of 1900 there were
roughly 25 entities (states) in our world, while 100
years later the number has risen to 200. These are
human creations and subject to change. The ultimate
question is under what conditions these entities can
be maintained or altered: whether they break up
violently (Yugoslavia) or peacefully
(Czechoslovakia); whether they are rearranged
peacefully (Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada), or
violently (Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey in the 1980s
and 1990s). I prefer a peacefully renegotiated
political order in Turkey.
You may think that the cases of Cyprus and Kurdistan
are not comparable, but I think differently. It is
about finding viable and peaceful solutions for
fundamental conflicts, irrespective of international
recognition (Cyprus) or denial (Kurdistan). The
first case is about the external ambition of a state
(irredentism), the second about internal hegemony
and domination (Marxists call it internal
colonialism). Recognition is the first step toward a
constructive solution. Neither Mandela nor the
apartheid leaders committed political suicide by
agreeing to create a new political order in South
Africa.
If you believe that Erdogan should avoid political
suicide, then I suggest that TUSIAD organize an EU-supported
confidence-building conference to identify the basic
problems and propose mechanisms and procedures for
finding a peaceful solution for the Turkish-Kurdish
conflict in Turkey. There are peaceful Kurdish
institutions, organizations and individuals willing
to contribute, but I suggest the conference be held
in Brussels so that participants are not arrested
and don't face the same charges as Orhan Pamuk the
moment they refer to southeast Turkey and northern
Iraq as Kurdistan.
Mensur Akgun: It
seems that we will not be able to bridge our
differences even in this last round. Yet it was a
great pleasure to exchange ideas with you. We
certainly need more time to develop a common vision
and a better understanding of each other's position.
I have a few final comments, or rather
clarifications.
Let me begin with borders. As you well know,
questioning the authenticity of borders is a process
that invites chaos and turmoil. Territorial
integrity and the inviolability of borders are
almost sacred in international law. You and I can
easily name tens of international instruments
referring to the fundamental value of the interstate
system. If the aim of collective self-determination
is human emancipation, this can be achieved in a
democracy via respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
With regard to conferences with peaceful Kurdish
institutions, they are already taking place. For
instance, in early March the Helsinki Citizens
Assembly of Turkey and the Empathy Group organized a
major conference on the Kurdish question at Istanbul
Bilgi University. Turks and Kurds debated the
problem and nobody has so far been arrested.
Needless to say, this was not the only conference
organized on this subject. But of course, I don't
have any objection to organizing a conference in
Brussels.
Your reference to the Orhan Pamuk case seemed to me
an attempt to demonize Turkey in the eyes of our
readers. The case was filed against him by a group
of nationalist lawyers and was subsequently found
inadmissible in court. Like any other democratic
country, Turkey unfortunately has its fanatics who
equate anything they don't like with treason. With
further democratization, I am sure their voices will
be heard less and their influence will drop.
Finally, I hope Kurds on both sides of the border
will support Turkey in her efforts to democratize,
and will denounce the use of force, that is to say
terrorism, as a means to political ends. There are
plenty of Kurds in Turkey and obviously more on the
other side of the border.
I look forward to meeting you soon.
Mensur Akgun is the foreign policy director of TESEV,
the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation.
He is associate professor of political science at
Kultur University, Istanbul, and columnist for the
daily Referans. Khaled Salih is a senior lecturer in
Middle East politics at the University of Southern
Denmark. He is coeditor (with Brendan O'Leary and
John McGarry) of The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
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